

Gated

Practical Discourses Upon the **BEATITUDES** Of our LORD and SAVIOUR **JESUS CHRIST.**

VOL. I.

WITH
Three other Volumes of
PRACTICAL DISCOURSES
upon several Divine Subjects.

By JOHN NORRIS, M. A. Rector of
Bemerton near Sarum.

The FIFTEENTH EDITION.



L O N D O N :

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To my much Honour'd
Friend and Patron
JOSEPH LANGTON, Esq;

S I R,

IS a Maxim of Prudence given by some of the Nicer Describers of the Bounds of *Gratitude*, That it ought to be temper'd between a total Neglect and a full and just Requital. To strike off *all Scores* is, they say, as uncivil as to discharge *none*, and every whit as disingenuous not to *suffer*, as not to acknowledge an Obligation.

Now, Sir, 'tis one of the proper Happinesses of my little Fortune to be necessarily cast upon this Measure I am got too far in your *Accounts* to be able to requite to the full; some part of them I must ever leave *uncrossed* as a standing *Hold* upon me; and tho' my *Gratitude* it self be never so strong and pregnant, yet the most forward Instance of it can rise no higher than an *Acknowledgment*.

The Epistle Dedicatory.


AND as this is the utmost I can do, so of doing this too I have so few Capacities and Opportunities, that I am the less willing to let go any that offer themselves ; which indeed has given a speedier Issue to my Deliberation, whether I ought to Address these Discourses to your Patronage or no, which perhaps without the Formality of a *Dedication*, would of Right belong to you, as falling within your District, and as being the Fruits of that Retirement which by your *Free Bounty* I enjoy.

As an Acknowledgement therefore of this and your other constant Favours, I presume to put these Discourses into your Hands, which I hope will be able to do both *You* and *Me* that Justice, as to convince the World, that as you proceeded by generous and uncorrupt Measures in disposing of this Publick Trust, so you was not altogether mistaken in your Choice, when you thought fit to Oblige


Your Humble Servant,

*Newton St. Loe.
April 21. 1690.*

JOHN NORRIS.



TO THE READER.

 HERE commend to thy serious Perusal a Set of Select Discourses upon the Beatitudes, which were at first undertaken, and are now publish'd for the Publick Benefit of all well-disposed Christians. The Subjects themselves are as Great and Noble as any perhaps that occur in all Practical Divinity, being the Prime and Capital Aphorisms of our Saviour's excellent Sermon upon the Mount, and containing the Fundamental Principles of all Christ's Practical Instructions, and of a true Christian Temper and Life.

Here we may see (what the Philosopher so much desir'd) the true Living Idea of Virtue and Goodness; nay more, what 'tis to be a Christian, an Interiour Christian, a Christian indeed. And I heartily wish that those whose Orthodoxy is chiefly employ'd in giving out Marks and Signs of Conversion and Saintship, wherein their End seems rather to be the distinction of a Party, than any real Promotion of Godliness, would choose rather to dress their Interiour by this Glass, and afterwards try it by this Measure.

To the READER.

sure. For here they will find that Real Christianity consists in Poverty of Spirit, Humility, Self-denial, Mortification, Meekness, Mercifulness, Purity of Heart, Peaceableness, and such like inward Dispositions of Soul, and not in a few outward Formalities, Sighs and Groans, Looks and Postures, Words and Phrases, and such other affected Badges of a fond Distinction.

And as the Subjects themselves are Great and Noble, so I hope these Discourses will be found in some measure to rise up to their Dignity. I am sure there has been no Care wanting on my part to make them worthy of their Subjects, to which I have endeavour'd to do the utmost Justice. But however I may fail of that, yet I hope the Reader will not be altogether disappointed of his Expectations, or repent of his Labour, but will find here sufficient Entertainment both for his Speculation, and for his Devotion.

It may perhaps be a Surprize to some to see me appear again so soon in publick. To this, if there needs any Apology, that which I shall offer is, That if these Discourses be not worthy of publick View, then 'tis not fit they should ever be sent abroad; but if they be, I cannot understand how they can be publish'd too soon. The Truth is, considering the shortness and uncertainty of Life, I have been lately very much of Opinion, That a Man can never live too fast, (the Heathen will tell you Never fast enough) nor make too much haste to do good; especially when a Man's Sphere is such, that he has but Few Ways and Opportunities of doing

To the READER.

doing it, which by Experience I am well convinc'd to be my case.

I am afraid (where-ever the fault lies) that it will not be my Happiness to be able to do that good where I am, which I might have done in some other Station. Which makes me the more frequent in Publick, that I may supply this Defect by the Service of my Pen, having some Reason to hope that my Discourses will meet with better liking Abroad, than they usually do at Home ; and that there are some in the World to whom I shall not be a Barbarian.

What has been here the Performance of my Pen, was (as I learn from Dr. Rust) intended, and in part performed by the excellent Bishop Taylour, who while he was meditating upon the Beatitudes, was receiv'd up into the Enjoyment of them. And I have lately spoken with a Gentleman, who told me, That he himself saw a Manuscript of it in the Bishop's own Hand. I am very sensible how much the Subject has lost by the Change of its Author. All that I can say is, That I have done my Best, and I hope God will accept of my good Intention, and that the World will be something the better for my Performance.

John NORRIS.

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Christian Blessedness:
OR,
DISCOURSES
UPON THE
BEATITUDES.

VOL. I.

DISCOURSE the First.

MATT. V. Ver. iii.

*Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs
is the kingdom of heaven.*



HUS the Divine Angel of the Covenant, Christ Jesus, begins that Great and noble Institution of Christian Philosophy, his Sublime Sermon on the Mount. This was he that was pointed at by the eminent Prophecy, *I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth,*

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and

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and he ſhall ſpeak unto them all that I ſhall command him, Deut. 18. And now it was that this Prophesy had its full Accompliſhment; Christ was now entring upon his Prophetick Office, and was to ſhew himſelf a Prophet like unto Moses. This great Trust he diſcharged with as great Care and Fidelity, and (as the Author to the Hebrews obſerves) was faithful to him that ap-pointed him, as alſo Moses was faithful in all his house, Heb. 3. 2. As therefore Moses gave a Digest of Laws to the People with whom he was intruſted, ſo it became this Divine Prophet alſo to give Laws and Precepts for the Inſtructi-on and Order of his Disciples. He was to be a Law-giver, as well as Moses; and to carry on the Proportion yet farther, he thought fit to imitate him in the very Manner and Circum-ſtance of delivering his Law, and, according-ly ascended up into a Mountain, from whence he ſhow'd down his Heavenly Manna upon his Hearers: So alſo making good another Instance of Reſemblance relating to Moses, who ſpeaks thus of himſelf, *My doctrin ſhall drop as the rain, my ſpeech shall diſtil as the dew; as the ſmall rain upon the tender herb, and as the showers upon the grass*, Deut. 32. 2.

Bur the Parallel will not run throughout: For the Divine Oracles were not now accom-panied with *Thundrings* and *Lightnings*; with *Blackness*, and *Darkneſſe*, and *Tempeſt*; but were deliver'd in the ſmall ſtill Voice of *Bleſſing* and *Conſolation*. 'Twas with a Beatitude that David began his Collection of Divine Hymns; and in like manner does the Son of David usher in his ſublime Inſtructions. And this was very ſuitable and

and agreeable, both to the Character of his Person, and to the Genius of his *Doctrin*. As to his Person, Blessing became the Mouth of him, who was the Reconciler of God and Man, the great Ambassador of Peace, the Author of Salvation and Happiness, and at whose Nativity the Angels sang Peace on Earth, and Good Will towards Men. And as to his *Doctrin*, The Precepts he was to deliver were of so refined and high-raised a Nature, so little agreeable either to the Maxims of the World, or to the grosser Relishes of the Animal Life, that they would have found but cold Entertainment, had they not come recommended with a Reward, and been guarded on each side with a Beatitude.

'T w a s requisite therefore that the *Duty* and the *Blessing* should go hand in hand ; and accordingly, our Lord, who well understood the Temper of the Sons of Men, how passionately we pursue any thing that looks like *Happiness*, and how apt we are to ask that Question, *Who will shew us any Good ?* thought it expedient to join them both together in his Discourse, as they will be in the *Event* ; and to pronounce them Blessed here, whom he intends to pronounce so hereafter, when he shall say, *Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world*, Mat. 25.

A N D the better to win us over to the Practice of his Divine Sermon, our Lord, like a wise Master-builder, lays the Foundation of his Discourse where we must lay that of our *Obedience*, and assigns the first Place among his Beatitudes to *Humility*, and Poverty of Spirit ; for *Humility* is the Foundation of *Obedience* : We must be

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first poor in Spirit, before we can be rich in Good Works ; first humble before we can obey ; and first obey before we can reign. And therefore with good Reason does our Lord lay down this as the first Principle and Ground-Work of his Institution, *Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.*

In my Discourse upon these Words I shall,

I. RESOLVE what we are to understand by Poor in Spirit.

II. SHEW that this Poverty of Spirit is a Christian Duty ; and the Reasonableness of it.

III. SHEW the Happiness of those who are so disposed.

As to the Resolution of the First, I consider, that this Poverty of Spirit here recommended by our Saviour, is not a State of *Life*, but a State of *Mind* ; and we may take it either in Opposition to *Covetousness*, or in Opposition to *Pride* and *High-mindedness*. If in Opposition to *Covetousness*, then to be poor in Spirit, is, to have our Souls so disposed, as, *First*, Not to be eagerly carried out in our Desires after any created Good ; particularly, the good Things of this lower World, whether Honours, Pleasures or Profit ; especially, not to be greedy and craving in our Desire of Riches, But *Secondly*, To be so moderately and indifferently affected towards all these, as to be well contented without them, and also ready to resign and part with them when either God shall think fit to deprive us of them, or when we can no longer retain them with a good Conscience. This is to be poor

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in Spirit, considered in Opposition to Covetousness. But it may also be considered as opposed to Pride or High-mindedness; and then to be poor in Spirit will denote, First, A just, that is, a low and mean Sense and Apprehension of our own selves, of our Souls, and of our Bodies; of our Intellectuals, and of our Morals; of our Acquirements, and of our Performances. And, Secondly, As a Consequent of this, a Contentedness whenever any or all of these are disesteemed or disparaged, either tacitly and interpretatively, by Affronts, and dishonourable Treatments; or else directly, by express Undervaluations, a Readiness to prefer others before our selves, and a Willingness that the same Preference should be given them by others; an utter Captivation of our Understandings to the Obedience of Faith, and a modest Submission of them, in all doubtful Cases, to the Dictates of our Superiors; a Declining of Fame and Popularity, and a studious Concealment of our own Praises and Excelencies; but when either the Glory of God, or the Good of our Brother is concern'd in the Publication. In short (to use the Description of the Psalmist) he is truly poor in Spirit, who from his Heart can say to the Searcher of Hearts, Lord, I am not high-minded, I have no proud looks; I do not exercise my self in great Matters, which are too high for me; but I refrain my soul and keep it low, like as a Child that is weaned from his mother: yea, my soul is even as a weaned Child, Psal. 131.

HAVING thus briefly shewn what it is to be poor in Spirit, both with respect to Covetousness, and with respect to Pride and High-mindedness, I come now, in the second Place, to shew,

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that this *Poverty of Spirit* is a Christian Duty; and withal, the greater Reasonableness of it. And, *First*, That *Poverty of Spirit*, according to the *first Acceptation* of it, is a Christian Duty, 'twould be Conviction enough to consider how often we are call'd upon in Scripture to withdraw our Affections from the Creature, *Colos. 3. 1.* *To seek those things which are above; to set our affection on things above, not on things of the earth; to mortifie our members which are upon earth;* among which is reckoned *inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is idolatry.* Again, We are bid to beware of *Covetousness*, *Luk. 12. 15.* and to have both our *Treasure* and our *Hearts* in *Heaven*; *Luk. 12. 33.* to be as indifferent in the very Enjoyment of any *Worldly Good*, as if we enjoyed it not, *i. Cor. 7. 29.* and if in the *Enjoyment*, then certainly much more in the *Desire*. *Lastly*, to add no more, We are cautioned by St. John not to love the *World*, neither the *Things* that are in the *World*. And lest we should take this only as a *Matter of Advice and Counsel*, not express *Command*, he farther adds, *If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him*, *i John 2. 15.*

But that 'tis a Christian Duty to be thus poor in *Spirit*, will be farther evident from the very *Nature* and *Design* of the Christian Institution. The grand Thing intended in the Christian Religion was, to reduce straying Man to his true *Good* and *Happiness*, to sublimate, refine and spiritualize his *Nature*, to loose him from the *Cords* of *Vanity*, and from his fast *Adhesions* to created *Good*: to purge him from

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all Earthly Concretions and Alloys ; to dis-engage and separate him, not only from the World about him, but even from one Part of himself : In one Word, to raise him from Earth to Heaven, not only by a *Local*, but by a *Moral* and *Mental* Elevation.

INDEED, 'twas much otherwise under the *Jewish Dispensation* : There was then great Indulgence afforded to the Animal Inclinations and Worldly Affections of Men ; and their very Religion was endeared to them by Temporal Promises and Blessings. Not that God intended hereby to express any Liking or Approbation of Covetousness and Earthly-mindedness, but only to comply with the Infirmity of that gross, stupid People, which rendered them incapable of being won upon by more noble Proposals. And besides, it being a received Notion among the Idolatrous Inhabitants of the Land, (as is observ'd by a late learned Author) that the Worship of their Idols, and false Gods, did procure them fruitful Seasons, and increase of all manner of Store ; it was in proportion requisite, that God also should promise *his* Votaries the like Worldly Affluence, to keep them from running over to the *Gentile Superstitions*.

UPON these, and the like Accounts much was indulged to the *Jewish State and People* : They were never expressly required to abstract their Desires from the Things of the World ; nor, unless they proceeded to covet *unjustly*, that is, what belonged to another, were they ever taxable for a *soo* Earthly and Downward Disposition

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Disposition of Soul. Not but that Earthly-mindedness was as much an Imperfection in it self as it is now, and was really forbidden according to the more retired and involute Sense of the Law; but the Letter did not reach it, because then was the Time and State of Imperfection; and it was the only Handle which that People could be took hold of by, whose Hardness of Heart was the Occasion of this, as well as of some other Indulgencies.

But now, they that shall think themselves obliged to no higher Measures of Perfection under the Christian State, know not what manner of Spirit they are of. Christ, as he has introduced a *better hope*, Heb. 7. 19. so has he annexed to it more excellent, and more exalted Precepts; and as his Kingdom was not, so neither is his Religion of this World. The Christian Law is *Lex Ignea*; a Law of Fire, a Law that purifies and refines, that warms, actuates and enlightens, that separates also and dissolves those strong Ties whereby the Soul sticks glued to the Earth. And therefore the Apostle calls the Christian Institution *the law of the Spirit of life*; Rom. 8. 2. and in another Place, *the ministration of the Spirit*, 2 Cor. 3. And what our Saviour said of some Words of his, may truly be applied to all, *The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life*, Joh. 6. 63.

THIS therefore being the Design of the Christian Dispensation, to perfect Holiness, to advance the Interest of the Divine Life, to elevate us to the utmost Degree of Moral Perfection our Nature is here capable of; and, as far

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far as is possible, to make us Partakers of the Divine, 'tis utterly inconsistent with the *End* of such a Law as this to suffer us to lie grovelling with our Faces on the Earth, to seek Rest and Happiness in Things more ignoble than our selves, and to grow one, as it were, with the dirty Planet upon which we live : We ought rather, (as the Philosopher speaks) *επ' οὐν καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸν πάρακλησιν*, aspire to the Measures of Immortality, shake off the Clogs of Earth that weigh us down, and make haste to be Angels as fast as we can. We are oblig'd by the *Design*, as well as by the *Rule* of our *Religion*, to be as loose from the Creature as may be, not to love the World, nor the Things of the World, whether the Lust of the Flesh, or the Lust of the Eye, or the Pride of Life ; but to be poor in Spirit, and empty of the Creature, that we may be rich towards God, and filled with the Fulness of him that fills all in all.

AND now that to be thus *poor in Spirit* is a *reasonable Duty*, as well as a *necessary one*, will sufficiently appear upon these two Grounds :

I. BECAUSE these Worldly Enjoyments are not our True Good.

II. BECAUSE they hinder and divert us from that which really is so.

THAT they are not our True Good is certain ; for, if they were, we should then find Rest and Satisfaction in them. But this we are so far from doing, that we are as dissatisfied under our Enjoyments, as without them. For, tho' by Fruition our Appetite be abated as to that particular

particular Object which we prosecuted, yet still we desire on farther, and our *general* Thirst after Happiness is as unsatisfied as ever : Which plainly argues, that our True Good is not to be found in these things, but that they are altogether *Vanity* and *Vexation*. To place therefore our Happiness in such Objects is utterly absurd, and against Reason, and argues us to be grossly ignorant of one of the two Things, either of *our selves*, or of the Things of the *World*. We are either ignorant of the Dignity and Excellence of our Natures, of the Designs and Ends of our Creation, and of the Strengths and Capacities of our Appetites, which can be satisfied with nothing less than Infinite : Or, if we do know and consider all this, then are we so much the more grossly ignorant of the World about us, to think there is any thing to be had in this Circle of *Vanity*, that may satisfie the Importunity of such craving and capacious Appetites. Poverty of Spirit therefore is reasonable, because the Things of the World are not our *True Good*.

But this is the least part of their Charge : They are not only insufficient to be our True Good themselves, but they also, *Secondly*, hinder and divert us from that which really is so. For, not to mention the many Snares and Temptations of a great Fortune, and what a dangerous thing it is to be always furnish'd with all the Possibilities and Opportunities of Sin and Folly ; I only observe, that the very desire of these Earthly Things diverts us, and takes us off from the Love of God. When our Love is divided, even among *Created Objects*, the Force of it will be much abated in respect of each ; but much more

more will the Love of the Creature diminish from the Love of God: For there is so vast a Disproportion betwixt the *Kinds*, as well as the *Degrees* of the two Goods, that he that once comes to relish one, will find but little Taste in the other. And therefore, says St. Austin, *Mor nemus ne mundum ametis, ut eum qui fecit mundum libere ametis*: Our Advice is, that you love not the World, that so you may love its Maker freely. The Truth is, to love God freely, we should love him entirely; for, every Advance we make towards the Creature, so much we recede from God; for these are two contrary Terms of Motion: And there is so great a Contrariety between the Love of God, and the Love of the World, that they do not only abase each other, but are in some Degrees utterly inconsistent. For so St. John, if any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him, Joh. 2. 15. And if this be the Consequence of loving the World, I think the less we have to do with it, the better; and that there is a great deal of Reason to be Poor in Spirit.

Thus far have we consider'd the Duty and Reasonableness of Poverty of Spirit, as it signifies an Indifferency of Desire to the Things of the World: I come now to consider it, as it denotes Humility, and Lowliness of Mind; whereof I am also to shew,

I. THE DUTY.

II. THE REASONABleness.

THE DUTY of Humility is plain in all the Scripture, but more frequently and earnestly inculcated

inculcated in the New Testament ; insomuch that it may be reckon'd among the *distinguishing* Doctrines of the Christian Religion. The Heathen Morals almost overlook'd it, and in the Old Testament Writings 'tis but sparingly recommended ; but in the Christian Institution we every where meet with it in Capital Characters, as a Precept of the first Magnitude, Jam. 4. 6. *God resisteth the Proud*, saith St. James ; and 1 Pet. 5. 5. *be ye cloathed with Humility*, says St. Peter. And our Lord himself, who was a perfect Example of all Moral and Divine Perfection, and in whom the Fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily, seems yet to commend himself to our Imitation, chiefly upon the Account of his *Humility* ; *Learn of me*, says he, *for I am meek, and lowly in heart*, Matth. 11. 29.

BUT there needs no Multiplication of Scripture for the Proof of this. I shall therefore only farther observe, That the greatest Personages that ever were in the World were always most eminent and conspicuous for this Excellency. Out of many, I shall select three Instances, which may well deserve our Consideration. The first shall be the great Fore-runner of our Blessed Saviour, the *Holy Baptist*. This Great and Holy Person, when the *Jews* sent Priests and *Lewites* from *Jerusalem*, to demand of him who he was, not only disclaim'd the Titles of *Christ*, of *Elias*, and of *that Prophet*, (this his humble Spirit was not content with) but went farther, and gave this strange and mortified Account of himself, *I am*, says he, *the voice of one crying in the wilderness*, Joh. 1. 23. The Prophet *David*, indeed, had said before of himself, *That he was a Worm, and* *nothing*.

no Man, Psal. 22. 6. And this, one would think, was a sufficient Stretch of Humility: But the *Baptist* speaks in a Strain below him, allowing himself to be no more than a *Voice*. The same holy Person thought himself unworthy to baptize his Saviour; nay, what makes that less admirable, not worthy so much as to unloose the very Latchet of his Shoes.

THE next Instance I shall mention, is the ever-blessed *Mother* of our *Lord*. She, if ever any Creature, had Cause to be *proud*: 'Tis impossible even to imagin a stronger Temptation. She was saluted by an Arch-Angel, said to be a Person highly favoured with God, and blessed among Women; and in particular, That she should be Mother to the Son of the Highest, and that too by the Power of the Most High. Was not here enough to betray a poor innocent Virgin into Pride and Vanity? Had the Angels half so much Reason for their Pride and Haughtiness, when they fell from the Heights of Glory? Well, how did she behave her self under the *dangerous* Salutation? Why, she seemed to make it rather Matter of *Obedience* and *Resignation*, than of *Triumphant* and *Boasting*. Behold, says she, *the hand-maid of the Lord: be it unto me according to thy word,* Luke 1. 38.

BUT the most stupendous Instance of Humility that ever was, or can be, was in the Person of our *Blessed Lord*; whether we consider him in the Mystery of his Incarnation, or in the mean Circumstances of his Birth, or in the humble Method of his Life; whether we consider him as emptying himself of his Eternal Glories, and drawing a Cloud over his Brightness; or as forbidding

bidding the Devils to publish his Divinity, and Men to declare his Miracles, and his Disciples to tell of his Transfiguration; or as washing his Disciples Feet, or as riding upon an Ass, or as conversing among Sinners; and lastly, chusing to die between Thieves. These, and many other Instances of Condescension, argue the most profound Humility that can be imagin'd; and withal, how concerned our Lord was to commend and endear this most excellent Duty to the Practice of Men. Of all the Virtues and Excellencies in the World, one wou'd have thought this of Humility least capable of being practised and exemplified by the Son of God. Commend it, indeed, he might by Precept, as well as any other, but sure, one would think, not by Example. But see what rare Arts and Mysteries God has found out to teach us this Lesson. And therefore we may well conclude, that there is Excellency and Necessity in it, as well as Difficulty; and how much it concerns us to learn, what God has been so peculiarly solicitous to teach.

IT is then a Christian Duty to be thus poor in Spirit: And the Reasonableness of it is as great as the Obligation. This I might shew from the good Consequences and happy Effects of this Disposition of Spirit; but this falling in more properly under the Third Partition of my Discourse, I shall for the present content my self with some other Consideration, taken from the Condition of Man; whom I shall consider,

I. As a Creature.

II. As a Sinner.

FIRST then, Man is a *Creature*, and this is a very reasonable Ground for Humility, and Poverty of Spirit. We usually think it a very *humbling* Consideration to re-mind a Person of the Meannets of his Original. But now, What Original can be so mean, as to be from *Nothing*? It is enough to take down the Spirit of the brightest Intelligence, to consider, that nothing was his Original; a State more vile and dishonourable than the Chaos it self. Now, this is the Condition of Man: He had his Rise from nothing, and derives his Pedigree, by his *Mother's Side*, from *Darkness*. and *Emptiness*: And though now, by the Omnipotency of his Creator, he is something; yet still he holds his Being as precariously as he first received it, and depends as much for his Existence upon the Will of his Creator, as Light does upon the Sun, or the Image in the Glass upon the Presence of the Body. If God does but turn his Face from him, and cease to behold him, he will vanish into nothing. God spake the Word, indeed, before he was made, but to unmake him there needs no *contradictory Fiat*; he need only be *silent*, and not sustain him by the *Word of his Power*. And shall that Being be proud, which was once Nothing, and has still such a *Natural Bent* towards *Annihilation*, as to need only a bare *Negative* to make him Nothing again? No, says the Wise Man, *Pride was not made for man, nor furious anger for them that are born of a woman*. Man must forget his Extraction to give the least Admittance to Pride; and he need but study and consider that, to have the most *inward* and *feeling* Sense of Humility.

THIS

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THIS Consideration is yet farther improvable, if we admit the Hypothesis of those who say, that to be a Creature involves a State of Nothing, as well as an *Origination* from Nothing; that there is nothing *Real* or *Positive* in any Creature, but what is from God; and that tho' a Creature be something as of God, yet he is nothing as of himself, nor can exert any positive *Act* or *Operation* from himself, as a distinct Principle of Action; being still, as to *that*, as much a *Nothing* as before. If this be true, (and

Lib. 4. Cogitat. Ration. de
Deo, p. 574.

he that shall consider, and well understand, what is alledged by *M. Poiret*, in Defence of this Notion, will scarce find it in his Power to think otherwise) certainly Man has infinite Reason to be *poor in Spirit*, and to descend into the lowest Abyss of Humility and *Self-Abdication*, as becomes a Being that not only *was once*, but *is still a mere Nothing*.

MAN therefore, as a *Creature*, has sufficient Reason to be humble, and *poor in Spirit*. But if we consider him *2dly*, as a *Sinner*, he has Cause, not only to be humble, but to lie down flat upon his Face, and look upon himself to be more base and vile than the very Dust whereof he was formed, and whereon he treads. To be a Sinner is much more vile than to be the meanest Creature; and the Non-Entity of *Sin* is more dishonourable than that of *Nature*. This latter, tho' it cannot actually conform, yet it is not disobedient to the Will of God: But the former *Nothing* contradicts and *refists* his Will. This is, as I think one of the Fathers calls it, *Nihil Rebelle, & in Deum armatum, an Armed Nothing*. Indeed, to be a Creature, involves

involves Weakness and Imperfection in it ; but then it also involves Good, because nothing can be, but by partaking of the Perfection of God. But now, to be a Sinner involves nothing but pure and unmixed Evil ; and is withal, a farther remove from Good than to be nothing, since it is, not only *negatively*, but *contrarily* opposed to it. 'Tis indeed the greatest Monstrosity and Deformity in the World, the greatest Contradiction to Order and Harmony, to Reason and Proportion, to Well-being and Happiness : In one Word, 'Tis the only thing which God hates. What great Reason then has Man to be humble, and poor in Spirit ; poor even to Emptiness, and Self-Annihilation, who is not only a *Creature*, but a *sinful Creature* !

HAVING now shewn the Duty and Reasonableness of Poverty of Spirit, in the full latitude of the Word, I proceed to shew, in the Third Place, the Happiness of those who are so disposed. *Blessed are the poor in spirit*, says our Saviour, *for theirs is the kingdom of heaven*. That's the only Blessedness which is here expressly mentioned : But they are happy also in other regards : For, in the first place, What an happy Disposition of Soul must it be, always to carry about one such a strong and lively Conviction of the Vanity of all created Good, as not to run out into vehement Desires after it ? For, Desire it self, to go no farther, is always a great Torment : 'Tis the same to the Soul, that *Thirst* is to the Body : and *Hope deferr'd* (as the Wise Man tells us) *makes the heart sick*, Prov. 13. But that is not all; for here will come in the Trouble of *Disappointment*, as well as of *Desire* : Not that which the

World generally understands by Disappointment, the not compassing what you design'd, (tho' that also will often happen) but the not *enjoying* what you have compassed, the *Disappointment of Fruition*.

BUT now, to be *poor in Spirit* is the Way to avoid all this. Such a Person expects no Happiness from the Creature; and consequently, not to find it there, will be to him no Disappointment. He does not lean upon any created Good with any *Stress*; and therefore, tho' it should fail under him, his Fall will be but slight and *easie*. And, indeed, it is not to be imagined what a deal of Anxiety, Care, Restlessness, Disappointment, Sorrow, fruitless Labour and Endeavour are saved by this Poverty of Spirit. And I think this is no small Degree of Happiness.

AGAIN, Is it not a great Happiness to be so moderately and indifferently affected towards the World, as to be contented with any Condition in it? to be of a quiet, sedate, resigned and disinterested Disposition? He that is thus disposed, is above, or rather below the reach of calamitous Accidents. The Storm flies over his Head, he has nothing for Fortune to take hold of: Nor will he be under the Hazard of parting with his Religion to secure his worldly Interest. No; he can do his Duty, tho' at the Expence of Martyrdom; and tho' highly *deserving* of the best Times, may yet be *trusted* in the worst.

THEN as to the Happiness attending upon Poverty of Spirit, as it stands for Humility, there is no one Virtue that is more her own Reward than this: Pride is the most *uneasie* thing in

in the World ; and withal, the most odious ; uneasie to the Patient, and odious to the Observer. And, as it is uneasie in it self, so is it the Parent of many troublsom and uneasie Passions ; such as Anger, Contention, Revenge, Envy, Impatience, &c. So that it is hard to determin whether the proud Man be more ridiculous or miserable.

But now, to be humble, is to be wise, to understand the true Proportion and Measure of a Creature, to be serene, to be contented, to be thankful, to be pleasant and chearful, to be calm and untroubled, to be dispassionate and unconcerned. In short, No Man enjoys what he really is, so much as he that does not fancy himself what he is not. And besides, the humble Man is sure to get that very Honour which he declines, and because he declines it. I end this with the Observation of *Plato*, That a Man that does not rightly know himself can neither be prudent, good, nor happy ; which is all that goes to the Perfection of Man : And he that does, is sure to be all this.

Thus far of the Happiness belonging to the two Kinds of Poverty of Spirit severally. There remains yet one more belonging to them both in common ; and that is, the Kingdom of Heaven, which I suppose to comprehend both Grace and Glory. As to Grace, we are told by the Apostle, that God has chosen the poor in this World to be rich in faith. And in the same place where God is said to resist the Proud, he is said also to give Grace to the Humble, Jam. 4. 6. Indeed, Humility is the proper Foundation of Grace, and the Theatre of all Divine Operations. This State of Nothingness, and Self-emptiness, is as much a

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Preparation to the New, as the *Void* and *Inform* Space was to the Old Creation : 'Tis the true and proper *first Matter* in the Spiritual World, into which the Form of the *New Creature* will be introduc'd : And if Man does but contain himself in this *Nothing*, God will not fail to work All, and to be All in him ; having promised his Special Presence to the Man of an *humble Spirit*, Isa. 57. 15.

THEN, as for Glory, 'tis highly equitable, that they who have humbled themselves here, should be exalted hereafter ; and that they who have renounced this World, should have their Portion in the next. And to convince the flow-hearted and distrustful World, that thus it shall be, God has already given a Specimen of it, in the Example of his Son, who was particularly eminent for this double Poverty of Spirit ; for renouncing the World, and for debasing himself ; whom therefore God has highly exalted, giving him a name above every name, Phil. 2. 9. and has also placed him on his own Right-Hand, *Angels, and Authorities, and Powers being made subject unto him*, 1 Pet. 3. 22.

DISCOURSE

DISCOURSE the Second.

MATTH. V. Ver. iv.

Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.



HEY are the Words of him who was himself a Man of Sorrows, and acquainted with Grief ; and who was also acquainted with *Happiness* too, with the Joys of Religion, with the Refreshments of Angels, with the Antepasts of Glory, and with that Peace of God which now passes all Understanding, and shall hereafter satisfie all Desire : He had tasted of both Cups, the *Cup of Trembling*, and the *Cup of Salvation* : He had tried both the Miseries of Human Nature, and the Glories of the Divine ; and so well knew what Proportion the Consolations of God have to the Infelicities of Man ; and how little the Sufferings of this present Time are, in comparison of the Glory that shall be reveal'd to them that with Meekness bear them, and with Fru fulness improve under them. He therefore having tried both the *Worſt*, and the *Best*, must needs be a proper Judge in the Case, whether Happiness may consist with Affliction, or no. And he is so far from discouraging his Disciples

from treading in the same thorny, rugged Way that he did, that he rather gives them all the Invitation in the world to do so; casts a Glory round the Head of the Sorrowful, and represents Grief as a very lovely thing, by telling them, that *Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.*

BUT are *all* those blessed that mourn? And does Grief entitle all that are under its Dominions, to Happiness and Consolation? This, indeed, wou'd be good News to this our World, where there is so much of it; which is a Valley of Tears, and a Region of Sadness; where there are a Thousand Sighs, for one Smile; and where *the mourners go about the streets,* Eccl. 12. 5. But it is not all Mourning that comes within the Circle of this Beatitude; nor shall all that sow in Tears, reap with Joy. As there are some that sorrow without Hope, so there is some kind of Sorrow, concerning which we can hope nothing. There is a Sorrow that proceeds from no Human and Moral Principle, but from Natural and Necessary Causes; as from the Influence of External Impressions, from the Grossness of the Spirits and Blood, from Melancholy, and the like. Again, There is a Sorrow, which tho' of an Human and Moral Extraction, yet springs from no good or laudable Principle, but is altogether of a neutral and indifferent Nature. Again, There is a Sorrow that proceeds from an ill Principle; as, from Malice, Envy, Covetousness, Ambition, Servile Fear, and the like: And which tends also to an ill End; as, to Revenge, Impatience, Despair, &c. Accordingly the Apostle

Apostle tells us of a *Worldly Sorrow*, and of a Sorrow that worketh *Death*, 2 Cor. 7. So far is all Mourning from being Christian Mourning, or from giving us a just Title to this Beatitude.

HERE therefore it will concern us to consider Three Things :

I. THAT there is such a Thing as the Duty of Christian Mourning.

II. WHO these Christian Mourners are.

III. WHEREIN consists their Blessedness.

AND First, I say, there is such a thing as *Christian Mourning*. This must needs seem a strange Paradox to the Philosophy of those who make the Pleasures of the Animal Life the End of Man, and think that now we have nothing to do but to enjoy them, and that God sent *Man* into the World to the same Purpose as he plac'd the *Leviathan* in the Sea, only to take his Pastime therein. 'Twould be but a cold Employment to go about to convince such Men, either of the *Necessity*, or of the *Blessedness* of Mourning ; whose Answer would be in the Language of those Sinners in the Book of Wisdom, *Come on, let us enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the creatures, as in our youth. Let us fill our selves with costly wine, and ointment ; and let no flower of the spring pass by us. Let us crown our selves with rose-buds before they be withered, let none of us go without his part of our Voluptuousness, let us leave tokens of our joyfulness in every place ; for this is our Portion, and our lot is this.*

THIS is the Style of the *Epicurean School*. And there are also some Christians, who, tho' they do not make the Pleasure of the Animal Life their End, Lot and Portion, as do the other, yet they think they may allow themselves a great Scope and Compass in it, that they may indulge themselves to the full in all the Mirth and Jollity of the World, and that there is no need of any such thing as Mourning in *Sion*. These Men seem to have the same Notion of Christ's Religion, that the Jews had of his Person. They look'd upon him under the Character of a great Temporal Prince ; and dreamt of nothing under his Reign but Victories, and Triumphs, and Festivals, and Vine-yards, and Olive-yards. And so some think of his Religion. They look upon it as a fine, gay, secular, jolly Profession ; as a State of Freedom and Emancipation, of Ease and Pleasantness ; as if the Children of the Kingdom had nothing to do, but to eat, drink, and be merry, and that Mourning had no more place in *This*, than it is to have in the *New Jerusalem*, wherein, as the Evangelical Prophet tells us, *All tears shall be wiped away from mens eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, nor any more pain*, Rev.

21. 4.

It is, indeed, most certain, that Religion has its Joys and Pleasures, and that the Christian Religion has the most of any, and that they are such too as by far transcend all others ; that the best Life is also the most pleasant Life ; and that 'tis worth while to live well, if it were only for the meer Pleasure of doing so.

And

And there is a great deal of Truth
in that noble Saying of *Hierocles*,
μὲν πόνος τῷ καλῷ, &c. The good Man
excels the wicked Man, not only in
Goodness, but also in Pleasure it self; for whose Sake
only the other is wicked. Nay farther; The Plea-
sures of good Men are not only greater than
those of ill Men, but such as they cannot enjoy
or relish, and have no manner of Notion of,
As there are some Things of God, so there are
Pleasures of Religion, which the Animal Man
does not perceive: For the secret of the Lord is
with them that fear him, and the stranger does not
intermeddle with their joy. Nay, farther yet, No
Man has any Ground or Pretence for Rejoi-
cing, but a good Man. 'Tis the most usurp-
ing and daring Piece of Impudence in the
world, for an ill Man to laugh, or be merry,
What has he to do with Mirth, who has the
Wrath of God abiding on him, and Hell open
to receive him? It does not belong to him, 'tis
none of his Part. Mirth is the Reward of a
good Conscience, the Prerogative of Innocence,
and the peculiar Right of good Men: And
they not only may be joyful and chearful, but
are also commanded to be so. Thus in the Law,
Deut. 16. 11. Thou shalt rejoice before the Lord
thy God, says *Moses* to the Jewish Votary. So
again the Psalmist, *Psal. 33. Rejoice in the Lord,*
O ye righteous; for it becometh well the just to be
thankful. Again, *Psal. 68. Let the righteous be*
glad, and rejoice before God: let them also be mer-
ry and joyful. And again, *Psal. 100. Serve the*
Lord with gladness. And says our Blessed Lord,
in his Farewel-Discourse to his Disciples, *John*

Comment. in
Aurea Car-
mina, p. 177.

15. 11. *These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy might remain in you, and that your joy might be full.* And we are exhorted to rejoice evermore by the Apostle, 1 Thes. 5. who also reckons Joy among the Fruits of the Holy Spirit, Gal. 5. 22.

Now all this is true, and I not only confess, but also recommend the Thing hitherto pleaded for. But then 'tis also to be considered what the Wise Man says, that *to every thing there is a Season*; and that there is a Time to weep and mourn, as well as a Time to laugh and dance, Eccles. 3. And this not only from Natural, but also from Moral Necessity: For the Circumstances of Human Life are such, as make it our Duty, as well as Fate, to mourn, and be sorrowful. Religion has its gloomy, as well as bright Side; and there are to be Days of Darkness, as well as Days of Light, in the Christian Kalendar.

THIS is intimated to us by several Expressions, and by several Examples, in Holy Scripture. Thus the Church in general is, in the Divine Song of Solomon, compared to a Dove; which, tho' considerable for some other Qualities, is yet for nothing so remarkable as for her continual Mourning. So far was that Wise Man from the Opinion of those who make Temporal Prosperity, a Mark of the True Church. Again, says the same wise Preacher, *It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting.* And again, *Sorrow is better than laughter.* Where you see he not only inculcates the Practice of Mourning, but also expressly prefers it before its Contrary. And he gives

gives this Reason for it, because *by the sadness of the countenance is the heart made better*, Eccles. 7. 3. And therefore he makes this the Measure of Wisdom and Folly, by telling us in the next Verse, *That the heart of the wise is in the house of mourning, but the heart of fools in the house of mirth.* This Practice of Mourning is every where inculcated in the Writings of the Prophets, but especially of the Prophet Jeremy, who has writ a whole Book of *Lamentations*. But, above all, 'tis remarkable what our Lord himself says of Mourning, in the 16th of St. John, where he seems to make it the great Mark of Difference between his Disciples and the Men of this World, *Verily, verily, says he, I say unto you, that ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice.*

Nor do there want Examples of this Holy Mourning in Scripture. Thus the Devotion of *Hannah* is expressed by her being a Woman of a sorrowful Spirit, 1 Sam. 1. 15. The Royal Prophet spent his whole Time almost in Mourning and Sorrow, which he also indulged and fomented with Music and Divine Hymns: And yet he was a Man wise and learned, and a Man after God's own Heart; and withal, a Man of great Business, and publick Occupation. Thus again, the Prophet *Jeremy* was a great Mourner; a Man as infatiable in his Sorrow, as some are in their *Luxury*. He was so full of Grief, as not to be satisfied with the natural and ordinary Ways of expressing it: And therefore says he, *Ob, that my head were waters, and mine eyes a fountain of tears, that I might weep day and night*, Jer. 9. 1. More I might instance

instance in, but I close all with the great Example of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, who, as the Text says, was *a Man of Sorrows*, and acquainted with Grief; and that not only in his last Passion and Agony, when his Soul was exceeding sorrowful, even unto Death; and when, as the Author to the *Hebrews* says, *Heb. 5. 7. He offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears;* but also throughout the whole Course of his Life. We oftentimes read of his Weeping and Sorrowing, as upon his Prospect of the City *Jerusalem*, at the Grave of *Lazarus*, and a little after his Supper, when, as the Text says, *Mat. 26.* he began to be *sorrowful, and very heavy;* and in the Garden, where he wept Tears of Blood. But we never read that he ever laughed. Once, indeed, 'tis said, *Luk. 10.* that he rejoiced; but then it was not with an outward, sensitive and tumultuous Joy; but with an inward, spiritual and silent Exultation: *He rejoiced in Spirit.* And what was it for? Not upon any Animal or Secular Account, but upon an Occasion altogether Spiritual and Divine. 'Twas for the abundant Grace of his Father, bestowed upon his Disciples; and for their good Use of it, and Improvement under it.

I do not intend in all this, such rigid Measures as are practised and exacted by some of the Religious Orders of the *Roman Church*; where a Man is not allowed so much as to laugh, or say any thing but *Frater memento mori,* for several Years together. This would be to turn Society into a *dumb Shew*, to make Life a Burthen, and withal, to bring an ill Report upon the good

good Land of Promise, and to discourage Men from the Christian Religion. But that which I stand for is this, That we ought not so to give our selves over to Secular Mirth and Jollity, but that we are still to remember that we are in the Vail of Tears ; that there is a Time for Mourning, as well as for Rejoicing ; and that this is that Time, now we are in our Exile, and in the midst of Dangers and Fears ; and that therefore Sorrow must sometimes have its Turn, as well as Joy ; and that there is such a Thing as Christian Mourning :

NOR need we be troubled that we have discover'd such an ungrateful Duty, since there is a *Beatitude* annexed to it. But because, as was before remarked, all manner of Mourning will not come within its Compass, it will concern us, in the second Place, to consider who these Christian Mourners are. This, I think, cannot be resolved by any better Measure, than by considering what are the true and proper Causes why a Christian ought to mourn. Now to this I shall answer,

I. IN General.

II. IN Particular.

IN General, I say, that then a Christian mourns for a due and proper Cause, when the Principle of his Sorrow is either Zeal for the Honour and Glory of God, or a Concern for the Good of Mankind : Nothing less than this can either deserve his Sorrow, or derive any Virtue or Excellency upon it. So that, in short, *Piety* and *Charity* will be the two Principles into which all true Christian Mourning must be at last resolved.

BUT because this may be exemplified in variety of Instances, it will not be amiss to consider some of the more remarkable of them. I answer therefore more particularly, That one very proper and reasonable Cause why a Christian should mourn, is, the *Consideration of Sin*. For a Man to consider seriously what a great and strange kind of Evil Sin is; how contrary to God, to his Nature, to his Will, to his Commands, to his Goodness, to his Justice, to the wise Order of his Grace and Providence, and especially to the great Mystery of Godliness: Then to consider how contrary it is to Man, to his Nature, to his Reason, to his Rational Instincts and Inclinations, to his inward Peace and Satisfaction; and lastly, to his Interest, both Temporal and Spiritual, Private and Publick, Present and Future: Then again, to consider, how prone we are to commit it, and that we our selves are the Authors of this Prone-ness: And lastly, how much of this great, strange Evil there is in the World; how Iniquity abounds, and the Love of many waxes cold; that the whole World, as St. John says, *Job. 5. 19. lies in wickedness*; that there are but few that pretend to any Strictness or Regularity of Living, and yet fewer that discharge their Pretensions truly and sincerely. I say, For a Man to consider all this, to consider it seriously and thoroughly, must needs be a sad Scene of Contemplation, and such as will justly call for his Sorrow and Mourning. It was so to God himself, who is brought in by *Moses* as grieved at his very Heart for the Abundance of Wickedness which he beheld in the Old World.

And

And I question not, but that, among the bitter Ingredients of our Lord's Passion, this was none of the least, to foresee that there would be so many, who by their final Impenitence, and persevering in Wickedness, would receive no Benefit from it. And, if we may judge by Proportion, the Angels in Heaven, who rejoice at the Conversion of one Sinner, do also mourn and lament for the irreclaimable Wickedness of so many Millions as are in the World. 'Tis a Thing worth our Considering, and worth our Lamenting. And therefore says the Psalmist, *Psal. 119.* *Rivers of waters run down mine eyes, because men keep not thy law.* And again, *It grieveth me when I see the transgressors.* This is a virtuous and laudable Sorrow, as proceeding from a good and noble Principle, from Piety and Charity: And he that mourns upon this Consideration, is a true *Christian Mourner.*

AGAIN, Secbndly, Another very proper and reasonable Cause why a Christian should mourn, is the Consideration of the *Miseries of Human Life.* 'Tis a most deplorable thing to consider what a deal, and what Variety of Misery there is in the World at once. *Many Things* must occur to make us tolerably *happy*; but *one Thing* alone is oftentimes enough to make us very *miserable*. And how unhappy then must Human Life be, among such a Multitude of Evils as are incident to it! I shall not go about to recount or describe them: They are too many to be number'd, and too various to be reduced to any Method. This only I say, That should a Man, by some compendious Device, have an united Prospect of the Miseries of the World,

as

as our Saviour, by the Devil's Artifice, had of the Glories of it, 'twould be the most dismal Landscape that ever was drawn, or can be imagined. 'Twas for this that some of the Ancients reckoned an early Death among the greatest Blessings of Heaven. *Quem Dicit diligunt, Adolescens moritur, The Favourite of the Gods dies young*, says the Comedian. But Solomon goes farther, *Eccles. 6.* and prefers an *untimely Birth* before a Man that has spent many Years in this World. To be short, Such is our Condition here, that we see God has not thought fit to trust us with the least Fore-knowledge of what is coming upon us, left, like Men upon a deep Precipice, we should be amazed, confounded, and fall down at the dreadful Prospect. And if the private Circumstances of each single Man's Life be so blaek and disconsolate, that 'tis thought fit he should see no farther than he goes, what shall we think of the Miseries of all Mankind put together? If any thing be worth our Sorrow, certainly this is. Our compassionate Saviour wept over the approaching Ruin of perishing *Jerusalem*: And shall not a Christian mourn for the Miseries of the whole World? We suspect the Good Nature of him that can endure to sit out a deep Tragedy with dry Eyes: And can we stand and look upon a miserable World without mourning? There are some Men of Rocky Hearts, and impassible Tempers, that could stand by, and see the whole World in Flames without any Concern, were but their own little selves secure from the Ruin. And this some are pleased to call *Philosophy*. But certainly, Christian Charity, that obliges

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obliges us to sympathize with the Miseries of each particular Man, to weep with those that weep, as the Apostle speaks, does much more require us to lament the common Miseries of Human Life. This therefore is a very proper Cause of Christian Mourning.

As is also, in the Third Place, the Consideration of the *Vanity* and *Emptiness* of all Worldly and Created Good. The general Caule of most of the Discontent and Melancholy that is in the World, is because Men cannot get so much of Worldly Good as they desire; not at all questioning its *Vanity*. But on the contrary, supposing that if they could compass such and such Things, they should be happy; and their only Trouble is, that they cannot get them. Now this is properly Worldly Sorrow, and comes from an ill Principle, either from Covetousness, Lust, or Ambition. But now there may be a virtuous and laudable Discontent, as well as a vicious and sordid one: and that is, When a Man mourns, and is troubled; not because he cannot compass such and such Created Goods: No; perhaps he would not eat of the Fruit, if he could reach it; but purely because they are all *empty* and *vain*, and cannot satisfie. He does not grieve because he *wants them*, for it may be he chuses to be without them; but because they are wanting in *themselves*, and have not that in them which can ever make him happy. And, indeed, it is enough to cast a Damp upon the Spirit of any Considering Man, to think that what is substantial and satisfactory is out of his Reach, and that all is Vanity and Vexation that lies within it; that the former he can-

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not

not *enjoy*, and that the latter cannot *satisfie*. To be thoroughly and inwardly convinced that all Fruition is a Cheat, and so to have nothing in Expectation, no one Glimpse or Prospect of Enjoyment before one, to invite one to live longer : This is a sad Reflection, and such as must needs cause Sorrow and Mourning. But then, 'tis a very laudable one, and such as proceeds from an excellent Principle. 'Tis a Sorrow that arises from *Increase of Wisdom*, Ecclef. 1: 18. from a right Notion and Understanding of Things, from Contempt of the World, from a due Consciousness of our own Powers and Capacities, and from the more than ordinary Aspirings of the Soul to God, who alone is able to satisfie her. And, to be sorry upon such Principles as these, is to sorrow in a Rational Way, and after a Godly Sort.

To instance one more : Another very proper Cause why a Christian should mourn, is the Consideration of the *Uncertainty* of our *Salvation*, and the infinite Misery of those who shall miscarry in so momentous a Concern. As to the Certainty of our Salvation, it is not so great as some are apt to imagin : For, though I can be assured of this Proposition with a Certainty of Divine Faith, it being Matter of express Revelation, that the Faithful and Penitent shall be saved ; yet that I believe and repent, can be known to me only on the Grounds of Experimental Knowledge, which is an Human, and therefore Fallible Testimony : And consequently, the Conclusion always following the weaker Part, I cannot be assured of my *Salvation* with a Certainty of Divine Faith, but only

only with an Human and Moral Assurance ; which, indeed, to call it by a right Name, is no more than an high Probability, a strong Presumption.

But yet, if even this Moral Assurance were *Absolute* and *Irreversible*, and were to take in the *Future*, as well as the *Present*, 'twere yet a considerable Stay and Security. But it is not so with us : That Assurance which we have is absolute only for the *Present*, and reaches not the *Future*, but only upon Condition, supposing that we persevere in the present Disposition ; which, considering the Mutability of our Wills, and the Multitude of our Temptations, and the frequent Examples of Apostacy, is a Thing not only of *uncertain*, but of *bazardous* Consequence.

AND as we are not, cannot be absolutely sure that we shall not miscarry, so, on the other hand, 'tis most certain, that we shall be unspeakably miserable if we do. For a Man to fall off from his last End, and only true Good, without any Hopes or Possibility of Recovery, is a thing that can hardly be thought of without Confusion and Amazement. Now let a Man put these two things together, That whether he shall be saved, or no, is a Matter of a depending and uncertain Issue ; and that if he miscarry his Case is intolerable ; and then tell me whether this be not a just Cause for Trouble and Sadness, and whether this Salvation, this uncertain Salvation, be not to be wrought out with *Sorrow* and *Mourning*, as well as with *Fear* and *Trembling* ?

CERTAINLY it is : And were it not for this, it would be no easie thing to give an Account, why Gravity, Seriousness, and Sobriety of Spirit should be such decent and commendable Qualities in Men. For otherwise, Why should not a Man give himself up to the utmost Gaiety and Jollity, and express it in all manner of odd Postures and Gestures, up to the Height of an *Antick Dissoluteness* ? I say, Why should not a Man do this ? But only because this is not agreeable to the Part he is to act ; who being in a State of Probation and Doubtfulness, and having so great an Interest depending, ought rather to temper and correct the Luxuriancy of his Spirit, with some Grains of Sadness, and Pensiveness ; and beware of laughing too much here, lest it should be his Turn to weep and mourn hereafter.

THESE are the principal Causes of *Mourning*. And from hence we may gather, who the *Christian-Mourners* are, who are concern'd in this Beatitude ; those, namely, whose *Mourning* proceeds upon these, or such like Grounds ; which are at last reducible to either of these two Principles, Zeal for the Honour and Glory of God, or a Concern for the Good of Mankind. They who mourn upon the Score of *Piety* or *Charity*, are true *Christian-Mourners*.

IT remains that we now consider, in the last place, wherein consists their Blessedness. St. *Austin*, in his Confessions and Meditations, very frequently speaks of the *Grace of Tears* ; and as often *prays* for it : And well he might, since it is attended with such happy Effects, and has such a Blessedness intailed upon it. Its Blessedness

ness is both present, and to come. What the present Blessedness is, we may learn from the Wise Man, who tells us, *That by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better.* It is so; for by this it becomes more soft and tender for all Divine Impressions, for the Love of God, for Devotion, for Charity to our Neighbour, for Mercy and Compassion, for Repentance, and the like. It is also hereby made more serious, more considerative and reflecting, more recollected, more settled and composed; which is to be considerably *better.* For, as Sorrow is the Principle of Consideration, so is Consideration the Principle of Repentance and Well-living, according to that of the Psalmist, *I considered my own ways, and turned my feet to thy testimonies,* Psal.

119.

AND of all this we have a very signal Example in the Nation of the Jews, who, till the Time of the Babylonish Captivity, were very gross and carnal, notwithstanding so many Miracles of God, both in their Deliverance out of Egypt, and in their Passage through the Wilderness. And when they were brought into the Land of Canaan, tho' they had such open and clear Testimonies of the Divine Presence among them; so many Prophecies, so many Miracles, and so many Apparitions of Angels; yet we find them ever now and then relapsing into Idolatry. But after the Captivity, when they had gone through a Course of Sorrow and Affliction, they presently began to behave themselves more orderly; and seem'd, like Gold, to refine upon the Trial of the Furnace: For we do not read, that after that Time they ever fell

into Idolatry. And accordingly, God began to deal with them now no longer as Children, but as Persons of some *Maturity*, by withdrawing from them his *Visible Presence*, and the *Spirit of Prophecy*; thinking them to have learnt enough already in the School of Affliction, to supersede all other Methods of Instruction and Discipline. And from that Time forwards, the *Minds of Men* began to be more generally erected towards Heaven, and the Good Things of a better Life; when they saw that the strictest Observers of the Law fell oftentimes into those Evils which were denounced against the Transgressors of it. By which means they were, by degrees, prepared for the Reception of the Gospel.

THIS is the present Bleſſedneſſe of those that mourn: What the future is we are told by our Saviour; who says, they shall be comforted; that is, shall be received into a *State or Place of Bliss and Happiness, Joy and Delight*; and be infinitely rewarded in Heaven for all their pious and charitable mourning upon Earth: According to that of the Psalmist, *Pſal. 126.* *He that now goes on his way sorrowing, and bringeth forth good seed, shall, doubtless, come again with joy, and bring his ſheaves with him.* They shall be received into the City of God, the New Jeruſalem, where there is no more *Mourning*, nor Cause of *Mourning*; and where not only *all Sin*, but even those very *Vertues* which are founded upon the least *Imperfection* shall be done away. Here therefore there will be no room left even for *Godly Sorrow*; but all shall be Joy and Gladness, Harmony and Thanksgiving. And, Bleſſed

sed are they who so mourn here, that they may enter into this Joy of their Lord hereafter.

DISCOURSE the Third.

MATTH. V. Ver. v.

Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the Earth.

HE Judgment of God differs so verily widely from that of Man, that his Thoughts are seldom as our Thoughts, nor his Ways as our Ways. But in nothing is the Difference so signal, as in the Conclusions concerning *Good* and *Evil*, *Happiness* and *Misery*. Our Judgments are seldom conformable to the Divine in Matters of mere Truth and Notion, but much seldomer in Practical Maxims, and Moral Resolutions. Here, if any where, is chiefly to be found that *vain Philosophy*, which we are caution'd against by the Apostle, Col. 2. 8. and that *Tradition of Man*, and those *Rudiments of the World*, which are not after Christ. Herein it is that the Wisdom of God, and the Wisdom of the World, which seldom meet in one Point, stand yet most divided and opposed to each other; and tho' the latter be always, in some respect or other, Foolishness to the former, yet

never so much as in her Resolutions concerning Good and Evil, Happiness and Misery; the World, for the most part, calling that Evil which God calls Good, and those Miserable whom God pronounces in an especial Manner Happy. This is very remarkably verified in the Matter now before us: For, tho' there has been great Diversity of Sentiments in the Gentile Philosophy, about the Objects of Human Happiness; some placing it in one thing, and some in another; yet, among all their Variety, we do not find any that placed it in *Humility* or *Meekness*. These they scarce acknowledged as Virtues, much less to be such as wherein the Happiness of Man should in great part consist. Nay, they rather looked upon these as mean, servile Dispositions, such as were fit for *Men* of low Fortunes, and lower Minds; and which were so far from conducing to Happiness, that they rather exposed Men to Misfortunes and Miseries. But now, these are the Dispositions of *Mind* which our Lord and Saviour, who was the *Wisdom of his Father*, and the *Light of the World*, singles out, and marks, for a peculiar Excellency and Happiness.

NOR need we wonder over-much at the Singularity of this Christian Paradox, since the whole Course of our Saviour's Life and Doctrin was a direct Contradiction to the Maxims and Practice of the World. Thus Men hate to unsay or undo what they have either done or said, and to confess their former Folly by an After-Retraction. But now, this is the principal thing of our Saviour's Institution, whose whole Gospel is a Doctrin of *Repentance*, which

which is a Retraction of Judgment and Choice. Thus, again, Men love Riches, but Christ chose to be Poor : They are altogether for Honours and Greatness, but he hid himself that he might not be made a King : They, again, greedily pursue after Pleasures, but both his Life and Doctrin was all over Rigour and Mortification. The World thinks Affronts intolerable, and it is reckon'd a piece of Gallantry and Honour to revenge them ; but our Wise and Good Lord chose to be reviled, and spit upon : They are impatient of Calumnies and Slanders, but He chose to be condemned being innocent : They, lastly, (as the Prophet complains) *Mal. 3. 15.* call the proud happy, and despise the meek Man, as a miserable Slave and Fool ; whereas, says our Lord, in Opposition to the former, *Blessed are the poor in spirit* ; and, in Opposition to the latter, *Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.*

FROM the Words, I shall discourse of these two things in general, the *Duty*, and the *Blessedness* of Meekness. In treating of the first it will be requisite,

- I. To consider what Meekness is.
- II. To shew that it is a Christian Duty.
- III. To state the Measures of its Obligation in its more general Cases.
- IV. To inforce the Practice of it, as far as it obliges.

FIRST therefore, As to the Notion of Meekness. Aristotle has long since defined it to be a Mediocrity about Anger : *μεσότης διμεσότης οὐδὲ πλεύτερος*, are

are his Words in the Fourth of his *Ethicks*. This Definition, tho' it be true as far as it goes, yet, like the rest of his, it runs in such general Terms, that a Man is little the wiser for it: And, indeed, it rather serves to tell us the Meaning of the Word, than to discover the Nature of the Thing. To do this therefore I shou'd rather think fit to say, That it is such a Temper, or Disposition of Mind, whereby a Man so moderates and commands the Passion of Anger, as not to be carried to any such Degree of it, as may either discompose himself, or injure his Neighbour. Call this a Definition, or Description, or what you please, I think it is such as may give a Sufficient Idea of the Thing we are discoursing about.

THIS therefore being settled, our next Business is, to shew, That to be thus meek, is a Christian Duty. That it is so, might sufficiently appear from this General Consideration, that it is an Instance of *Charity*, which, as we well know, is the Life and Substance of the Christian Law. And it is a very considerable Instance too: For, since Charity obliges us to promote both our own, and our Neighbours Happiness, it must, by Consequence, oblige us to moderate and govern those Passions which have any Influence upon either of them. Now, among all the Passions, there is none, in the Exercise of which, either our own, or our Neighbours Happiness, is so often, and so much concern'd, as in this of Anger. So often, it being a thing of daily Incursion. So much, because upon this depends all the Strength and Stability both of private and publick Peace. And consequently, such a due Moderation

Moderation of this Passion as may secure both (which is what we call Meekness) is a very considerable Instance of Charity, and therefore also of the Christian Law, which is so much a Law of Charity, that, as the Apostle tells us, *Gal. 5. 14.* it is fulfilled by it. And accordingly we may observe, that among the several Excellencies and Properties of Charity, reckon'd up by the Apostle, these are particularly insisted upon, that it suffers long, and is kind; *I Cor. 13.* that it is not easily provoked: and that it bears all things; which are also some of the chief Properties of Meekness.

But that Meekness is a Christian Duty, and one of the first Order too, may be more particularly shewn from the Express Doctrin and Example of our Divine Law-giver. As to his Doctrin, he not only commands it, but seems to resolve all that Moral Excellency which he either had in himself, or would have in us, to these two, *Humility and Meekness*: *Come unto me*, says he, *and learn of me*. But what? Not to make Worlds, not to cure the Sick, nor to restore Light to the Blind, or Life to the Dead, (to use the Remark of the excellent Cardinal *Bona*) but learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart.

WHAT! Was it that our Lord had no other Vertues; or that he excelled in these two more than in any of the rest, that when he bids us learn of him, he proposes no other to our Imitation? Neither of these can be said. Not the Former, because in him dwelt the Fulness of the Godhead, which is not consistent with the Absence

Manuducto
ad Cælum, &c.
32. p. 40.

fence

sence of any one Grace or Virtue. Not the Latter, because he was uniformly, as well as entirely good, and had every Virtue in its utmost Perfection, having (as the Scripture says of him) received the Spirit of God without measure. 'Tis true, indeed, he might be, and was more remarkable for the outward Exercise of one Virtue than another, according as Opportunities and Circumstances might require : But as to the inward Habits and Dispositions themselves, he was equally perfect in them all, and did not excel in one, more than in another. Why then does he recommend only these two to be learnt by his Disciples ? It must be partly because he was the only Master that could teach such Divine Dispositions, and partly because of some special Excellency in the Virtues themselves, above any other of the Christian Law. And therefore also our Lord puts them for the whole of it, by calling them his Yoke : *Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me ; for I am meek, and lowly in heart,* Mat. xi. 29.

NOR are we less oblig'd to this by the Example, than by the Precept of our Lord : For, as his Example was a Living Law, so was the Practice of his Virtue a very eminent Part of his Example. This he himself intimates to us, by assigning this for the Reason why we should learn of him. And of this we may be farther informed from the whole Story and Process of his Life. Never was any Man's Meekness so much tried as his was : For, as the *real* Excellency and Dignity of his Person heightned every Affront and rude Treatment that was offered him, to an incomparable Pitch, so the outward Lowness and

and Meanness of it exposed him to a great many of them : And yet, notwithstanding the Number and Heinousness of his Provocations, we do not find that he was ever in the least discomposed, or put into a Passion by them.

Moses, indeed, was a Man very eminent for this Virtue ; insomuch that the Scripture gives this Character of him, *That he was very meek, above all the Men which were upon the Face of the earth,* Numb. 12. And yet we find that, with all his Meekness, he could not bear with the Crossness and Perverseness of that untractable People the Jews, who (as the Psalmist's Observation is) *so provoked his spirit, that he spoke unadvisedly with his lips,* Psal. 106. Now our Lord had to deal with the very same stubborn and cross-grain'd Generation of Men, only now under infinitely greater Prejudices and Disaffections ; and suffered more Indignities from them, than either were or could be offered to Moses ; and yet none of all their ill Usages could ever raise such a thing as Anger or Resentment in him, though they did so in those who stood by, and beheld his Abuses. Thus the Unkindness of the rude *Samaritans* cou'd not so much as strike a Spark into his Divine Breast, when at the same time it made his two zealous Disciples, *James and John*, kindle to that Degree, as to desire Fire from Heaven to consume them, Luk. 9. 54. And so again, the rough Seizure of his Sacred Person by the Soldiers could not extort from him so much as an angry Look, when yet the very Sight of it made his warm Disciple draw his Sword.

AND with the same Meekness he went on with his Sufferings, with which he begun them ;
as

as may appear from that mild Answer which he returned to the Officer that struck him, *Joh. 18. If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil; but if well, why smitest thou me?* What could have been said more mildly and dispassionately, or that cou'd argue a more sedate and well-govern'd Spirit? His greatest Apostle could not be half so moderate under a far less urging Occasion: For, when not actually smitten, but only commanded to be so by the Order of *Ananias* the High-Priest, he return'd him this sharp and warm Answer, *God shall smite thee, thou whited wall. For smitest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest me to be smitten, contrary to the law?* There was, indeed, nothing in his Answer, but what, perhaps, might have been justified by the Oddness of the Provocation; but yet you cannot but observe a great Difference between the Behaviour of the Disciple, and of the Master.

BUT if you would see a perfect Example of *Meekness*, look upon him under the Shame, and Dishonour, and Pains of the Cross; encountering at once with the Agonies of Death, the Contradictions and Revilings of Sinners, and the Vengeance of an Almighty God; and all this without any the least Shew of Impatience, or Discomposure of Spirit. So that I think I may well enlarge the Question of the Prophet, and to that, *Is there any sorrow like to my sorrow?* add this also, *Is there any meekness like to my meekness?*

AND here I cannot but make a Stand, and with Sorrow reflect upon a certain Order of Men, how little they have of the true *Spirit of Christianity*, how little they have learnt, either by the Precept, or by the Example of him whose Religion

gion and Imitation too they profess, and by whose Venerable Name they have thought fit to distinguish themselves ; who, instead of this Meekness and Gentleness, are all made up of Passion and Violence, Fury and Outrageousness ; mere Fire-brands in Society, that kindle and lay waste where-ever they come, and seem more like *Granada's* shot into a Town, than *Inhabitants* of it, by thus raging where they light, by thus burning, destroying and tearing all about them. How unlike are these Men to the Temper of the meek Lamb of God ! As unlike, certainly, as Wolves and Tygers. And yet it is an Unlikelihood they are so little sensible of, that they will yet pretend to the Name and Practice of Christians ; yea, to the very Name of Jesus : And he had need be a bold Man, or at a good Distance from them, that shall dare to contradict them.

But certainly, as *Wrath worketh not the Righteousness of God*, Jam. 1. 20. so neither is such an allowed Course of it consistent with it. And as he cannot be a good Man who is so inordinate in the Use of a Passion, wherein both his own and his Neighbour's Peace and Quiet is so much concerned ; so much less can he be a good Christian, who is of a Frame of Spirit so directly contrary to that of the Holy Jesus, and who wants this great Christian Qualification, the Spirit of Gentleness and Meekness, which is so considerable an Instance of Charity, and so strictly enjoined by the Precept, and so strongly recommended by the Example of Christ.

But because the *Limits* of this Duty are not so plain as the *Obligation* of it, I proceed, in the Third Place, to state the *Measures* of its *Obligation*

Obligation in its more general Cases. And here, in the first place, it may be demanded, Whether all Anger be contrary to Meekness, and consequently unlawful? The Affirmative is stiffly contended for by the Stoic; but I think the Negative sufficiently warranted by the Apostolical Caution, *Be angry, and sin not*, Eph. 4. 26. Which plainly implies, that there may be Anger without Sin: And it is also plain, from the Nature of the Thing, that there may; for Anger is a Natural Affection, implanted in us by God, from whom nothing can proceed that is simply, and as such, evil. And besides, the Office of Meekness is not utterly to destroy this Passion, but only to regulate it; whereby 'tis supposed that it is not, in its whole Kind, evil; for, what is so, cannot be regulated, and must be destroy'd.

SINCE then Anger is supposed not wholly to be destroy'd by Meekness, as being Evil, but only to be regulated, lest it become so; the next thing to be considered is, by what *Measures*. Now, these *Measures* may either respect Anger as to the inward Passion, as within a Man's own Breast, or as to the outward Acts, Effects, and Expressions of it.

AND First, As to those *Measures* which respect Anger as to the inward Passion, as lodged within a Man's own Breast. These, I think, will be sufficiently comprised within these four Circumstances; the Cause or Occasion, the Object, the Degree, or the Time: As to the Cause, to render that justifiable, it will be requisite, *First*, That it be something weighty and considerable, something wherein either the Glory of

God,

God, or the publick Good, or else some very great private Interest is concern'd. 'Tis not every little impertinent Trifle that can warrant our Anger. *Secondly*, 'Twill be requisite that our Anger owe its Birth to some competent Measure of previous Counsel and Deliberation: For, if all our Actions are to be govern'd by Reason, certainly our Passions ought not to be wholly exempted from it: I am sure they need it most of all. And if a Man thinks not before he gives himself leave to be Angry, tho' the Ground of it should prove never so just and proper in it self, yet, as to him, his Anger was brutish and unreasonable. As it will also be if, *Thirdly*, it be not conceived for a due End; such as either the Vindication of the Divine Honour and Glory, the Procurement of Good to our Neighbour, or the Prevention and Suppression of Sin. And so much to qualifie our Anger, with respect to the Cause.

But *Secondly*, To the farther Regulation of it, 'twill be requisite that it have a due Object; for all are not so. There are some things that cannot; some that ought not to be the Objects of Anger; that cannot with Reason; and that ought not for Religion. Thus we ought not to be angry with God, as it is said *Caligula* was; who being vex'd at the Thunder for disturbing his Banquet, rose up from the Table, and provoked *Jupiter* to fight with him. Neither ought we to be Angry with inanimate, senseless Things; as *Cyrus* was with the River; for drowning one of his sacred Horses. It argues a Mind overcome and blinded with Passion, to be so prodigal of it where it can signifie nothing. Nor ought we to be angry with those, who, either by

Chance, or Necessity, or probable Ignorance, or common Frailty, have offended us. Nor are we to be angry with those, who, though they have none of these Excuses to qualifie their Trespass, yet acknowledge their Fault, beg our Pardon, and promise Amendment. Repentance is the Measure of God's Forgiveness; and so it ought to be of ours. Nor, lastly, should we let loose our Anger against *Brute Creatures*, Children, Fools, or Mad-men, or any other that are under any great Defect or Disorder of Understanding. But we are to be angry with such only as are impious and wicked, and that are neither ashamed nor repent of their Wickedness. And even here also we ought rather to be angry with the *Fault*, than with the *Person*. For so *Moses* was exceeding angry at the *Idolatry* of the *Israelites*, when at the same time he prayed for the *Idolaters*.

AND thus far of the *Object*. The two last Circumstances whereby our Anger is to be qualified, are, *Degree* and *Time*. As to *Degree*, this may receive a double Measure; one from the Person who is the *Object* of Anger, and another from the Person who is the *Subject* of it. That with reference to the *Object* is this, that our Anger should not exceed the Quality of the Offence committed. That with reference to the *Subject* will be this, That it should not be so great, let the Offence be what it will, as to discompose the Mind of him who conceives it, and thereby unfit him for the Discharge of such Offices as he owes either to God, his Neighbour, or himself.

THEN as to the *Time* of our Anger: This we find already stated by the Apostle, who limits it within the Compass of a *Day*. 'Tis a Passion

Passion that ought to be so short-lived, that the Sun must not go down upon it, *Eph. 4. 26.* For, indeed, it is not safe trusting our selves with such a dangerous Guide in the *Dark*, nor to nourish a Passion which, though in its own Nature innocent, borders so nicely upon *Hatred*, that with a little keeping it will grow so stale, sower and inveterate, as to commence *Malice*.

AND thus far of those Measures which respect Anger, as to the *Inward Passion*. Proceed we now to those who respect it as to the outward Acts, Effects and Expressions of it. And here, among other Things too obvious to be insisted on, two Enquiries offer themselves more principally to be considered. One is, concerning the Propulsion or Repelling of Injuries; the other is, concerning the Revenging of Injuries already done. Of both these it may be demanded, how far they are consistent with the Virtue and Duty of Christian Meekness.

As to the Former, it is to be considered, that Injuries are either Publick; as, when the Magistrate oppresses his Subjects; or, Private, when one Subject injures another; or, Lastly, such as are on both sides Publick, as when one King or State injures another. This premised, I answer, *First*, That an Injury offer'd from one Kingdom or State to another, may, and ought to be repelled by that other; this being one of the main Ends and Uses of the Civil Sword, to protect those who are subjected to it; which when it does, it is duly employed. To which it may be added, that distinct Kingdoms, being under no common Jurisdiction, have no other

Expedient whereby to right themselves: Either therefore they must always suffer, which would be intolerable to Society, or they must right themselves by the Sword. *Secondly*, That in case the Supreme Magistrate oppress his Subjects, 'tis by no means consistent with Christian Meekness for them by Force to repel the Injury. We are, indeed, to obey him only in *some Cases*, but to *resist* him in *none*. This is certainly a true, tho' to some an hard Saying; *wherefore ye must needs be subject: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation*, are as plain Words as any in the Bible. But Men are very slow to understand what they have no mind to practise; otherwise one would think there should need no other Decision in the Case, than the Example of our meek Lord and Master, who patiently submitted himself to an ordinary Magistrate, commanded his rash Disciple to *sheath his sword*, and would not suffer his Angelical Legions to *draw theirs*, Mat. 26. 53:

BUT *Thirdly*, As to private Injuries between Man and Man, I answer, *First*, That these are never to be forcibly repell'd by a private Defence, when a publick one may be had; in defect of which, a private one may be used. But then we are to consider, *Secondly*, That either this private Injury reaches only to our Goods and Possessions, &c. without hazard of Life; and here a good Man would go very far in yielding from his Right, and in patiently undergoing Injuries: Or else 'tis with extream Danger of Life; and then, indeed, he not only may, but perhaps is obliged by the Law of Self-preservation, by the utmost Force to repel the Injury.

ry. And thus much to be observed in Repelling of Injuries.

I come now, in the Second Place, to consider the *Vindication* of Injuries already done. And here I take notice of a Two-fold Extream. One is, of those who stand for the highest Vindication of Injuries, without any Measure, or Moderation : Which seems to have been the Fault of the *Jews of Old*, who, by the Law of Retaliation, thought they might exact any thing ; an Eye for an Eye, or a Tooth for a Tooth. The other is, of the *Anabaptists* and *Socinians* ; who so extol the Law of Charity, as not to allow any place for the Vindication of Injuries ; not permitting it either to private Persons, or publick ; and so taking from the Magistrate both the Right and the Use of the Civil Sword.

THESE I take to be Extreams ; and that the Truth lies between them, which I suppose is, That publick Vindication of Injuries is not only lawful, but necessary ; so far from being against Charity, that it is a great Instance of it, and required by it : For, without this there would be no living, and Human Society could never stand. But as to private Vindication of Injuries, that which we more especially call *Revenge*, this I shall readily allow to be utterly unlawful, and so make appear upon these Grounds. *First*, Because Vengeance is proper to God, and therefore to be committed either to him, or else to those whom he has empower'd, who are therefore styled Gods. *Secondly*, Because Vengeance is an A&t of Judgment, and consequently a publick A&t, and therefore not to be exercised by a

private Person, who also must not be allow'd to be a Judge in his own Cause. *Lastly*, Because Vengeance cannot belong to them, by whom the Ends of it cannot be obtain'd : But now, by a private Hand they cannot, as may appear by considering what these Ends are ; which I suppose to be chiefly these Three ; To amend him that is punished, To better others by his Example, and To procure to the injured Party and others, Security for the future. But now private Revenge reaches none of these Ends. For, *First*, It does not amend or reform the Adversary, but rather provokes him farther. Nor, *Secondly*, does it tend to the bettering of others, but rather corrupts and scandalizes them by an ill Example. Nor, *Lastly*, does the private Avenger procure Safety either to himself or others, but rather Danger to both ; and to himself Vexation and Trouble for the present, and Fear for the future, lest his Enemy should revenge himself again. Private Revenge therefore is universally to be condemn'd, as utterly unlawful, and altogether inconsistent with the Duty of *Christian Meekness*.

AND thus have we stated the Measures of this Virtue, in its more general Cases. But this is a thing that needs to be *inforced*, as well as *explained*. Consider therefore, *First*, That God has expressly forbidden us all undue Anger, and has prescrib'd the contrary Offices of Charity and Meekness. Consider again, that all Injuries befall us by God's special Providence, and may, if we hinder not its Course, turn to our greater Good. Consider again, that God uses an incredible

credible Patience and Long-suffering toward the worst of Men, and particularly towards our selves ; by the former setting us an Example of Lenity, and by the latter making it very reasonable for us to follow it. Consider again, that all Vengeance belongs to God, who has said, *Vengeance is mine* : And that therefore, he that avenges himself, assumes the Part of God ; yea, withal, of a Judge, of an Accuser, of a Witness, and of an Executioner, all at once ; against all Sense and Reason, Equity and Justice. This may be consider'd with reference to God.

THEN, again, as to our Neighbour. Consider, that he is nearly related, both to God, and to our selves : To God, as made after his Image ; and to our selves, as cast in the same Mould with us, and partaking of the same common Nature. Consider again, what we would have done by our Neighbour, to our selves ; and how reasonable it is that we should do the same to him. Lastly, Consider what we have already done to him ; whether we have not been guilty of the same, or greater Injuries towards him, than those which we so warmly resent from him.

THEN Lastly, With reference to our selves. Consider, First, how much by our unjust Anger we expose our selves to the just Displeasure of God, who, by his Son, has told us, that *Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment*, Mat. 5. 22. Consider again, That we may easily, and do often mis-interpret Men's Minds and Intentions by their outward Demeanour ; and think our selves af-

fronted by them, when there is no such thing intended ; and that therefore, even upon this Account, it is very reasonable we should be *slow to wrath*. Consider again, how much causless and intemperate Anger unsuits us for all the Parts of Divine Worship, which can neither be well performed by, nor will be accepted from a Heart flaming with this strange Fire. And therefore, says the Apostle, speaking of Prayer, *1 Tim. 2. Lifting up holy hands, without wrath* ; implying, that a Vacancy from Wrath is a necessary Qualification for Prayer. To which Purpose it is very considerable, that when King *David* would have erected a Temple for the publick Worship of God, though a Man otherwise of a sweet and gentle Disposition, and only accidentally, and innocently too, engaged in Circumstances of Anger and Contention ; yet he was refused, and the Work imposed upon one not of a more meek Spirit, but only of a calmer and more serene Life. And if God would not accept an *House of Prayer* from a Man of a Military Way and Character, much less will he accept those *Prayers* which proceed from a Soul disturb'd with Anger. Consider again, How it unsuits us for the Business of our Calling, how it hinders the free Exercise of our Thoughts, how it prejudices our Health, disturbs the Tranquility of our Minds, renders us odious and uneasy to all about us ; in one word, how utterly it unsuits us, both for enjoying our selves, and from being delighted in by others. Consider, *Lastly*, to what mean and sordid Principles within us this passion owes its Rise ; such as *Pride, Self-love,*

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love, vain Curiosity and Suspicion, rash Credulity, Negligence and Inadvertency, Ambition, Lust, Envy, and the like. So that, besides its own proper Illness, 'tis farther to be detested upon the Scandal of its Parentage,

HAVING thus far discoursed of the Duty of Meekness ; *First*, By shewing what it is. *Secondly*, By shewing that it is a Christian Duty. *Thirdly*, By stating the general Measures of its Obligation. And *Lastly*, By proposing such Considerations as may recommend its Practice. I come now briefly to discourse of its *Blessedness* ; which may also serve as another distinct Consideration to inforce the Practice of it. *Blessed are the meek*, says our Saviour, *for they shall inherit the earth* : The only Beatitude which has a Temporal Promise annexed to it ; wherein our Lord seems to imitate *Moses*, who in his Law had also one Commandment with a Temporal Promise. And there seems to be great Resemblance between them : One is, *That thy days may be long in the earth* ; and the other, *They shall inherit the earth*. Here therefore we are to do two Things : *First*, We must enquire into the Sense and Meaning of the Beatitude. *Secondly*, Into the Truth of it. That is, We must *First* enquire, What is meant by the Meek's inheriting the Earth ; And *Secondly* shew, That they do so inherit it.

AND *First*, by their inheriting the Earth, I suppose, cannot be meant, that they shall have large Portions of it, that they shall raise great Estates, that they shall take Root, and spread, and, as the Prophet expresses it, *Isa. 5. joyn house*

to house, and lay field to field. This I suppose, cannot be meant;

I. BECAUSE this is not true: The Meek do not inherit the Earth according to this Sense.

II. BECAUSE if they did, this would not be a proper Ground for their being pronounced Blessed.

AND First, This Sense is not true; the Meek do not *thus* inherit the Earth. We rather find that the World is made for the Bold and the Violent, for the Rough-spirited and Turbulent, for the Furious and Boisterous; and that they have commonly the greatest Share of it, who deserve the least. And therefore we commonly urge this as one Argument against the Goodness of Riches, That they frequently fall to the Lot of the worst Men. And therefore, says the Psalmist, *Psal. 74. Lo, these are the ungodly, these prosper in the world, and these have riches in possession:* While, in the mean time, the Meek are oppressed and devoured by these Beasts of Prey; and are so far from inheriting the Earth, that it is as much as many of them can do to live upon it, and more than some of them can do to find Room under it.

BUT Secondly, Suppose they did thus inherit the Earth, by having great Portions of it, yet this would not be a proper Ground for their being pronounced Blessed: For, Are Clods of Earth a suitable Good for Man? Or, is Happiness to be measured by the Acre? Do we find that rich Men are so very much happier than others? Or, Do we think that the Earth has Mines of Happiness, as it has of Gold? But, whatever we think, Is it at all probable, that our

our Blessed Lord, who himself made choice of Poverty, who but in a Line or two before pronounced the Poor blessed, who tells us that his own Kingdom was not of this World, who bids us beware of Covetousness, and warns us of the great Danger of Riches, by telling us how hard it is for one that has them to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven ; who exhorts us from laying up Treasures on Earth, and who, lastly, recommends to his Disciples nothing more than the Contempt of the World, by assuring them, that the Life of Man does not consist in the Abundance of Things which he possesses : I say, Is it imaginable that our Lord, after all this, should therefore pronounce the meek Man blessed, for having great Possessions ?

This therefore cannot be the Thing meant by the Meek's inheriting the Earth ; which I take, rather to signify the *Manner* of Possessing, than the *Greatness* of their Possessions ; and to import thus much, That the Meek shall enjoy what they have, be it little or great, with Comfort, and Satisfaction, and Tranquility of Mind ; whereas those of a contrary Disposition, tho' they may possess a great deal, may yet be truly said to *enjoy* little or nothing. And this seems to be the Sense of the Psalmist, when, in Words directly parallel to these of our Lord, he says, *The meek-spirited shall possess the earth, and shall be refreshed in the multitude of peace*, Psal. 34. 11. That is, They shall have Comfort and Pleasure, Peace and Content, with whatever they have ; which, how little soever, shall yet carry a true Relish, and yield more real Satisfaction to them, than the otherwise-affected can reap from their ample Revenues.

venues. According to what the Psalmist, in the same place, immediately subjoins, *Psal. 34. 16.*
A small thing that the righteous has, is better than great riches of the ungodly.

THIS I take to be the Sense and Meaning of this Beatitude. As to the Truth and Reality of it, there is this double Security for it; the Natural Tendency of the Virtue of Meekness, and the Blessing of God upon it. As to its Natural Tendency, Meekness is a very decent, amiable and winning thing; and, accordingly, the Apostle calls it, *The ornament of a meek and quiet spirit.* And by this, in all probability, the meek Man will sweeten and indear even his very Enemies to him, and so gain himself Peace without by his quiet and inoffensive Behaviour. But however this be, yet he is sure, to have Peace *within*, with himself, and with God. And having this, he is in a very fit Condition of Mind to enjoy himself, and to take Comfort in what he possesses.

WHICH he will be farther enabled to do, Secondly, by the Blessing of God. And this again the Psalmist takes notice of, some few Verses after the fore-cited ones: *Vers. 22.* *Such as are blessed of the Lord shall possess the land,* says he; implying, that as the Meek, whom he just before spoke of, should possess the Earth, so it is through a special Blessing of God that they should do so. And these are two great Securities for a Life of Comfort, and Self-Enjoyment; the Peace of a sedate Spirit within, and the Blessing of God without. And both these the meek Man has, whom therefore we may venture to pronounce *Blessed:* and therefore *Blessed,* because he shall

thus inherit the Earth : Which yet shall be but a Type and Pledge of his future Inheritance with the Saints in Light.

DISCOURSE the Fourth.

MATT H. V. Ver. vi.

Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.



HO' God has provided *Entertainment* for all the Appetites which he has made, yet there are but two Appetites of Man which he intends to gratifie to the *height*, and to bless with a full and lasting Satisfaction ; and those are, the Desire of being happy, and the Desire of being good. There are some Appetites of Man which are never satisfied ; for, says the Wise Man, *Eccl. i. 8.* *The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing.* Seeing and Hearing are the most refined of all the Senses ; and those Appetites which are most spiritual and refined, and come nearest to the Elevations of the Intellectual Nature, are always hardest to be satisfied : And the Intellectual Nature it self, when it is more raised and elevated, as in the State of Separation, will have a more enlarged Appetite, and a sharper Edge of Desire, and so will be harder to be satisfied than it is now. Which, by the way, I take to be the Reason why those Sensual Spirits, which now feel no great Uneasiness from the Absence of the Supreme,

preme Good, will, notwithstanding, hereafter be extreamly miserable, in being exiled from his Beatifick Presence. As for the *grosser* Appetites of the Animal Nature, such as Hunger, Thirst, and the like; these, indeed, have this Advantage above the *Finer*, that they may be satisfied for some time; and (such is the Brutishness of Man) are too often over-charged. But then they will return again in certain Periods, like the Tide, and be as importunate as ever for new Supplies; and, as our Saviour told the Woman of Samaria, Joh. 4. 13. *Whosoever drinks of this Water shall thirst again.* The Appetite may be laid asleep for a while, but it will infallibly awake again into its former Eagerness.

BUT it is not the Unhappiness of Man to have *all* his Appetites like these, such as will either *never*, or not *finally* be satisfied. There are two that are designed for a full and lasting Satisfaction; the Desire of being happy, and the Desire of being good and vertuous; but still with this material difference between them, That the Desire of Happiness is not absolutely secure of Satisfaction, but only upon Condition. The Satisfaction of this Desire is suspended upon the Quality of our Moral Conduct: But now, the Desire of Goodnes and Vertue has, by the Grace and Indulgence of God, an absolute Title to Satisfaction, and is sure to be thoroughly gratified: For, says our Saviour, *Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.* *Shall be filled,* without any farther Condition, or Reserve.

THAT we may the better comprehend the Sense and Truth of this Beatitude, it will be necessary

I. To

I. To enquire what Righteousness that is, which if we hunger and thirst after, we shall be filled.

II. What kind of Hunger and Thirst that is, to which this Promise of Repletion is made.

III. To make good the Proposition it self, that those who do hunger and thirst after Righteousness shall be filled.

To satisfie the first Enquiry, I shall not critically weigh all the Acceptations of the Word *Righteousness* in Scripture ; thinking it sufficient to the Busines in hand, to consider the general *Kinds* and *Degrees* of Righteousness. This therefore may be considered either in a *Judicial*, or in a *Moral* Sense. Righteousness in a Judicial Sense imports as much as a Legal Discharge, whereby the Person impleaded becomes Right in the Court, or Righteous. Which Legal Discharge may be again two Ways, either by remitting a Criminal, or by acquitting suspected or accused Innocence. These are the two Ways of a Legal Discharge ; and then is a Person judicially righteous, when he is discharg'd either of these two ways, either by the Remission of his Guilt, or by the Declaration of his Innocence. The latter of these is properly Justification ; tho' the former be that Justification whereby Christians must expect to stand in the Judgment of God, since, in the other Sense, no Man living shall be justified : For we are not justified as *innocent* Persons, but as *Sinners* ; and, accordingly, are not *acquitted*, but *pardon'd*.

RIGHTEOUSNESS, in a *Moral* Sense, may be supposed to import all those Divine and Moral

ral Vertues which are required by the Christian Law, consisting of the whole Duty of Man, to God, himself, and his Neighbour. This latter kind of Righteousness may again be considered, either *Materially* and *Abstractedly* for the bare Vertues themselves; as they are certain supposed Actions which naturally tend to the Good and Perfection, both of Human Nature, and of Human Society; or else *Formally* and *Concretely* for such and such Vertues as subjected in Man; or for the habitual Will of doing such supposed Actions, which is formal Virtue, and whereby the Man is denominated virtuous or righteous.

THIS is not one of those Distinctions which are without any *Difference*: For the Difference is very clear and great. As for Instance, When it is said, *I love or practise Virtue*; and, *I am proud of my Virtue*, 'tis plain that the Word Virtue does not bear the same Notion in both Propositions. For, when it is said, *I love and practise Virtue*, there it is plain that Virtue is taken *Materially*, for the Abstract Idea of Virtue, which is supposed to be the Object of my Love. But when it is said, *I am proud of my Virtue*, here 'tis as plain that Virtue is taken *Formally*, for my Habit of Willing it; whereby I am denominated virtuous: For I cannot be supposed to be proud of Virtue in its Abstract Idea, but only of the Love I have towards it. To be short, Moral Virtue may be taken either for the Things which are fit to be done, or for the habitual Will of doing them. The former is the Righteousness of the Law, prescribing what ought to be done: The latter is the Righteousness of the *Man*, willing to do what is so prescribed.

prescribed. These are the general Kinds of Righteousness.

Now to the Question ; What kind of Righteousness that is, which if we hunger and thirst after, we shall be filled ? I answer, *First*, That the Righteousness here intended cannot be Judicial Righteousness, since the mere Desire of Pardon or Justification is not of it self sufficient to procure it, or to avert the Sentence of Condemnation. It must therefore be *Moral* Righteousness.

If you ask in what Sense ? Whether as materially, or as formally taken ? I think either Sense may be admitted. But then there will be Difference in the Proposition, according to the Sense presumed. For, if Righteousness be here taken *Materially*, then the Hungering and Thirsting after it will be a *simple* and *direct* Act of the Will : But if *Formally*, for that Righteousness whereby a Man is formally good and virtuous, then the Hungering and Thirsting after it will be a *Reflex* Act of the Will ; that is, a Desire, not of Material Righteousness, but of the Love of Material Righteousness, which is a Man's Formal Righteousness. And this Sense of Righteousness I take to be most agreeable to the Exigence of this Place, because the Desiring Material Righteousness, by a direct Act of the Will, actually makes a Man formally righteous, and so prevents and anticipates that Repletion which our Lord promises as a future Reward and Blessing. Whereas the Desiring Formal Righteousness, or the Love of Material Righteousness by a Reflex Act, supposes the Man not yet actually righteous, as he is also supposed in the Beatitude ;

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and so leaves him capable of having the Promise made good to him, that he shall be filled.

Now, as to the *Degrees* of Christian Righteousness, the Masters of Spiritual Life usually assign Three. By Degrees, I suppose, meaning not all those Advances in Righteousness, whereby a Man may exceed either another, or himself; for then they might as well have reckoned three Thousand, there being an infinite Latitude in Goodness: But only such Advances as imply different *Periods*, and distinct *States* of the Divine Life. These they assign to be Three; grounding this their Division upon the Authority of St. John, who, they say, represents Christians as under a Threefold State, by bespeaking them under the several Titles of *Little Children*, *Young Men*, and *Fathers*, John 2. 12. By Little Children, meaning young or new Converts, who must be fed with the Milk of the Word, with the plain Doctrins and Principles of Christianity. By Young Men, those who are grown up to some Strength in Holiness, and have made some Progress in the Mortification of the inferiour Life. By Fathers, those who are arrived to a perfect Habit of Goodness, and, as far as Human Nature will admit, are fully regenetrated into the Divine Life.

But I think this Computation must be retrenched: For, with all the Invention which I have, I can find but three States, or Degrees, for the whole Moral Condition of Mankind: For all the Men in the World, and every particular Man in several Periods of his Life, may be reduced to one of these three Orders: Either

he

he is one of those who do not apprehend Sin as an Evil ; who either through Want of Understanding and Reflection, have not attained to any Sense of its Malignity ; or through Debauchery and habitual Viciousness have lost it, and so will and chuse Sin *purely* and *entirely*, with Unity of Consent, and without any Mixture of Reluctancy, which is the most exalted Pitch of Wickedness that a Creature is capable of. Or else one of those who indeed do look upon Sin as Evil, and as such nill and are averse to it ; but not looking upon it always as the greatest Evil, do oftentimes nill it only imperfectly, and absolutely speaking do will and chuse it, to avoid (as they then think) some greater Evil. Or else lastly, one of those who looking upon Sin not only under the Notion of Evil, but as the greatest of all Evils, nill and refuse it, not only in some certain respect, but absolutely and thoroughly, so as not by any means to be persuaded to commit it.

THESE Three Degrees will comprise the whole Moral State of Mankind. And accordingly I observe that St. Paul makes mention of a three-fold Law. The first is, *νόμος τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν εἰς τοὺς μέλεα*, *The Law of Sin which is in the Members*, Rom. 7. 23. The Second is, *νόμος τῆς ψυχῆς*, Ver. 23. *The Law of the Mind*, or Conscience. The Third is, *νόμος πνεύματος τοῦ Ζωῆς*, *The Law of the Spirit of Life*, Rom. 8. 2.

THESE Three Laws answer exactly to the three Moral States of Human Nature. Under the first Law, the Law of Sin, are those who will and embrace Sin purely and entirely. Under the second Law, the Law of the Mind, are those

those who nill and stand averse to Sin in some certain respect, as Evil, but yet will and chuse it absolutely and effectually. Under the Third Law, the Law of the Spirit of Life, are those who absolutely and thoroughly nill the Commission of Sin.

THE first of these States is a state of meer Sin and Death, and those of this Order are they who are said to be *Dead in Trespasses and Sins*, Eph. 2. 1. The second is a state of Imperfect Life. The third is a state of Health and Vigour. The first is a state of Rest and Acquiescence in Sin. The second is a state of Contention. The third is a state of Victory. In the first state the Mind is laid fast in a deep sleep. In the second she is between sleeping and waking. In the third she is broad awake, and well come to her self. He that is in the first state, is born only of the Flesh, and has no higher Principle in him: He is that *Animal Man* that perceives not the things of God, 1 Cor. 2. 14. He that is in the second, has indeed some quickning Motions, some ineffective Stirrings and Endeavours of the Divine Life. But he that is in the third, is born of the Spirit and of God, and doth not commit Sin, because his *seed remains in him* Joh. 3. 9.

FROM this Distribution of the Moral State of Man, 'tis evident that there can be but two distinct Degrees of Righteousness, or States of the Divine Life. For the first of the Three (as was before remark'd) is a State of meer Death and Sin. Righteousness and Life belong only to the Two latter, but with this great Difference, that the first of these two Degrees, tho' it has something

thing of Life and Righteousness in it, yet 'tis such as is consistent with the final and absolute Prevalency and Dominion of Sin, and consequently such as cannot qualifie a Man for Pardon, or put him into a State of Grace and Salvation. Whereas in the last, the Principle of the Divine Life is supposed to be so strong, as not only to resist, but to overcome Sin. And he that is thus spiritually alive, is alive indeed; alive unto himself, and alive unto God, and if he abide in this Life, shall live for ever.

THERE are therefore but two such Degrees of Spiritual Life and Righteousness as imply different States. And therefore to the Distribution of St. John my Answer is, That it must necessarily be understood, not of Three distinct States of Righteousness (there being no more for the whole Moral Condition of Man) but of three Degrees in one and the same general State. If it be demanded which of the two States of Righteousness that is? I answer, That St. John must be supposed to intend the last and best State, because he addresses himself to his Little Children, Young Men and Fathers, as those who had their Sins forgiven them, who had overcome the wicked one, and who had known the Father, Joh. 2. 12, 13. All which Expressions argue one State of Grace in common between them, tho' differing in Measures and Proportions. The Reasonableness of which threefold Gradation I do not think my self concern'd at present to enquire into or justifie, it being sufficient to my present Purpose to have shewn that it cannot be meant of Three different States of Righteousness, but only

of Three different Degrees in the same State.
The States themselves are but two.

Now to the Question, What Degree or State of Righteousness that is, which if we hunger and thirst after we shall be fill'd : I answer, That it must be no other than that which puts a Man in favour with God, and qualifies him for the Mercies of the New Covenant. For if the *Righteousness* it self be not such as will render a Man acceptable with God, how can the *Desire* of it intitle him to his Promises? Tis a much less Worthiness to desire any Righteousness than 'tis to have it ; and how then can it be an acceptable thing to desire an unacceptable Righteousness! The Righteousness therefore here intended must be such as makes him that has it, acceptable to God ; and consequently it can be no other but the last Degree or State of Righteousness : Since nothing short of that can either reconcile God to Man, or make Man fit for God. And this I take to be the constant Voice of Scripture, and the Doctrin of our Holy Church, which every where represents an absolute and effectual Love of Holiness, and the like Hatred of Sin as necessary to the State of Grace and real Regeneration.

THERE are, I know, some among us, who notwithstanding their usual and popular Pretence, That they differ from our Church not in any Doctrinal Points of Religion, but only about some few Ritual Observances, do yet teach very differently in this Article, setting the State of Regeneration and Sanctification so low, that a bare ineffective Striving against Sin is reckon'd a very sufficient Mark of it : Wherein they conspire

spire with those of the Roman Church, who make the slightest Repentance by the Accession of Sacerdotal Absolution to be full and valid; only with this Difference, That what the one make sufficient in a certain Case, and on a certain Supposition, the other make sufficient universally and absolutely, requiring nothing further as of necessity to Sanctification than a bare ineffective Strife against Sin. A State which a Man may be soon *in*, tho', according to the same Gentlemen, not so soon *out*. For whoever has the least sense of Sin as an Evil (and certainly there are but few who have not so much) must needs be so far averse to it, and cannot possibly commit it but with some Reluctance: Which yet, according to these Men, is sufficient to intitle a Man to the State and Reward of Sanctification, tho' at the same time he be the Servant of Sin.

THIS I confess is a good way to counter-balance the Severity of their Reprobating Decrees, and to stock Heaven as much by one Doctrin, as they depopulate it by another. But certainly the Gate of Heaven is much too strait both for this Doctrin and for those (I will not say that hold it, but) that live by it. It is a Doctrin too little according to Godliness to be according to Truth, and such as makes neither for the Honour of God, nor for the Safety of Man. But I need reprove it no further, it being sufficiently exposed by our most excellent Bishop Taylor in his Preface to the Clergy of England, before his *Unum Necessarium*.

ALL therefore that I further remark is, That since the Righteousness of the first Degree is that

which these Men make sufficient for Acceptance with God, the same Degree of Righteousness would, I suppose according to these Men, be a sufficient Title to this Beatitude. But if the last Degree of Righteousness be only that which can procure us Acceptance with God (as most certainly it is) then that is the only Righteousness, which if we duly hunger and thirst after, we shall be fill'd. I say, which if we duly hunger and thirst after. Which leads me in the second Place to enquire what kind of Hunger and Thirst that is to which this Promise of Repletion is made.

AND first, 'tis plain that Hunger and Thirst here must be taken in a figurative and metaphorical Sense, since Righteousness is not the Object of a *Natural*, but of a *Spiritual* Appetite. Hunger and Thirst therefore is the same with willing or desiring. This as to the *Kind*. But then as to the *Degree*, 'tis to be consider'd, That every Good does as such necessarily move the Will, as every the least possible Weight moves the Scale, But it does not always move *effectually*, as every Weight in the Scale does not weigh it *down*. But however something it does towards it, since otherwise as much Weight would be necessary to turn the Scale as if it had been quite empty.

Dr. Glissonde
Vita Naturæ,
c. 19. p. 254.

I shall therefore distinguish of Willing as a very contemplative Theorist does of Physical Motion, into that which is *impotent*, and that which is *prevalent*. By impotent willing, meaning that natural Inclination or *Velleity* we have to every Good as such, which indeed would be prevalent, if not out-weighed by Reasons of stronger Moment

Moment on the other side ; but being overcome by them becomes impotent, not as to the Endeavour (for that is inseparable) but as to actual Determination. By prevalent Willing, I mean such a Degree of Willing as is not a meer Endeavour, but passes into actual and effectual Choice; When the Moral Scale not only *gravitates* and presses, but weighs down.

Now to the Question, Which of these Degrees of willing or desiring is here intended ? I answer, the last and highest, that which is peremptory and effectual, that which passes into Act, and ends in a thorough Determination of the Will. Since nothing less can either be signified by such strong Metaphors as these of *Hungering* and *Thirsting*, or consist with the Sincerity of a Christian Spirit. 'Tis not enough therefore to have ones Face set towards *Jerusalem*, and to cast some amorous Glances upon the Beauty of Holiness. 'Tis not enough to have some faint ineffective Wishes, some kind Resentments towards Righteousness, there being but few so wretchedly wicked and unmoraliz'd as not to have some such little *Velleities* of being Good ; and no question, *Balaam* that desir'd the *Death*, did also at this rate desire the *Life* of the *Righteous*. But the Desire must be strong and active, vehement and importunate, absolute and peremptory, without any Reserves or Conditions. It must bear the same Proportion to the Soul, that the Keenest Hunger and Thirst does to the Body; that is, it must be a great deal sharper, as much as the Appetites of the Spirit are more quick and exquisite than those of the Body. It must be such a Desire as our Saviour had to celebrate the *Pessover*, and institute

institute his last Supper, when he says, *Luk. 22. 15. With desire have I desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer.* Briefly, it must be such a Desire as carries in it the full Bent and Stress of the Soul, such as is accompanied with the most earnest and hearty Endeavours, and with the most Passionate and Devout Prayers and Aspirations to God. Such as that of the Psalmist, *O that my ways were made so direct, that I might keep thy statutes!* With many more such throughout the whole 119th Psalm, which I commend to the Meditation of the Pious.

THIS is that Hungring and Thirsting after Righteousness intended in this Beatitude. And accordingly 'tis observable what Solomon in a place almost parallel to this of our Lord, says concerning the Love of *Wisdom*, which generally in Scripture, especially in Solomon's Writings, signifies the same with Righteousness, *Prov. 2. My Son, if thou wilt receive my words, and bide my commandments with thee; so that thou incline thine ear unto wisdom, and apply thine heart to understanding; yea, if thou criest after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding; if thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures. Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of thy God.* Here the Wise Man makes the most searching Diligence, and the most vigorous Exertion of Soul, necessary to the finding of Wisdom. And he that so seeks her shall find her. Which brings me in the last place to make good the Proposition it self, that those who do thus hunger and thirst after Righteousness shall be fill'd.

BUT

BUT before I proceed to this, I beg leave by way of Digression to speak something of another sort of Hunger and Thirst, which all Christians are concern'd to have. Our Saviour tells us, that *Except a man eat the flesh of the son of man, and drink his blood, he has no life in him,* Joh. 6. 53. Now if the Flesh and Blood of our Lord be necessary to the *Life*, then certainly the Hungring and Thirsting after it is necessary to the Health and good Habit of a Christian. There is not a more open sign of a distemper'd Constitution either in the *Natural*, or in the *Spiritual Man*, than either to long for what is not his proper Food, or not to have an Appetite for that which is. And therefore since the Body and Blood of Christ is the proper Food and Aliment of a Christian, it concerns him as he values the Health and prosperous State of the Divine Life, not only to feed upon it, but to keep up in himself a due *Hunger* and *Thirst* after it.

MORE especially this he ought to do, whenever he approaches the Holy Altar to partake of this Divine and Heavenly Feast. He ought then by all the Arts of the Spirit, and by all the Methods of Grace, to quicken and raise this Hunger, and set an Edge upon this Thirst. St. Austin (if I mistake not) discoursing of the Dispositions of a worthy Communicant, reckons this *Hunger* and *Thirst* among them, and makes them as necessary Qualifications as any. And there is a great deal of Reason for it. This Holy Sacrament is generally set out in Scripture by Meat and Drink. 'Tis call'd expressly by the Name of the *Lord's Supper*. And, says our Saviour to the Jews, *My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed,* Joh.

6. And as 'tis expressed, so also was it prefigured by Types of the like Nature, such as the Tree of Life in the midst of Paradise, the Bread and Wine of *Melchisedeck*, the Manna, the Paschal Lamb, the Shew-bread, the Bread wherewith the Angel fed the Prophet, and particularly by the Waters springing out of the Rock, whereof the Fathers drank in the Wilderness.

Now I consider, that as these Figures represent the Nature and Efficacy of the Holy Sacrament, that 'tis the Food of the Soul, and the Life and Strength of the *Spiritual Man*; so they do also represent to us our *Duty*, and the proper Measure and Argument of Preparation: For if Meat and Drink be the Entertainment, what more convenient Preparation than *Hunger* and *Thirst*? We ought indeed to come to these Springs of Salvation, as the Hart is represented to do by the Psalmist to the Water-brooks, panting and thirsty, longing and impatient. Or rather, to use a nearer Emblem, as those thirsty *Israelites* did to the Waters that issued out of that Mystic Rock in the Wilderness. 'Tis impossible to give a just Description of this *Sacramental Thirst*; but if we could but so far advance our Fancy, as to represent to our selves with what Eagerness and Greediness those thirsty and scorched Travellers in the Wilderness did apply their Mouths to the springing Stone that was now more indeared to them by the *Benefit* than by the *Miracle*, then, and then only may we have some Notion of that Hunger and Thirst wherewith we are to approach and receive these Divine Mysteries. For if that Rock and Miraculous Water was a Type of our Sacrament (as the Apostle assures us it was, telling

ling us expressly, that that Rock was Christ, 1 Cor. 10. 4.) then by the like proportion, that *Thirst* was also a Symbol of our Duty, a Signification of our *Sacramental Thirst*.

AND as he that will come to this Divine Feast, must come Hungry and Thirsty ; so he that is truly Hungry and Thirsty as he ought, will be sure to come, and not (as too many do) study to find out Pretences to excuse his Absence. But why do I say *Study* to find Excuse ? There are some Men that will be hinder'd by *any* thing ; nay, by *every* thing. There is nothing, there *can* be nothing so little and inconsiderable, but what will hinder some Men from the Holy Sacrament : That which would not hinder them from any thing else, things of much lighter Weight than what were pretended by those in the Parable, the buying of a Farm, or the trying of a Yoke of Oxen, or the Marrying of a Wife. If the Heavens do but frown, or if they themselves are never so little out of Humour ; if a Visit be intended a Day after, or if a Domestick Jar happen'd a Day before, they presently keep off from the Sacrament. Nay, some are so very absurd, that though they themselves are in perfect Charity with all the World, and have not the least Tincture of the old Leaven remaining in them, yet if *another* Person happen to be out with *them*, they shall think this a sufficient Warrant to stay away from the Sacrament ; which amounts to as much as if a Man should say, Because another Person has sinned against me, therefore I will sin against God and my self, and so be sure to out-do him.

BUT there is a Degree of Folly beyond this. There are some that cover over this gross Neglect, which comes the nearest of any thing to what the Apostle calls *Trampling upon the blood of the covenant, and doing despite to the Spirit of Grace,* with the specious Pretence of Reverence. They have, forsooth, so profound a Reverence for the Holy Sacraiment, that they cannot find in their Hearts to come to it. A very odd Way of expressing Reverence to any Divine Institution, by turning ones Back upon it. This is such a Reverence as the Jews pretend towards the Tetragrammaton, or Name Jehovah, which consists in their never using it. Such a Reverence (if so much) as the Papists shew to the Host, when they carry it in Procession, to be gazed upon, and stared at. But do these Men, indeed, reverence the Sacra-
ment? Then one would expect, at least, that when-ever they *do* come, they should behave themselves there with more Devotion and Reve-
rence than othets that are most constant. But there is nothing like to be observed. Nor do I at all wonder at it, since the Way to Communi-
cate well, is to Communicate often. And I far-
ther remark, That those who behave themselves most *irreverently* at all other Parts of Divine Wor-
ship, are the very Men that stay most away from the Holy Altar, upon the Pretence of Reve-
rence.

BUT how comes it to pass that *this* is the on-
ly part of Religion that must be neglected upon the Account of Reverence? Do they do so by any *other* part of Religion? 'Tis true, indeed, that all the other Parts of Divine Worship are too much neglected, as well as this; but I do not find

find that ever any were so absurd as to pretend Reverence for the neglecting of them ; and why then should they do it here ?

BUT do these Men indeed reverence the Holy Sacrament ? Why then do they not pay some Regard to the Command it self, as well as to the Matter of it ? *Do this*, says our Saviour, *in remembrance of me*. Why should all the Reverence be fix'd upon *This*, and none upon *Do*? Or, if they do reverence the Command, how are they not afraid of breaking it ? Or how can a Command be reverenc'd by not observing it ? *Do this in remembrance of me*. If the doing this be in Remembrance of our Saviour, then the not doing it is to forget him : And how can he pretend Reverence to the Institution that forgets the Author of it ?

AND here I cannot but take Notice of another gross Notion that I find passes very current among Common People. They think all the Danger lies in coming unprepared : If they eat and drink unworthily, then nothing but Death and Damnation : But if they stay away, all is safe and well. As if a Man might not destroy himself with *Fasting*, as well as by taking *Poison*. These Men ought to consider that there is such a thing as an *Unworthy Non-Communicant*, as well as an *Unworthy Communicant*. And I wish they would read a certain Book that bears that Title, *The Unworthy Non-Communicant* : They would then perhaps be sensible of some other Danger, besides that of Coming without sufficient Preparation. In the mean time, all that I shall farther say to those Men is, that what-ever Pretences they make to Christianity, 'tis certain they have
not

not that *Hunger* and *Thirst* which is so necessary to the Life of a Christian, and which, if they had it, w^ould bring them oftner to this Spiritual Banquet, and procure them the Blessing of being *filled*, and replenished. To the Consideration of which I now return.

Now there are two Ways of being filled; either *Absolutely* and *Simply*, so as not to be any more in Desires: Or with respect to some *certain Object*, so as not to desire any more of the *same*; tho', simply speaking, you do desire *still*. The First of these is *Satisfaction*, the Second is *Satiety*: And those that duly hunger and thirst after Righteousness shall be filled both Ways; that is, They shall be filled with *Righteousness*, and they shall be filled with *Happiness*.

FIRST, They shall be filled with *Righteousness*; Rom. 5. 5. For, since the Spirit of God, which sheds his Love abtoad in our Hearts, is a good and loving Spirit, and knows no other Bounds in his Communications than what are set him by the Capacity of the Subject, it follows, that he will not fail to replenish all those with his Graces, who are duly qualified to receive them. But now, nothing can be supposed to be a greater Qualification, than such Hungering and Thirsting as I have describ'd. This is the utmost Man can do to dispose himself for the Reception of the Divine Impressions. This therefore is that sacred Lure, that powerful Charm, which draws down the Holy Spirit into the Hearts of Men; as the *Platonists* say of aptly disposed Matter, that it *sucks* a Soul into it by a kind of Natural *Magick*, from the World of Life. This Hunger and Thirst after Righteousness is the very

ry same to the Life of the Soul, as that *Organical Aptness* is to the Life of the Body : It is the Congruity of the Soul, in order to Spiritual Life. That Soul therefore that is so qualified for Righteousness, cannot miss, according to the Order of Grace, of being filled with it.

THE short is, God desires the Righteousness of Man, more than Man himself does, or can do : He delights to see his own Image reflect from him, and stands ready to sow the Seeds of the Divine Life in every capable Soil ; and therefore we need not doubt but that the truly hungry and thirsty Soul shall be filled with the *Bread of Life*, and with the *Waters of Comfort*, Psal. 23. Not that he shall be so filled with Righteousness in this Life, as not to desire any more of it, (for we are now in a State of Proficiency, not of Perfection) but in the next he shall : He shall then be so replenish'd with it, as not to desire any one farther Degree of it ; and shall be perfectly possessed of that Divine Life and Nature, whereof he is now only Partaker.

SECONDLY, These hungry and thirsty Souls shall be filled with *Happiness*. This is a certain Consequent of the other, there being both a *Natural*, and an *Establish'd Connexion* between Righteousness and Happiness. Some, indeed, have gone so far, as to make them one and the same as to *Kind*, and distinguishable only as to *Degree*. Hence that common Theological Effeate, *Grace is Glory begun, and Glory is only Grace finish'd*. But I think there is more Prettiness in the Expression, than Truth in the Notion. Nay, there is one Instance which plainly demonstrates it to be false : For 'tis most certain, that the Human

Soul of our Saviour was always in a State of *Perfect Grace*, having, as the Scripture says, received the Spirit of God without Measure; and yet it is as certain, that he was not, while on Earth, in the *State of Glory*, being then a *Man of Sorrows*, and acquainted with Grief: Much less was he in the *State of Glory* at the Hour of his Passion, and during his dreadful Dereliction. Which yet could never be, if perfect Grace and Glory were, as some contend, one and the same thing.

But our Proposition will stand well enough, without the help of this Notion. For, though *Righteousness* be not the same thing with *Happiness*, yet there is such a Connection between them, that they who are filled with the former, shall certainly be so with the latter. And this depends upon the Nature of Things, as well as upon the Order of God: For a righteous Frame of Spirit not only gives us Admission to the Supreme Good, but also disposes us for the Enjoyment of it; without which, all the other Materials of Happiness would signify nothing. 'Tis the Disposition of the Soul that makes the Vision of God truly *Beatific*; and when we *awake up after his likeness, and behold his presence in Righteousness*, Psal. 117. 16. then, and then only, we shall be satisfied with his Glory.

AND here we may stand still a little, and reflect what a great Privilege those that hunger and thirst after Righteousness have beyond all those who make Secular and Carnal Things the Objects of their Desire. These things can never fill them *absolutely*, so as to extinguish all Desire; being neither themselves the Good of Man, nor leading to that which is: Nor can they always satisfie that particular Appetite which

which is conversant about them ; sometimes because the Things themselves cannot be had, Nature having not provided enough for the Covetousness and Luxury, tho' she has for the Necessities of Men : And sometimes because they are too deficient when we have them, by reason of their Disproportion to the Enlargement of the Faculty ; as in the Objects of *Sight* and *Hearing*, wherewith neither the *Eye* nor *Ear* is satisfied, as was remark'd before. And when these things do fill any particular Appetite, it is only for a time, till the next Fit of Longing comes ; as the Ground is, for the present, refresh'd with a transient Shower. But for those that hunger and thirst after *Righteousness*, as their Desires are more noble, so their Satisfaction shall be more abundant. 'Tis their great and peculiar Blessedness to be filled in all Senſes, and in all Capacities, and to all Eternity.

DISCOURSE the Fifth.

MATTH. V. Ver. vii.

Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.



F all the Passions which God has planted in Human Nature, there is none which at once carries so bright a Resemblance of *God*, and is so fitted to the present Condition of *Man*, as that of Pitifulness and Compassion. And if, when God made Man, he consulted his own Eternal Essence, certainly when he drew this part of him, we may suppose him to have reflected upon the divinest of all his Ideas, and to have stamped upon him the most lovely Feature of the Divinity.

ALL the other Passions are, in their own simple Natures, indifferent, neither good nor evil in themselves, but equally determinable to either ; and, for the most part, are actually determined to the wrong. They are generally irregular, either in the Degree, or in the Object ; are either mis-governed or mis-placed ; and when most orderly managed, the highest Character they can pretend to, is only to be Instruments and Servants to Virtue. They are as a gusty Wind and Sail to a Ship ; if she steer right, they prosper, and further her Course ; but if wrong, they serve only

ly to strike her against the Rocks with more Speed and Force.

But now this Affection of Pity and Compassion rises higher than Indifferency, and is not content with a bare State of Innocence. It is of it self a virtuous Disposition, and needs only actual Exertion to make it a direct Virtue, and then its own Native Excellency will place it among the Highest Orders. And therefore tho' our Saviour by assuming our intire Nature, justified the Innocency of *all* our Natural Passions, yet as *Mercy* was that Attribute of God which he came chiefly to display, so is *that* the Affection which he chiefly commands to Man, by his Practice, and by his Discourses, by open Commands, and by Parabolical Insinuations; but chiefly by selecting and adopting this alone of all the Passions into the Sacred Number of his few Beatitudes, by telling us, that *Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.*

THIS great and peculiar Honour, done by our Lord to this Affection, will invite us to consider,

FIRST, The Nobleness and Excellency of it.

SECONDLY, Its great Reasonableness, and Usefulness.

THIRDLY, The particular Blessedness assigned to it.

But before we can well enter upon these Considerations, we must first premise something concerning the Notion of Mercy, or Compassion. By which, I suppose, is commonly understood,

a Trouble or Uneasiness of Spirit, conceived at some Evil that has befallen another ; with a Desire to help him out of it : Whereby it may be perceiv'd, that this is a mixt Passion, compounded of *Sorrow* and *Desire* : Sorrow for the Evil of the Patient, and Desire of delivering him from it.

If it be asked, What kind of Evil that must be, which is the Object of this Sorrow, or which may recommend a Man to our Pity ? I know no Reason why we shquld except against any. There are, I know, some considerable Divines and Moralists (among whom is *Curcellæus*, Pag. 999.) who will allow no other Evil to be capable of Pity, but only Evil of *Pain* ; nor that neither, if it be *deserved*. But, for my part, I do not understand why *Sin* may not fall under our Pity, as well as any other Evil. Nay, I think that the greatest Object of Pity in the World is an irreclaimable Sinner. And as for *Affliction*, tho' the thing it self be most pitiable when joined with Innocence, yet, I think, upon the *whole*, the guilty Sufferer is more to be pitied than the Innocent, since I can pity him for his Demerit, and for his Misery too ; whereas the latter is pitiable only for his Misery. Indeed, the guilty Patient is not to be pitied so much for his direct Misery, because he deserves it ; but then he is more to be pitied for his Desert and Misery together, than the other is for his Misery only. And I question not but that our compassionate Saviour, when he wept over *Jerusalem*, relented as much for the *Sins*, as for the *Vengeance* that was hanging over that unhappy City. And that, had those two great Tragick Scenes been at once presented before

fore him, the *Slaughter of the Innocents*, and the *Destruction of that guilty People*, he would have found more to be pitied in the latter, than in the former Tragedy.

I know that, by the *Roman and Jewish Laws*, it was forbidden to shew any Signs of Compassion in the behalf of those that suffered as *Criminals*; and, in consequence to this, they were not to *sit*, (that being the Manner and Posture of the *Hebrew and Roman Mourning*) but to *stand* at their Execution. Which was the Reason (as a learned Critick of our Church observes) why the Blessed Virgin, tho' deeply affected for the severe Usages of her Son, yet, in Compliance with the Law, chose rather to *stand*, than to *sit* near the Cross; and tho' full of inward Grief, refused to make any *solemn Shew* of Lamentation.

Mr. Gregory in his Notes and Observations, p. 25.

BUT I suppose that the Signification of these Laws, in forbidding open Compassion to convicted Malefactors, was not, that they were not Objects capable of it, and that therefore to pity them would argue a Sense of their Innocence, but only to procure the greater Reverence to Judicial Sentences, and to shew their great Satisfaction and Acquiescence in the Administration of Justice. This therefore will not exclude Criminals from the Sphere of our Compassion, of which I see nothing that should make them incapable. And I would fain know what would have become of all Mankind, if *Suffering Innocence* had been the only Object of Commiseration.

THESE few things being premised concerning the Notion of Mercy and Compassion, let us now consider the things that recommend it. The first whereof is, The Nobleness and Excellency of it. This has suffered much under the Misrepresentation of two sorts of Adversaries, the Stoick, and the Aristotelian. In the Stoick Morality it is so far from having any Reputation for Excellence, that it passes for a downright Vice, for an Instance of Weakness and Littleness of Soul, for such a Piece of Softness and Effeminity as does not comport with the Character of their *Wise Man*; who, indeed, is allowed to relieve, but not to be troubled for the Afflicted; and to add, if he can, to the Tranquility of their Minds, but not to lose any thing of his own. *Non miserebitur, sed succurret*, says Seneca: He may help the Miserable, but must not share in the Misery. This the Gravity of Zeno's School will, at no hand, permit; which, indeed, should make us the more beholden to them for granting what they do. But it is no wonder that they who will not allow a Man to be sensible of his own Evils, should forbid all Pity to those of other Men.

ON the other side, the Aristotelian, tho' he does not strike this Affection out of the List of the Vertues, as does the other, yet he very much cheapens and depreciates the Worth and Excellency of it, by deriving it only from selfish Principles, by making this the only ground of pitying others, that we upon the account of common Nature and Chance are obnoxious to the same Evils our selves.

IN opposition therefore to this Double Reproach I shall maintain and illustrate the Nobleness and Excellency of this Disposition upon this Double Ground.

I. BECAUSE 'tis found always in the Best of Natures.

II. BECAUSE it proceeds from the Best of Principles.

AND first, 'Tis always found in the Best of Natures. God as he is the Best, so is he also the most merciful and compassionate of all Beings. 'Twas the very Name whereby he proclaim'd himself to Moses, Exod. 34. 6. *The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, &c.* And our Saviour commends this Attribute of God in particular to our Imitation, Luk. 6. 36. *Be ye merciful as your Father is merciful.* We read in Scripture of the *Tender Mercies* of God, or as it may be more strictly render'd, Luk. 1. 78. *The Bowels* of the Mercy of God. There is a strange Emphasis and Strength in the Expression. And indeed there is nothing in Scripture so pathetically expressed as the Tenderness and Mercy of God. 'Twould be endless to alledge Particulars, but there is one Place which may go for all. 'Tis that famous Expostulation of God with himself upon the disingenuous Behaviour of his People *Israel*, Hos. 11. 8. *How shall I give thee up Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, and my repentings are kindled together.* What moving, melting Strains are these! What

a lively, breathing Image of Mercy and Pity! And yet 'tis but an *Image* still, vastly short of the Original, as will always be, whatever is said or thought of the infinite Mercy of God.

THE DOCTORS of the *Talmud* (as I am told) speaking concerning the Employment of God before the making of the World, say, not as he in St. *Austin*, that he was preparing an Hell for the Inquisitive, but that he was contriving how to be *merciful* to Mankind. And 'tis true indeed, God did from all Eternity contrive to shew Mercy to Man, tho' not by the way of Study or Employment of Mind, as they grossly fancy.

BUT the *Hebrews* further note (what indeed is more considerable) that God to shew his great Honour and Love for this dear Attribute, in all his kind and merciful Transactions with Men, chose always to be called by that his great and incommunicable Name, *Jehovah*, as to *Moses* in the Clift of the Rock, *Jehovah*, *Jehovah*, the *Lord*, the *Lord God*, *merciful and gracious*, &c. But in any Process of Justice and Judgment, he always stiles himself *Eloah*, or *Elohim*, a Name importing Force and Power, and that is not proper to God as the other, but common to him with the Creatures, being sometimes given to the Angels, sometimes to Magistrates, and sometimes even to False Gods. The Name *Jehovah* was more Sacred, and of Higher Import than that of *Elohim*; and therefore God to shew his special regard to Mercy above his other *Strange Work*, chose in his milder Addresses to be call'd by the former, and in his severer Proceedings by the latter. Which was the Reason, (as the forementioned Learned

Learned

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Learned Critick remarks,) why our Saviour at the Point of his Dereliction cried out, not *Jehovah, Jehovah,* but *Eli, Eli, my God, my God,* as not presuming at that time and in that Capitaly, to call God by his Titles of Paternal Love and Indearment, but as *Naming the Judge of the World doing the extreameſt Right upon his own Son, treading the Wine-press alone in the Person of all Mankind,* as that Learned Author expresses it,

Pag. 7.

But the greatest and most convincing Demonstration of the Mercy of God, is seen in the mysterious and costly Redemption of lapsed Man. The greatest Exaltation of which, is to say nothing of it, but, as the Angels are represented to do in Heaven, to stoop down and look near into it with Silence and Wonder. *Which things the Angels desire to look into, 1 Pet. 1. 12.* An Allusion no doubt to the Propitiatory or Mercy-lid upon the Ark, whereupon two Angels, *Cherubins,* (who are the Angels of Knowledge) did abide with their Faces one toward another, and their Eyes bent down to the Ark. Which, by the way, is also a sufficient Argument of the Unfathomableness of this great Dispensation of Mercy, which can still find further Employment for the Study and Curiosity even of Angels.

But perhaps 'twill be said, that Mercy in God is of another kind than what is called by that Name in Man, that it comes nearer the Stoical Notion of Mercy, importing only a bare Will to help the Miserable, without any compassionate Resentment for his Misery. It may be so, I won't dispute that now, tho' I can hardly

ly believe but that such strong and flaming Expressions of the Divine Mercy in Scripture must needs signify something more than what such cold Interpreters affix to them.

BUT however, to be more convincing, I further instance in the Human Soul of our Saviour Jesus Christ. 'Tis most certain that of all Human Spirits his was the most excellent. *Adam* in his Innocence was not comparable to him. He was excellent only by way of Nature, but our Saviour's Human Spirit to the same or greater Excellence of Nature had also superadded the Excellency of Grace, not common Grace, but that great and transcendent Grace of thy Hypostatick Union. And 'tis as certain that as he had the *Best*, so he had the *Best-natur'd* and most tenderly compassionate Soul in the World. I need not produce Instances, his whole Life is but one Argument of it. Only one Passage, when he saw the Multitude scattered abroad like Sheep that have no Shepherd, 'tis said, ἐπλαγχύσθη τοι αὐτῷ; *He was moved with compassion on them*, Mat. 9. 36. so we render it; but indeed the Expression is too high and pregnant to be verbally translated. 'Twould require a long copious Paraphrase to drain the Sense of that one Word, which signifies all that inward Feeling and Yerning of the Heart and Soul at a pitiful Object, that melts and turns the very Bowels of the Good-natur'd Spectator.

AND the same Tenderness of Spirit which he had on Earth, he retains still in Heaven, tho' in all other respects *Impassible*, and incircled with Divine Glories. Whereupon he is called in Scripture

ture our merciful High-Priest; and to convince any Opposer that this is not meant of Mercy improperly so called, a bare Will to help without any compassionate Resentment, says the Author to the Hebrews, *we have not an High-Priest which cannot be touched with feeling of our infirmities,* Heb. 4. 15.

AND these two Considerations by the way give a clear Defeat to the Pretences of both the forementioned Adversaries. For whereas the Stoick traduces this noble Vertue for a piece of Weakness and Infirmitie, fit only for soft and effeminate Persons; to him I oppose the Instance of our Saviour's Human Soul while on Earth. And whereas the Aristotelian, makes the only ground of Pity to be a fear of falling into the like Calamity; to him I oppose the same Instance of our Saviour, but in another Capacity, when he was altogether Impassible in his Glorified State, and above the Possibility of partaking with us in our Miseries any other way, than by Sympathy and Compassion.

To this I may add, that among meer Men, the most generous and brave Spirits, those whom Paganism has Deify'd, Christianity has Sainted; those Heroes whom History has marked with Honour, and whom Envy it self is ashame'd to calumniate, have all along been signal for their Mercy and Good-Nature. As on the contrary, the most base, timorous and low-spirited Breasts are always observed to be the Seats of Cruelty and Hard-heartedness.

BUT 'tis no wonder that this Disposition is found in the Best of Natures, since, in the Second Place, it proceeds from the Best of Principles.

pleſ. For it proceeds from *Charity*, with which the leaſt thing a man can think or do is excellent, and without which the greatest, *Rom. 13.* even *Martyrdom* it ſelf, is nothing worth. It has that for its Parent which is the Mother of all Vertues, and which is of it ſelf the fulfilling of the moſt perfect, that is, of the *Christian Law*. And that it proceeds from *Charity* is plain. For the more we desire the Happiness and Well-being of Mankind, the more we ſhall be troubled to ſee any of them in Misery, and be the moſe willing to procure them Ease and Deliverance. And this tho' we do not apprehend our ſelves in danger of the like Calamity, there being no necessity of making that the ground of Pity, as appears from the Instance of our Saviour's Human Soul in its Glorified State. I deny not but that the generality of Men are mov'd to Pity upon the conſideration of common Danger, and that it may be their own Turn next to ſuffer and stand in need of Help; but it is not neceſſary that they *ſhould*, and 'tis their Imperfection that they *are*. I lay *their* Imperfection, not that of the *Affection* it ſelf, whose Idea involves no ſuch selfish Principle, and which may really be ſeparated from it, as by the fore-alleged Example is certain and evident.

AND now if to be found in the Best of Natures, and to proceed from the Best of Principles, be any Argument of Excellence, we may hence conclude what a Noble and Excellent Disposition of Mind this is, and that when the *Roman Orator* told *Cæſar*, That of all his many Vertues, none was either more acceptable, or more wonderful

wonderful than his Mercy and Clemency ; he might perhaps Compliment the *Emperour*, but said nothing extraordinary of the Virtue.

As will further appear by considering Secondly, the great Reasonableness and Usefulness of it. As to the Former, besides that all that may be said in the behalf of Charity and Universal Love, may be alledged as well for this, there are these two more proper and peculiar Grounds to prove and inforce it.

I. To consider what Man has Receiv'd.

II. To consider what he Expects.

AND First, if we consider what Man has already receiv'd, this Virtue of Mercy will appear to be highly reasonable. Man has receiv'd innumerable Mercies of God, some of which are so great, so surprizing and incredible, that 'tis made one of the greatest Trials and Commendations of his Faith to believe them. Such as the Honour of the Hypostatick Union, the Redemption from Sin and Misery by the Death of the Son of God, the Grace of Repentance, and the like. All which are yet improv'd and heightened by this further Consideration, that they are proper and peculiar to him, no other Creatures, not so much as the Angels themselves, being Partakers with him. The Angels indeed, as all other Creatures, partake of the Goodness of God ; but Man alone among all the Creatures has the Privilege to be the Object of his Mercy. Since therefore Man, and Man only has receiv'd so much Mercy of God, it appears very reasonable that he of all Creatures should shew Mercy.

As

As it will Secondly, if we consider what he expects. Man has not yet received so much Mercy, but that he expects more. The Mercy that he has receiv'd is by the Redemption of Christ to be put into a *Capacity* of Salvation, but the Mercy that he expects is to be *actually* saved. The Court of Mercy is the only Court where Man dares appear, or can abide a Trial. Briefly; Man expects Mercy both from God and from Man, in this Life, and in the next, in Death and after Death, and therefore there is great reason to conclude, that he of all Creatures should be merciful, and that *Cruelty* was as little made for *Man as Pride*.

No R is this Affection less Useful than Reasonable. The Condition of Man in this World is such, as makes it as necessary for him to be *pitiful*, as to be a *sociable* Creature. Man cannot subsist without the Guardianship and Protection of Society ; nor is Society any Security without this Affection. For what signifies Strength and Ability (and Society as such infers no more) without Inclination to assist ? The Wise Man tells us, that *Wisdom is better than Strength*, Eccl. 9. 16. and 'tis very true ; but neither of them, nor both of them signify any thing without a tender and compassionate Temper. Then only may we expect Happiness and Defence from Society, when there is the same Sympathy in the Politick as there is in the Natural Body, when there is a mutual Correspondency and Communication of Parts, like the Sympathetick Answer of one Lute to another. When the *Heaven bears the Earth*, in the Prophet's Phrase; or as the Apostle more fully expresses it,

it, when *If one Member suffer, all the Members suffer with it; or if one Member be honour'd, all the Members rejoice with it,* 1 Cor. 12. 26. This would make a Millennium indeed; nor is any thing further wanting, but only that Men would agree together to make the Experiment.

AND because this is a Passion of so great Use and Necessity to the present Condition of *Man*, God has been pleas'd to take an early and an effectual Care for the Security of it, not only by giving the Soul of *Man* an Original Bent and Inclination that way, but also by disposing him to it by the very Make and Figuration of his Body, that so the whole *Man* might stand inclined to shew Mercy and Compassion. For we are to consider that there are some natural Dispositions in the Brain, whereby we are moved and admonished to be pitiful and compassionate, since the Course of the Animal Spirits is (by I know not what Principle) directed to those Parts whereby we are stirred up to the sense of others Pain or Misery. For as Experience witnesseth, whenever we happen to cast our Eyes upon a *Man* that is wounded, we find a sudden Tide of Spirits thronging towards those Parts of our Body, which answer to the Parts affected of the wounded *Man*, unless by some accidental Cause their Course be diverted some other way. And these *Motions* by which the Parts of our own Body are affected by the occasion of those *Motions* which are excited in others, do raise that Sentiment within us, which we call *Pity* or *Compassion*, which by an Order of God's Establishment, we can no more help being affected with, than we can that our

Animal Spirits should flow to and affect those Parts of our Body which correspond to those of another which we see wounded. So that you see the Ground and Foundation of this Affection is laid in Nature. God has bound it upon us, by a *Natural* as well as by a *Moral Law*, by the very Figure and Contexture of our Bodies, which certainly he would not have done, but that he knew how useful and necessary it was for the Interest of Mankind in their present Posture, which is a State of Want and mutual Dependence upon each other, whereby we stand in need of one anothers Pity and Compassion.

AND now if this Divine Affection (for so we may now venture to call it) be not yet sufficiently recommended from its Nobleness and Excellency, and from its great Reasonableness and Usefulness, let us further add the particular Blessedness here assigned to it. *Blessed are the merciful*, says our Saviour, *for they shall obtain mercy*. This they shall obtain from Men and from God, here and hereafter.

FIRST they shall obtain *Mercy* from Men here. Not that this is to pass for an absolute Rule, without any Exception, since as long as Men are but Men, *Mercy* is capable of being abused and ill-requited, as well as any other Virtue; otherwise our Saviour would have been more kindly treated than he was by the Jews. But the Meaning is, that nothing does more naturally recommend a *Man* to the good Will and Compassion of others, than a Merciful and Benign Temper; and that generally speaking, if Men be but tollerably well disposed, and have any Sense of Justice and Gratitude, the merciful

Man

Man will actually find Mercy among them. However if not, he has the greater Stock of Mercy to come. For,

SECONDLY, the *Merciful* shall obtain *Mercy* from God hereafter. And this does not depend upon so many Casualties, and such uncertain Suppositions as the other. Here 'tis only required that *mercy and truth meet together*, and that the Man be sincere and upright in all other Moral Respects. And so much indeed is necessary. For 'tis not to be thought that *Mercy* alone, any more than any other Solitary Virtue, can qualify a Man for *Mercy*. No, the Man must be πληρὸς καὶ ὄλοντις, Perfect and Intire, and wanting nothing as to all the integral Parts of Duty, to be accepted in the Judgment of God, Jam. i. 4. Only there may I think be allowed this further Sense in the Proposition, that no one Virtue shall go so far towards the obtaining of full *Mercy* from God, as this of *Mercifulness*. And that if the *Merciful* Man for want of other necessary Parts of Christian Perfection, should not be able to stand in the last Judgment, yet however his Fall shall be much the milder, and he shall have great Abatements of Punishment made him for the sake of this one Excellency. To which purpose, 'tis very considerable that our Saviour in the Description of the Last Judgment, makes all the Favour and all the Severity of that Day to proceed according to the Practice or Omission of this Duty, Mat. 25.

ONE way or other therefore the *Merciful* shall be sure to obtain *Mercy*, nor will God forget this *Labour of Love*. Pray God we may not

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forget it our selves, but may so love, study and practise *Mercy* here, that we may hereafter not only receive a milder Sentence, but find such a Degree of *Mercy* as may finally *rejoice against Judgment*. Amen.

DISCOURSE the Sixth.

MATTH. V. Ver. viii.

Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.



NE of the most distinguishing Perfections of the Christian Institution above any other either Divine or Human, is, That it requires an inward Rectitude of Mind and Spirit, and makes the *Heart* the Principle and Seat of Spiritual, as it is of Natural Life. The *Heathen Morality* went little further than the Regulation of the outward Behaviour, not much regarding the Sanctity of the *Interior*. And tho' some few raised Spirits among them, mov'd by a Diviner Impulse, would now and then, like *Men* in Ecstasies, talk above the World and themselves too, recommending certain *Purgations* and *Purifications* of Soul, as the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, yet this was not taught or known in the common Schools of Nature, nor was it any where made the ordinary Standard of *Morality*.

THE *Jewish Religion*, as it presented to the World a Second and more Correct Edition of the

the Law of Nature, so was it in this particular respect more perfect than the Gentile *Morality*, there being in the *Moral Law* one special Precept which directly concerns *Purity of Heart*. But yet there was a great defect even here too, because tho' there was a Prohibition, of *inward Concupiscence*, yet it had no penal Sanction annex'd to it. Every other Precept was so guarded as to be able to revenge it self upon those who transgressed it. Idolatry was punished, Perjury was punished, Profanation of the Sabbath, Disobedience to Parents, Murther, Adultery, Theft, and bearing false Witness were all punished, only Concupiscence, had no Punishment allotted to it. Which (as a Learned Person conjectures) gave some occasion to think that they might securely indulge their Concupiscence, so it did not break forth into the outward and grosser Act.

Philippus a Limborch. Theolog. Christian p. 217.

CERTAIN it is, that many among the Jews so thought and practis'd, contenting themselves with external Conformity to the Law, without any regard to the inward Purity and Holiness, as may appear from our Saviour's frequent Reprehensions of the Pharisees upon this very Account. And 'tis very probable that this their Fancy was occasioned by there being no Punishment assign'd to the Breach of the Tenth Commandment, as that Learned Person conjectures. However 'tis certain that it was a great Defect in the Law not to bind so perfect a Precept with a Penal Sanction. Tho' indeed the true Reason was, because 'twas too perfect to be severely exacted in that Infant Age and State of

the Church. The Law therefore did not rigidly *exact* it, tho' it did plainly *command* it. Which tho' no Defect with relation to that Time and State, (the Law being as perfect as the Gospel, as to all the Ends and Purposes intended by it, and every way accommodated to the Condition of those on whom it was imposed) yet absolutely speaking it was a great Defect and Imperfection of the Law.

THEN as to the *Mahometan* Religion (which indeed is only Heathenism pretending to *Revelation*) this, tho' the last, and assuming to it self the Improvement of all that went before, is yet really short even of Heathenism it self. This is so far from requiring internal Purity, that it does not require so much as external, but allows and recommends too the grossest Impurities; which has often made me wonder why the *Turk* should write upon the out-side of his Alcoran, *Let no man touch this Book, but be that is pure.* I'm sure the Book it self requires no such thing, nor can I justifie the Reason of the *Motto* in any other Sense but this, That none but he that is pure is fit to be trusted with such a corrupt Institution.

BUT the Christian Law is *pure* indeed, and none but such as are so are worthy to unloose the Seals of this Book. This requires the utmost Purity that is consistent with the Measures of Morality, Purity without, and Purity within, pure Hands and pure Hearts. It requires it more expressly, and in a greater degree, than either the Heathen or Jewish Religion, and (what was wanting in the other) under the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments, and those the

the greatest imaginable. It does not only command inward Purity, but encourage it too by the strongest Proposals that can affect either the *Sense* or the *Reason* of Man. One of the greatest of which Encouragements is, that our Saviour inserts it into the Order of his Beatitudes, and gives it a special Title to the Beatifick Vision in these Words, *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.*

THE Subject to be here discoursed of is *Christian Purity, or Purity of Heart.* Whereof I shall represent,

I. THE Nature, by a Character or Description.

II. THE Necessity.

III. THE Blessedness.

By Purity of Heart in general, is to be understood an inward Conformity of all the Thoughts and Desires of the Soul to the Will and Law of God. When not only the external Actions are according to the Rule, but the whole inward Frame and Position of the Mind stands right and well-order'd, and (as the Apostle describes it) not only the Body, but the *whole spirit and soul is blameless*, 1 Thes. 5. 23.

AND to make it so, these Two Things are particularly requisite, First, That we do not consent to any unlawful Desires, no not so much as to the first Motions of Sin, whether proceeding from the Corruptness of our own Nature, or from Diabolical Suggestion. Secondly, That we do not entertain with any Delight the Remembrances of our past Sins.

BUT more particularly yet, Purity of Heart may be doubly considered, either in opposition to *Pollution*, or in opposition to *Mixture*. In the first Sense it removes Sensuality, in the second Hypocrisie. This Distinction of the Word Pure is acknowledged, and withal applied to this Place, by our Learned Dr. *Hammond*, illustrated by the Instances of Water and Wine, the former of which is said to be pure, when not muddled or defiled; the latter when not mixt.

Pract. Cat. p.
107.

BUT tho' the Word be equally capable of this latter Sense, yet I do not think it to be at all intended by our Saviour in this place, there being no such particular Congruity between this sort of Purity and the nature of the Reward here assign'd. Confining therefore our Discourse to the former Sense of the Word, as more suitable to the Circumstance of this place, from what has been premised, we may collect this Idea or Character of the Pure in Heart, " That they are such as regulate not only the external Conduct of their Lives, but also the inward Frame and Habitude of their Minds, and conform not only their Actions, but their Wills and Desires, Thoughts and Designs to the Rule of the Law, and to the Dictates of the *Internal Light* of God in the Soul. Such as sanctifie the Lord God in their Hearts, compose the inmost Recesses of their Minds into an Holy Awe and Reverence of the Divine Presence, set a Law to all their Intellectual Powers, and suffer not the least Thought or Passion to violate the Order either of Reason or Grace. Such, lastly,

" lastly, as yield no consent either to the Being
" or Stay of irregular Motions, nor give any
" entertainment to the Allurements of the World,
" the Flesh, or the Devil, nor delight themselves
" with any pleasing Recollections, any imagina-
" ry Scenes of their past Immoralities ; but set
" themselves at the greatest Distance from Sin,
" resist the very first Beginnings, and, as near
" as they can, abstain from the least Appearan-
" ces of Evil.

THIS is the most resembling Idea that I can frame to my self of the Pure in Heart. And now lest this should be taken for a meer Idea, a thing of Notion rather than Practice, I proceed in the next Place to represent the Necessity of such a Disposition of Soul.

THE Necessity of it is Double in order to a double End, *Holiness* and *Happiness*.

AND First, This Purity of Heart is necessary in order to Holiness, that is, there can be no true Christian Holiness without it. This will appear by considering,

FIRST, That the Christian Law expressly requires it. For this I need appeal no further than to the Progress of this same Discourse of our Saviour upon the Mount. Where among several other improving Expositions of the Mosaic Law, we find this, *Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit Adultery. But I say unto you, that whosoever looketh on a Woman to lust after her, hath committed Adultery with her already in his Heart*, Mat. 5. 27. By which Lust here I conceive must not be understood the bare natural Appetite of Concupiscence (that being as such indifferent) but the Appetite irregularly deter-

determin'd; nor that neither as 'tis a pure Natural and Mechanick Motion, for so it has nothing Moral in it, and can only be materially Evil) but as it has the Consent of the Will going along with it. Which Consent may be either to the very *Desire* it self, or to the *Acting* of it. If to the *Act*, then the Man is in all Moral Accounts a compleat Adulterer, and will be so esteem'd by God, who as he *Sees*, so he *Judges* by the Heart, and will not think a Man the more innocent only for wanting an Opportunity of committing what he fully intended. But if the Consent be only to the *Desire*, then tho' the Man be not a compleat Adulterer, yet he may be truly said in the Style of the Psalmist, to be a *Partaker with the Adulterer*, Psal. 50. to have enter'd within some Degrees of Unchastity, and to have transgressed against that Christian Purity, which forbids all Consent not only to the compleat *Acts*, but also to the first *Motions* of Sin.

SECONDLY, The Necessity of this Purity of Heart in order to true Holiness, will appear by considering the Nature of God, who is both a *Spirit* and a *Discerner* of Spirits, and ought therefore for a double Reason to be worshipp'd in *Spirit and in Truth*, Joh. 4. 24. Our Saviour thought the former sufficient, but the latter adds a further Degree of Strength to it. God as a *Spirit* cannot be worthily served by any thing less than the *Sacrifice* of the *Spirit*, which perhaps was one of the Reasons why our Saviour, when he was to become a *Sacrifice* to his Father, took upon him not only Human Flesh, as some of the Antient Hereticks would have believ'd, but also an Human Soul. And as a *Discerner* of Spirits

he cannot be put off with a Bodily instead of a Spiritual Service, or accept of a Polluted and Unsanctified Spirit. The Psalmist had a due Sense of this, when he said, *Psal. 51. 6, 10.* *Thou requirest truth in the inward parts, and shalt make me to understand wisdom secretly.* And when he pray'd, *Make me a clean Heart, O God, and renew a right Spirit within me.*

THIRDLY, This Purity of Heart may be further concluded necessary to true Holiness from the Nature of Man himself, in whom as the Soul is in all respects the *Principal*, so in all Moral Respects it is the *only Part concerned*. This *Inner Man* is that Man who is the immediate and proper Subject of all Good and Evil, Virtue and Vice, and accordingly this is the Part to which our Sanctification and Regeneration is always ascrib'd, and from which the Man receives his whole Moral Distinction. And therefore says the Apostle, *To be carnally minded is Death, but to be spiritually minded is Life and Peace,* Rom. 8. 6. Where you see 'tis the inward Disposition of the *Mind* that makes all the Difference. If this be Pure and Holy, the whole Man is so; but if this stand not right to God and Goodness, 'tis not all the external Conformity in the World that can supply the Defect.

'T was the Conceit of the Ancient Jews (as we are told by Mr. Selden) that every Proselyte of *Justice* at the very Instant when he became so, had a new Soul infused into him, to which Opinion our Saviour is supposed to allude in his Discourse with *Nicodemus*. Now tho' Christianity does not acknowledge a New, that is, another Soul in its Converts,

*De Jure Nat.
& Gent. p. 159.*

Converts, yet it requires that the same Soul become new, it requires a new Frame and Temper of Spirit. The *Christian Man* is to be born again, and to become a New Creature, a Creature of another Rank and Order. And 'tis the *Mind* and *Spirit* upon which this great Transaction is to pass, and which is to be the immediate Subject of this extraordinary Change. And accordingly our Regeneration is expressed in Scripture by our being *renew'd in the Spirit of our minds*, Eph. 4. 23. We must be renew'd; and where? Not in our Body or outward Man, but in our Minds. And in what part of the Mind? Not in the Inferior Part, whether *Sensitive* or *Plastic*, that which is exercised about Objects of Sense, or that which *moves* and *forms* the Body, but in the Highest and Noblest Part, in the *Spirit* of our Minds, which answers to the Platonical *Nēs*, the very *Flower* and *Essence* of the Soul. Here 'tis we are to be renew'd, as indeed we must if we be renew'd at all, this being in all regards the Principal, and the only *moral* Part of Man.

To this purpose it must be further consider'd, that this Intellectual Heart, the Spirit and Soul of Man is the Fountain and Source of all Action. This is that which sees in the Eyes, and hears in the Ears. This is that which understands and wills, loves and hates. Here are all the Springs and Powers of Life and Motion, here is the last Resort of all outward Impressions, and from this *Central Point* are deriv'd all the Lines of Action and Motion, even as all the Arteries and Veins are from the Natural Heart, which it diffuses and disperses throughout the Body.

Body, and has its Pulses in every Part. If therefore this general Head-Spring be not kept pure, and clean, how can the Streams run clear? And upon this was grounded that signal Advice of the Wise Man, *Prov. 4. 23.* *Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life.* Parallel to which I find a Passage in the Meditations of the Royal Philosopher *Marcus Antoninus*,

"Ἐγδον βλέπε, ἐγδον οὐ πονητὸς τὸ αἰσθῆται," Oxford Edition, p. 224.
Look within, for within is the Fountain of Good.

FURTHER yet, this Intellectual Heart is not only the Fountain of Action and Motion, but the most active and most rapidly moving thing in the World. This Heart is always Beating, the Pulses of it never rest; Thought rises upon Thought, and Desire succeeds Desire. The Motion is perpetual, constant and vehement; so vehement, that the swiftest Bodily Motion, no not that of the Starry Orb, is comparable to it; so vehement, that it cannot be discern'd or number'd, and comes nearer to a Rest than a Motion, as the swiftest Turnings round of a Globe look like standing still. Now what a dangerous thing is such a Motion as this, if not rightly determin'd? Of what vast Heights in Goodness is it capable! And to what vast Heights of Wickedness may it rise, if not well govern'd! There is therefore great Necessity that this Heart of Man should be kept with all Diligence, and that it should be, kept pure and undefiled.

FOURTHLY and Lastly, the Necessity of Purity of Heart in order to Holiness will appear as from the Christian Law, the Nature of God, and the Nature of Man, so also from the intimate Union that is between the Divine and Human Nature.

Nature. All things are full of God, who is therefore call'd in the Sacred Tongue **המקדש** or the *Place*. But there is nothing so intimately united to him as the Spiritual Part of the Creation. God is the immediate *Place of Spirits and Souls*, who all live, move, and have their Being in him, and are join'd to him by a *Central Touch*, as the great *Plotinus* speaks. The Apostle says, that even our Bodies are the Temples of the Holy Ghost; our Souls then must be at least his Sanctuary, and most Sacred Recess. But what? Was not God just now supposed the Place of Spirits, and are Spirits now made the Place of God? Yes, and without any Absurdity. For so St. John describes our Union with God, by our dwelling in God, and by God's dwelling in us, *John 4. 16*. The Union is Double, on God's part, and on Ours. God dwells in us by his special Presence, by the Spirit of Grace and Benediction. But we dwell in God Essentially and Totally. God dwells only in some certain Spirits, such as are of a Disposition fit to receive and entertain him; those who (as the Jews love to speak) are worthy to have the *Shechinah* rest upon them. But all Spirits good and bad, however qualified, dwell in him. For where else should they dwell, since he is all, and fills all? Now both these Unions infer the Necessity of Purity of Heart in order to Holiness.

For first, if we consider the Soul of Man as dwelling in God, what infinite reason is there that that Part of him especially should be kept pure which is essentially join'd to, touches and inhabits so pure and so awful an Excellence! *Put off thy Shoes from off thy Feet*, said God to Moses, for the place whereon thou standest is holy Ground, Exod.

Exod. 3. 5. And if so much Reverence be due to the Dwelling-place of God, what Reverence is there then due when God himself is the Dwelling place ! How dares any Man lodge an impure Soul in the Bosom of so pure a Majesty ! Or how can he in any measure be esteemed Holy, tho' in all other Respects never so unblamable, who is polluted in *that* Part which is so inwardly united to the Beauty of Holiness !

THEN Secondly, if we consider God dwelling in the Soul and Body of Man, there is great Necessity of Purity of Heart. And that upon a double Account :

I. BECAUSE the Spirit of God which is the Principle of all Grace and Holiness will not enter but into a pure and clean Heart.

II. BECAUSE no other is worthy of so Divine a Presence.

AND first, The Holy Spirit will not enter but into a pure and clean Heart. For this special and gracious Presence of God is not like his General and Essential Presence, universal and unlimited, but fixt and confin'd to certain Laws, and depending upon certain Conditions and Qualifications. And tho' the first Addresses, influential Visits, and distant Overtures of the Holy Spirit prevent all previous Dispositions of Man, who (as our Church expresses it in her 10th Article) *cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength*, yet to his fix'd Dwelling and residential Abode in us, 'tis necessary that there be an antecedent Preparation of Heart. Which I conceive to be the Reason that though *all* Men are at some time or other

other Partakers of the common and ordinary Motions of the Spirit, (who is said to have striven even with the old World, Gen. 6. 3.) yet none but very good Men have the Privilege to be the Temples of his Residence. And this whole Matter I take to be distinctly represented in those Words of St. John, *Behold I stand at the door and knock: If any Man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him and sup with him,* Rev. 3. 20. Where by standing at the Door and knocking, is meant common and preventing Grace. And this indeed is used to all, without any previous Qualifications. But he does not come in and sup, that is, take up his Residence and be a familiar Guest, till his Voice be heard, and the Door open'd; that is, till the Man has well attended to, and complied with those his antecedent Motions and Suggestions, till he has swept and made clean the inner Room of his Heart: So that Purity of Heart is absolutely necessary, tho' not for the first preventing Influences, yet for the Residence and In-dwelling of the Holy Spirit, who tho' he visit those that sit in Darkness, and in the Shadow of Death, yet he will not Lodge but in a pure and bright Soul.

NOR Secondly, is any other than such worthy of so Divine a Presence. Indeed the purest Soul has Reason to say with the Centurion, *Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my Roof,* Mat. 8. 8. if we consider the Disproportion that is between the Purity of God, and that of the purest Temple we can prepare for him. For he putteth no trust in his Saints, nor are the Heavens clean in his sight, Job 15. 15. How much more unworthy then is the impure and polluted Soul of

so pure a Presence ! Suppose the Spirit of God would enter into a Polluted Spirit, yet what Soul that has any sense of Decency would dare to continue any longer so, when once possess'd by so Divine an Inhabitant ! *Psal. 93. Holiness becomes thine House for ever.* says the Psalmist, that is, it is very meet and right, decent and proportionable, that the place of the Divine Residence should be kept holy and undefiled. The Divine Presence is the greatest and most solemn Consecration of any Place that can be, and where-ever he fixes his Mansion, there the Inscription ought to be, *Holiness to the Lord.* And the reason of all this is by the Psalmist render'd elsewhere, *For thou art a God that hast no pleasure in wickedness, neither shall any evil dwell with thee,* *Psal. 5. 4.*

HAVING thus far shewn the Necessity of Purity of Heart in Order to Holiness, to compleat this Part it remains that we further represent its Necessity in order to Happiness. Now this Necessity may respect either our Admission into Happiness, or our Enjoyment of it when admitted. That Purity of Heart is necessary to our Admission into Happiness is already sufficiently deducible from what has been premised concerning its Necessity to Holiness, without which we are expressly told, *No man shall see God,* *Heb. 12. 14.* We are therefore further concern'd only to shew that 'tis necessary to the Enjoyment of Happiness.

AND here not to feign a long Hypothesis of a Sinner's being admitted into Heaven, with a particular Description of his Condition and Behaviour there, we need only consider that the Supreme Good is of a Relative Nature, as well

as any other Good, and consequently the Enjoyment of it must necessarily require some Qualification in the Faculty, as well as the Enjoyment of any other Good does, something that may render that Good a Good to that particular Faculty. Otherwise tho' it may be *possess'd*, yet it can never be *enjoy'd*. This again must be something that must produce some Likeness or Agreeableness between the Faculty and the Good to be enjoy'd. Which because the Purest of all Beings, leaves no room to doubt but that Purity of Heart must be that Agreeableness, without which as a Man cannot *resemble*, so neither can he *enjoy* God.

We see that even in this Life 'tis very tedious to be in the Company of a Person whose Humour is disagreeable to ours, though perhaps in other respects of sufficient Worth and Excellency. And how then can we imagin that an ill disposed Soul should take any Pleasure in God, who is to her infinitely more unlike, and therefore disagreeable, than one Man can be supposed to be to another ? For my part, I rather think that should an impure Soul be afforded a Mansion in Heaven, she would be so far from being happy in it, that she would do *Penance* there to all Eternity. For besides that a sensualiz'd Soul would carry such Appetites with her thither for which she could find no suitable Objects, which would be a constant Torment ; those that she *does* find there would be so disproportionate, that they would rather vex and upbraid, than satisfie her Indigence. So that this in short would be her Case, That which she desires and could relish, that she has not ; and that which she has, that she neither

ther desires nor can relish ; the Result of which must needs be a very high Degree of Misery and Dissatisfaction. So absolutely necessary is Purity of Heart both to the *Acquisition* and *Enjoyment* of Happiness.

AND yet there is something that recommends it further yet, and that is the *Blessedness* that attends it, the third and last thing to be consider'd. *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.* But before we come so far as this, there is a Present Blessedness belonging to it in this Life, which I shall briefly touch upon: And here, besides that inward Peace of Mind, that Satisfaction of Conscience, and Spiritual Joy and Complacency which are the common Advantages of a good and well-order'd Life, there are these three more peculiar Advantages of Purity of Heart.

I. THAT 'tis more *Innocent.*

II. THAT 'tis more *Easie.*

III. THAT 'tis more *Safe.*

MORE *Innocent*, because 'tis supposed to put a Bar against the very first Beginnings of Sin, and consequently to be removed at a greater Distance from it.

MORE *Easie*, because 'tis easier to abstain from the first Beginnings of Sin, than from a further Progress in it after you have once begun. Nor is there so much pains requir'd not to admit, as to eject a Temptation. Which made an ingenious Person say, That the Prohibition of *Cupiscence* was not so much a new or distinct Commandment, as an Instrument of Security for the keeping all the rest.

LASTLY, More *safe*, because more *Easie*; there being not so much Danger of yielding to

what a Man can easily forbear, as to that which he must abstain from with Pain and Uneasiness.

But the greatest Blessedness of all is the *Vision of God*. Which I suppose may be extended beyond that *Beatific Vision* of him, which is the Happiness of Angels and Saints in Heaven, and may signify some peculiar Advantage belonging to the Pure in Heart even in this Life, namely, the clearer Perception of all *Necessary* and *Ideal Truths* (which may well be called seeing of God, they being one and the same with the Divine Essence) especially such Ideal Truths as are of a Moral and Spiritual Nature, to the Discovery of which, Purity of Heart is an excellent Preparative. According to that of the Angel to *Daniel*, Dan. 12. 10. *Many shall be purified and made white, and none of the wicked shall understand, but the wise*

* Reflect. on
the Conduct of
Human Life. *shall understand.* But having professedly discours'd of this * elsewhere, I shall stay no longer upon this Part, but proceed to that other Vision of God which is call'd *Beatific*.

HERE I remark, that this is the only Beatitude to which the express Promise of the Vision of God is annex'd. This indeed is implicitly contain'd in some others, but there only openly expressed. And because 'tis reasonable to think that our Lord does suit his Rewards to the Natures of the Excellencies here specify'd, We may well conclude that he intended some peculiar Honour and Privilege to this Holy Disposition of Soul, and to signify that it has a more than ordinary Title to the Happiness of the Beatific Vision. This will include two things,

I. THAT

I. THAT the Pure in Heart shall have a clearer and more enlarged Sight of God.

II. THAT they shall take a greater Delight in what they do see of him.

AND First, They shall have a clearer and more enlarged Sight of God. This will depend upon Two Suppositions.

I. UPON the peculiar Aptness of this Disposition for the Vision of God.

II. UPON the Will of God to afford a greater and clearer Manifestation of himself to a Soul so disposed.

THAT Purity of Heart has a peculiar Aptness in order to the Vision of God, we need not doubt, if we consider that the only Reason why we see not God, now, is the Grossness of this Tabernacle wherein the Soul is incased. This is that Glass through which we now see so darkly, and which makes us do so, *1 Cor. 13. 12.* This is that black Skreen that parts the *Material* from the *Intelligible* World. The more abstract therefore we are from the Body, and from the Bodily Life, the more fit we shall be both to *behold*, and to endure the Rays of the Divine Light. We find that even now the purer and finer our Blood and Spirits are, the freer and clearer are our Thoughts. The more bright and transparent this Glass is, the more the Ideal Light will dart in upon our Souls. And the same will hold in proportion hereafter. The purer the Soul is, the purer will all its Faculties and Operations be;

the less it will retain of corporeal Gusts and Relishes, the more recollect'd and undivided will be its Powers; for Unity of Thought follows Unity of Desire; and the fewer things a Man desires, the fewer will be his Thoughts, and consequently the more strong and vigorous upon the Object where they fix. To which we may add, that the purer the Soul is, the purer will also be her *Resurrection Body*, which is of great moment to the Vision of God, as well as to other *Spiritual Operations*. For we must then see thro' a Glass as well as now; only the Glass will be clearer, according to the different Purity of the Soul, which even in this Life gives a particular Brightness of Air to the Countenance, and makes the Face to shine with an unimitable Lustre. Purity of Heart therefore even upon this single account has a peculiar Aptness in order to the Vision of God. But to this may be added, Secondly, the Will of God to afford a greater and clearer Manifestation of himself to a Soul so disposed. For 'tis highly rational to believe, that God who is so great a Lover, will also be a liberal Rewarder of inward Purity; and that he who delights to dwell in pure Hearts now, will reveal himself in a very plentiful measure to such hereafter. So that both from the Aptness of the Disposition and from the Will of God we may conclude, That the Pure in Heart shall have a larger Share of the Beatifick Vision.

N O R shall they only see more of God, but, Secondly, take a greater Delight in what they do see of him. And this is the principal Ingredient of their Happiness: For 'tis not the meer

having

having, but the delighting in a thing that makes a Man happy. And this is the Condition of Pure Souls. The same Purity which procures them a more enlarged Sight of God, will also make them to delight in the Vision of him, so that they shall *Taste* as well as *See* how good God is, *Psal. 34.* For the purer the Soul is, the liker it is to God who is Essential Purity; and the more it resembles God, the more it must needs love and delight in him.

LIKENESS is the greatest Indearment of Love, and the most natural Foundation of Delight and Complacency. We see this in all the Orders of Being, and in all the Degrees of Life. In the Sympathetic Associations of Vegetables, in the Voluntary Consortings of Animals, and in the chosen Friendships of Men. But most of all may this be seen in God himself. What is it but the most perfect Likeness and Conformity of Essences, Understandings and Wills that renders the Sacred Persons of the mysterious and adorable Trinity so infinitely lovely and agreeable to each other! This was that which made the Father say of the Son, *Heb. 1. 3.* *This is my beloved Son in whom I am well-pleased,* because he saw there the *Brightness of his Glory, and the express Image of his Person.* And upon this is founded that mutual Delight which the other Sacred Persons enjoy from each other. That therefore which makes the Persons of the Holy Trinity delight in one another, must needs make the pure Soul delight in the Holy Trinity. A pure Soul cannot but delight in a pure God, and the purer she is, the more she will love and delight in him. Purity of Heart does even here *Anticipate*, much

more then will it hereafter increase the Joys of Heaven.

It remains therefore, that having this excellent Hope, we study to purifie our selves even as God is pure, and so endeavour to resemble and transcribe the Divine Perfections here, that we may contemplate them with the greater Complacency and Delight hereafter. To which purpose, let us now and always pray in the Words of our Holy and Devout Church,

O God, make clean our Hearts within us, And take not thy Holy Spirit from us. Amen.

DISCOURSE the Seventh.

MATTH. V. Ver. ix.

Blessed are the Peace-makers, for they shall be call'd the Children of God.

HE Words very well become the Mouth of him that spake them, who was himself the greatest *Peace-maker* in the World. He made Peace in Heaven by the Blood of his Cross, and endeavour'd to promote it on Earth. He first reconcil'd God to Man, and then tried to reconcile Men to one another. He chose to be born in the most quiet and peaceful State of the Roman Empire, when *Augustus* in token of an universal Peace

Peace had shut up the *Mystical Gates* of *Judas* his Temple. And when he came into the World his Proclamation by the Angels was Peace ; and when he was to leave the World, the same was his Legacy, *John 14.* *Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you.* The Order of his whole Life was a constant Compliance with the Peace of the State, whereof he gave Two signal Instances, in Paying Tribute when not obliged, and in Forbidding Resistance of the Officer that seized him ; and his last Prayer was for the Peace and Unity of the Church. And now, since by this great Love and Study of Peace he shewed himself to be the Genuine Son of God, who is styled the *God of Peace*, *1 Cor. 14. 33.* he might with the better *Decorum* make the same Disposition of Mind the Measure and Argument of our Filial Relation to him ; as he does when he tells us, *Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God.*

By *Peace-makers* here, I suppose, is meant, not only those that interpose as Moderators, to compose Feuds and Quarrels, (tho' that be the more immediate Sense of the Word,) but more generally those that are peaceably affected, and that shew this their Peaceable Disposition, either by living quietly and inoffensively, or by endeavouring to maintain Peace where it is, or to restore it where it is interrupted. The first of these Degrees of Peaceableness consists in a mere Negative ; the two last are of a Positive Nature, and consequently of a greater Excellence : But the most excellent of all is the last, it being, for the most part, not only a *thankless*, but an odious, difficult and hazardous Undertaking, to bring them

them nearer together, whom Anger has set at a distance. 'Tis like the Busines\$ of a *Fire-quencher*, who, tho' he may, with plying of Engins, and great a-do, rescue the Pile of Building from the devouring Flames, yet his Eyes will be sure to smart with the *Smoak*.

Now this Peace, in the not violating, preserving, or restoring of which this Peaceable-mind-ednels is concern'd, may be either private Peace between Man and Man, or publick Peace between Societies of Men. Again, Publick Peace is distinguishable according to the general Distribution of Human Society into Civil and Ecclesiastick, that of the State, and that of the Church. The former concerns Men, not only as subjected to Government, or as under this or that particular Form of Government; but also as Men, and consequently all Men: For, even the State of Nature, antecedently to all human Conventions and Constitutions, (as has been abundantly proved against the Author of the *Leviathan*) is not a State of War, but of Peace. The latter respects only those who are Members of the Christian Church, whereof Christ Jesus is the Head, and subject to that spiritual Government whereof he is the Author. The former kind of publick Peace is opposed to War and seditious Practices, the latter to Schisms and Divisions.

THE Way being thus far cleared by pointing out the general Degrees of Peaceableness, and the general Kinds of Peace, we may now with the less Entanglement proceed to fix the Subject and Order of the following Discourse. And here I do not intend a *Casuistical Tract*, by entering upon that long beaten Common-place concerning our

our Obligation to Peace, and the Measures of observing it with reference either to Church or State : For, besides that this has been the constant Theme of almost every Casuist, and that it is impossible to say any thing more than *All*, or better than *Some* have already said upon it, I further think that the thing is of it self plain enough; and that, were it not for the Perverseness of some Men, rather than for any Obscurity in the Duty, there needed not have been any other Measure given in this Matter than that general one of the Apostle, *If it be possible, as much as lies in you, live peaceably with all men.* For, when 'tis enquired, How far we are obliged to Peace in the State, or Peace in the Church? The Answer is plain and ready from hence, That we are obliged to both as far as is possible, and as much as in us lies ; and that nothing less than *Absolute* and *Evident* Necessity can justifie either War in the State, or Separation in the Church. Which one Rule if well heeded and practised, the Condition of the World would be much more peaceable and quiet than it is, or is like to be.

INSTEAD therefore of treating of this Beatitude in a *Casuistical* way, by describing the Measures of our Obligation to Peace, I shall rather chuse this Order of Discourse.

FIRST, To set forth the general Excellency of a peaceable Disposition;

SECONDLY, To consider that more particular Prerogative of it, in making those that have it Children of God.

THIRDLY

THIRDLY, To conclude all with some Reflections upon the present Disturbers of the Peace of Christendom.

AND First, The general Excellency of a peaceable Disposition may be deriv'd from these two Principles:

FIRST, From what it argues.

SECONDLY, From what it causes.

AND First, It argues a well-ordered Frame and good Habit of Mind; good by natural Disposition, good by Deliberation and Choice, and good by Gracious and Divine Operation. It argues a Soul, not only lightly tinctur'd, but deeply season'd, and throughly imbued with Goodness. —— *Incoctum generoso pectus honesto.* The same may be said of the peaceable Man, that St. James says of him that offends not in his Tongue, that he is a *perfect Man*, Jam. 3. 2, Not that the due Government of the Tongue alone does make a Man perfect; for there is a Body of Righteousness, as well as a Body of Sin; and to make it perfect, the Members must have both a just Number and Size; but that, considering the many Requisites to so great and excellent a piece of Temperance, it argues and supposes him to be so; and, as it there follows, *able also to bridle the whole Body.* And so here the peaceable Man may be said to be the perfect Man; not that he is so made by this signal Excellence, but that this Disposition argues him to be so, considering what a various Accomplishment of Soul is required before a Man can be capable of exercising so noble a Virtue.

YACINTH

THERE

THERE are some Degrees in Wickedness that necessarily suppose others : The Man must first walk in the Counsel of the Ungodly, and stand in the Way of Sinners, before he can have the *Fore-head* to sit down in the Chair of the Scornful. And so there are some Degrees in Goodness, that do also necessarily suppose others. For there is a Scale of Perfection in both, and we can neither be good nor bad by Strides and Jumps. And this is such a Degree of Goodness as supposes many others to have gone before it, being one of the *Top-stones* of the *Spiritual Building*, and one of the last finishing Strokes of the Divine Image of that Christ which is formed in us : *Gal. 4. 19.* For the Holy Spirit of God (as was shewn in the preceding Discourse) requires a consecrated A-bode, a chaste Body, and a pure Soul ; and will not enter into us till the former be made a Temple, and the latter a Sanctuary. And yet this Excellence is reckoned by the Apostle among the special *Fruits* of the Spirit, *Gal. 5. 22.* and consequently must pre-suppose all that Moral Preparation, at least, that the Entrance of the Holy Spirit does ; and must therefore argue a well-order'd Frame and good Habit of Mind.

BUT this being only a general (tho' to one that attends the Force of it, sufficiently conclusive) Argument, I will more distinctly shew that it does so, by considering what particular Qualifications of Soul are required, in order to a peaceable Disposition ; whose Presence must needs argue whatever it requires. Now these Requisites are either Negative, or Positive : The Negative are,

FIRST,

FIRST, That the Man be free from all inordinate *Self-Love*; it being impossible that he who prefers his own little private Concerns before the publick Interest, should be at Peace with the Publick when that tender Part comes once to be touched. No, Such an one will ballance *Self* against all the World, will not care what becomes of the Publick when it stands in Competition with that; but will embroil all the World in War and Mischief if he can, for the least Self-advantage.

SECONDLY, That the Man be free from Covetousnes, which tho' the Root of all Evil, is yet more so of Strife and Dissention, than of any other. Covetousnes and Peace cannot dwell long together. 'Tis, indeed, a very *Litigious Principle*, and one of the greatest Makebates and Incendiaries in the World. 'Tis this that fills the Court with Brawls and Wranglings, and the Field with Blood and Slaughter. And 'tis a known Observation, That in all Wars, whether justly or unjustly undertaken, the greatest part fight only for *Plunder*.

THIRDLY, That he be free from *Ambition*, which is as great an Enemy to Peace without, as it is to inward Tranquility. The ambitious Man is always advancing his Aim at some higher Mark of Honour; and if Peace will not serve to raise him, War shall. Take an Instance of this from the Court of *Rome*. What a World of Schisms and Disturbances in the Church, and Factions, Seditions, Plots, Massacres and Wars in the State, have been from time to time occasioned by the Ambition of that See! But there is an

higher

higher Instance than this ; for it was *Ambition* that made War in *Heaven*.

FOURTHLY, That he be free from *Envy*, which, indeed, spites every thing that is excellent ; but is, of all things, the most direct and sworn Enemy to Peace. 'Twas the Envy of the Devil that first disturbed the Peace and Order of the World, and set the whole Creation in Battle-Array against Man. And it is the same envious Being that still raises and foments all the Enmities and Dissentions that divide both the Church and State ; and may therefore be called the *Father of Discords*, as well as the *Father of Lyes*. Envy is the greatest Enmity in the World ; and the envious Man is the most universal Enemy : There is no Man but whom, by the very Principles of his Disposition, he is obliged either to *hate*, or to *despise*. All his Superiors and Equals he hates, and despises all his Inferiors ; which comprise the whole Body of Mankind. And both Ways is Envy an Enemy to Peace, and very destructive to Kingdoms and States. Whereof there is a signal Instance in the Case of *Hanno* and *Bomilcar*, who, through Envy to the growing Glories of *Hannibal*, denied him a Supply of Forces to carry on his *Italian Conquests*, and so ruin'd him, their Country, and themselves too.

FIFTHLY, That he be free from *Revenge*, which is another great Trespasser against Peace ; and without which, the rest would not be so mischievous as they are. For this continues and foments those Enmities to which the other give Birth, rivets and fastens Animosities in the Minds of Men, and by fresh Returns of Provocation, brings in (what has in vain been attempted in *Nature*)

Nature) a kind of *Perpetual Motion* in Malice, and immortalizes Quarrels and Contentions.

SIXTHLY and Lastly, To comprise all at once, 'tis requisite that the peaceable Man be free from all manner of *Lusts*, and *Irregular Passions*, whether of the Sensual or Intellectual Part; and from all Disaffection and Disorder of Soul; this being the Spring and first Mover to all the Discords and Disorders that are without; According to that of St. James, *From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts, that war in your members?* Where these reign, there can be no Peace; and therefore the peaceable Man must be free from these.

THESE are the *Negative Qualifications*, in order to a peaceable Disposition. The *Positive* I need but just name, the Proof of them being virtually contain'd in the other. They are therefore, First, *Charity*, or Universal Love; that seeketh not her own, but the Common Good. Secondly, Generosity, and a noble Enlargement of Soul, that sets a Man above the little petty Occasions of Quarrel and Contention. Thirdly, Humility and Modesty, that makes a Man possess himself and his Station with Contentedness and Thankfulness. Fourthly, A candid, sweet and benign Temper, that thinks no Evil, but is well pleased in the Prosperity of every Man, and every State or Community. Fifthly, A mild, meek and forgiving Spirit, that does not keep up the *Circulation* of Injuries, but lets the Quarrel fall and die. Sixthly and Lastly, A serene and well-composed Soul, one that rules well her own *inward Charge*, having her Passions

in Subjection with all Gravity, Peace and Tranquility of Mind.

ALL these excellent Qualifications are required to furnish out a peaceable Disposition, which will not come into the Soul, as the Soul will not into the Body, till after it be duly tempered and prepared for it. Whence the Proposition to be made out is sufficiently concluded, that it argues a well-ordered Frame, and good Habit of Mind : Which is the first Ground of its Excellency.

THE Second is taken from the Consideration of what it *causes*. The Effects of it are as great and noble as its Principles and Prerequisites. Its great and general Effect is *Happiness*, upon which no one Vertue has so large an Influence as this. Some Happiness it causes immediately and directly, and contributes to secure whatever Happiness it does not cause. Some Blessings it originally procures, and preserves the Possession of all. So that, some way or other, all our Blessings are *Blessings of Peace*, since to this we owe either the Blessings themselves, or, at least, the secure Enjoyment of them. And all this it does by giving Strength, Beauty and Pleasure to Society.

FIRST, *Strength*. Peace is as much the *Sinew of Society*, as Money is of War ; and without it, Society is so far from obtaining any of its just and natural Ends, that 'tis a far less eligible State than that of perfect Solitude : For, in perfect Solitude Men only want the mutual Assistance of one another ; but in a divided and enraged Society, every Man is in the Condition of *Cain*, in fear lest the next that meets him should do him a Mischief. 'Tis Peace that makes Society a Defence, and that distinguishes the Con-

gresses of Men from the Herds of Beasts, or, which is worse, from the Confusion of the Rabbble. And as it strengthens Society *within*, so it strengthens it without too: Nor would War be any Security Abroad, without Peace at Home. Briefly, 'Tis Union and Co-herence that makes every thing strong, and Peace is the Cement that holds all fast together. And what Society is there that can subsist without it, when even a *Kingdom divided against it self*, tho' it be that of the Devil himself, *cannot stand?* *Mark 3. 24.*

S E C O N D L Y, *Beauty.* There is, indeed, a certain Beauty in Strength; and every thing that is strong is so far beautiful. But, besides this, Peace gives a more proper and peculiar Beauty to Society; the Beauty of Order and Proportion, of Decency and Agreeableness. For, a peaceable Disposition inclines every Man to mind his own proper Business, and to contain himself within that Place and Station wherein God and his Superiors have fixed him, and not to *aspire* to what is *above* him, or *invade* what does not *belong* to him. For, indeed, Peace it self cannot subsist without this, any more than Society can without Peace. Where-ever therefore there is Peace, there will also be this Order and Proportion: The Hand will not affect the Office of the Eye, nor the Foot the Place of the Head; but every Member will be contented with, and intent upon his own Office and Place in the Body. The Result of which must needs be the greatest Beauty and Harmony.

T H I R D L Y, *Pleasure.* This, indeed, is necessarily consequent to the two former, since it cannot but be a great Pleasure to every particular well-affected

well-affected Member of Society to reflect upon the Strength and Beauty of the whole. But, besides this, a peaceable Disposition derives a more immediate and direct Pleasure upon Society. For, Who can express the Pleasure that is in Love and Joy, Sweetness and Dearness in mutual Kindness and Confidences, in Union of Minds, and Universal Friendship! They that have had the Happiness to taste of this Pleasure, know they cannot express it: which made the Psalmist break forth into that abrupt Extasie, *Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!* Psal. 133.

HAVING thus far set forth the general Excellency of a peaceable Disposition from what it *argues*, and from what it *causes*, I now proceed, in the Second Place, to consider that more particular Prerogative of it, in making those that have it, Children of God.

To be Children of God is, indeed, common to all good Men; who being begotten a-new by the immortal Seed of the Word, do bear God's Image in Holiness, endeavouring in all things to do their Father's Will. But there are some Dispositions that give a more peculiar Right to this Title than others, as they are nearer Resemblances of the Divine Excellencies: Among which is the Disposition now under our Consideration, whereby a Man becomes, in a special Degree and Manner, like God, and so evidences himself to be his Child, and may upon the Consideration of that Likeness fitly be so called. And this is the constant use of this Phrase in Scripture, Job. 8. 44. *Ye are of your Father the Devil,* (says our Lord to the unbelieving Jews)

and the Lusts of your Father ye will do. And so again, Luke 6. 35. Love your Enemies, and do good, &c. and ye shall be the Children of the Highest, for he is kind to the unthankful and to the evil. And says the Apostle, Eph. 5. 1. Be ye followers of God as dear Children. They are the Children of God, who are Followers of God, who purifie themselves as he is pure, and who are perfect as he is perfect. So that to be the Child of God, or the Child of the Devil, signifies as much as to carry a particular Resemblance of either. When therefore 'tis said, that the Peace-makers shall be call'd the Children of God, it comes to as much as that they carry a particular Character of the Divine Likeness, whereby it may be known to whose Family they retain, and that they are the True Sons of God.

AND so indeed they are. For God is the God of Peace; and the greatest Peace, that which pasles all Understanding, is called the *Peace of God*. For God is the greatest Lover of Peace, the Author and Giver of Peace, and the Rewarder of all such as live in Peace. Indeed under the Jewish State, (which as in other things, so in this was very peculiar, that 'twas a State of *Theocracy*) God was known by the Name of the *Lord of Hosts*, not as expressing his true natural Liking and Approbation, but only his Relation to that particular People, whose immediate King and Leader he was. But now under the State of the Gospel, which exhibits a more genuine Idea of God (for the only begotten Son, which is in the Bosom of the Father, he has declared him, Job. 1. 18.) he has changed his Title from the Style of *War* to the Style of *Peace*.

THIS

THIS indeed was ever his *Delight*, but now 'tis his *Glory*, and inserted among the brightest Ornaments of his Crown. He is now manifested to be what he ever really was. God from all Eternity to all Eternity enjoys a profound Peace within himself, and the Sacred Persons of the Trinity are not more One in Essence and Nature, than in Will and Inclination. Their *Moral* is as great as their *Natural Unity*. The Kingdom of God is a Kingdom of Peace, and Heaven the Throne of his Majesty is a peaceful Region. We never read but once that there was any War there, and those that caused it were quickly banish'd thence, *Rev.* 12. 7. To be short, God both enjoys and establishes Peace above, he *maketh Peace in his High-places*, and he has sent his Son to procure it below, to reconcile Men to him, and to one another, that so both Worlds might conspire in Unity, and that this Will of God might be done in Earth as it is in Heaven. And therefore since God has shewn himself to be so great a Lover of Peace, there is sufficient Ground for this particular Prerogative of a peaceable Disposition, that it makes those that have it Children of God. From which I pass in the third and last Place, to conclude all with some Reflections on the present Disturbers of the Peace of Christendom.

'TIS the Observation of a Great Civilian and Moralist, that *Peace is a state peculiar to Man as he is distinguish'd from Brutes*. And so indeed it should be. But could we suppose a Stranger from one of the other Planetary Worlds to come and take a View of this our little Spot, and of

Pufendorf de
Officio Hom.
& Civ. p. 154.

the Manners of those that live upon it, he would not sure think *this* of all the things in the World to be the Character of Man. For he could not but observe, and perhaps it would be one of the first Remarks he would make, that there are more Wars and Fightings among Men, than among any other sort of Creatures, and more among *Christians* than among any other sort of Men. For at the very first opening of the Scene, what a miserable Face of things would appear both in Church and State ! What Wars and Desolations in the one ! And what *Debates*, *Envirings*, *Wraths*, *Strifes*, *Backbitings*, *Whisperings*, *Swellings* and *Tumults* in the other ! 2 Cor. 12. 20.

BUT because most of the Disturbances in the State proceed from those of the Church, I shall confine my Reflections to those that disturb the Peace and Order of the Christian Church. Where I shall First, Point out who these Disturbers are. And Secondly, Set some such Considerations before them, as may make them sensible of their Crime.

THERE are I conceive these two general ways of disturbing the Peace of the Church ; either by imposing unlawful or unreasonable Terms of Communion, or by refusing to comply with such as are Lawful and Reasonable. That the first of these is a Breach of the Church's Peace there can be no doubt, because it introduces a Necessity of Separation. And that the latter is so is as plain, because 'tis a Separation without any Necessity for it. Either of these is *Schism*, whose Notion (as all agree) consists either in making a Necessity of Separation, or in separating without Necessity.

THE First of these will fall heavy upon the *Church of Rome*, who, (as it has been sufficiently made good against her) has brought in an Absolute Necessity of Separation, by imposing such notoriously unlawful and unreasonable Terms of Communion. The latter will light upon all those who separate from such Parts of the *Reformation*, where they may lawfully Communicate. More especially it will light heavier than ordinary upon all those *Sectaries* among us, who now divide from the *Church of England*, the Terms of whose Communion, (as has been undeniably prov'd and maintain'd) are not only Lawful, but highly reasonable, and of an excellent Constitution.

I need not here, nor is it my Design to set my self professedly to make out the Charge of Schism against the Dissenters and Separatists from the *Church of England*. It has been done over and over, to the utmost Degree of Evidence, and the whole Circle of the Reformed Churches cry out upon them for their unreasonable Separation. Only I would desire them to try themselves and their Cause by that one plain Apostolical Canon before-mentioned, and see whether they can justify themselves by that single Measure. It is this, *If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all Men*, Rom. 12. 18. If with all Men, then certainly much more with Bodies and Societies of Men; much more with our Governors and Superiors; much more yet with the *Church*, the most Sacred and most Eminent of all Societies. And if as far as is possible, then certainly as far as is lawful.

But now I would ask our Dissenters and Separatists this one Question, and appeal to their Consciences as well as to their Practices for an Answer. Do they live peaceably with the Church of England as by lawful Authority establish'd, as far as is possible, and as much as in them lies? So far from this, that I might say, (were I minded to aggravate things) that they do the quite contrary, and Divide from us as far as possible, and as much as in them lies, it being very notorious that they run from us as far as they can, measure their Purity and Sanctity by their distance from us; and condemn and disuse many things meetly because we approve and use them.

But I need not take advantage of this, tho' it be too notorious to be denied, as well as too scandalous to be defended. I only demand, Do they live peaceably with the Church as far as is possible, and as much as in them lies? They cannot with any Modesty say that they do. For if they did, not to say that they might come much nearer to us than they do, they must of necessity conform with us. Since as they were never able to shew any thing unlawful in our Communion; so they now generally allow it to be lawful, and accordingly will afford us their Company now and then upon occasion, as often as they think fit to do us that Honour. Well then, if our Communion be lawful, then 'tis Possible for them to communicate with us, and if they do not, then 'tis plain that they do not live peaceably with us as far as is Possible, and as much as in them lies, and consequently by virtue of this plain Apostolical Canon stand fully convicted of Schism, and let them bring themselves off if

if they can. I am satisfied they will be able to answer it but ill here, and am afraid worse hereafter.

I have now in general pointed out the Disturbers of the Christian Peace, and I wish I could now as easily make these Troublers of our *Israel* sensible of this their Crime, as prove them guilty of it. In order to which, not to insist upon the Heinousness of the Sin of Schism, which is as expressly forbidden in Scripture as Murder or Adultery, and the great Obligation that lies upon all Christians to preserve the Unity and Peace of the Church, which the Scripture every where so earnestly presses and inculcates, and which the Example of the Primitive Christians so strongly recommends; and for which both our Reason and our Interest (especially at this time) would suggest to us a Thousand Arguments; I say not to insist upon these and such like Considerations (for a Combination of which I refer to an excellent Discourse of Dr. Barrow's concerning the Unity of the Church) I would only desire the Persons concern'd to consider how much by their Schisms and Divisions they prejudice the *Christian Religion*. I do not mean as to the Life and Power of Godliness, (though that be very true, and worthy to be seriously consider'd) but as to the Propagation of the Christian Faith. And that with respect to the Three great Enemies of it, the *Heathen*, the *Jew*, and the *Mahometan*.

FIRST, With respect to the *Heathen*, to whom as the Unity and Agreement of the *First Christians* was a great Indearment, and a very prevalent Invitation, so as to occasion that common Speech among them, See how the Christians
love

love one another! So the Schisms and Divisions of the Present Christians must needs be a great Scandal and Objection. For indeed how can any considering Heathen be persuaded to think such a broken and divided Religion to be of Divine Revelation, when that which he takes to by the Light of Nature has more of Unity and Consent!

SECONDLY, With respect to the Jew, who may certainly number the Dissentions of Christians among the greatest Hindrances of his Conversion. For when in the Prophetick Writings among other Characters of the Times of the Messias he shall find this to be one, and one of the chiefest, that it shall be a Reign of Charity and Peace, *Isa. 2. 4.* That *they shall beat their Swords into Plowshares, and their Spears into Pruning-books*; That *Nation shall not lift up Sword against Nation, neither shall they learn War any more.* That *the Wolf shall also dwell with the Lamb, and the Leopard shall lie down with the Kid, &c.* I say the Jew finding this to be one of the Characteristics of the Messias his Reign, and observing withal nothing like it in the Christian State, but rather a perfect Reverse of all this, and not being able to distinguish with some between the Design and Natural Genius of the Christian Religion, and the accidental Event of Things; or with others, to have recourse to the other more glorious Reign of Christ in the Millennial State of the Church, wherein these great and strong Figures shall have a proportionable Accomplishment, he must needs be shrewdly tempted to think that the Time of the promised Messias is not yet come, and that

the

the Religion which now goes for his, is as false as its Professors are evil and wicked.

THIRDLY and Lastly, with respect to the *Mahometan*, who indeed allows Christ to have been a true Prophet, and his Religion to have been once a true Religion, only he says it has had its Time as well as that of the Jews, and is now, as *superannuated*, to give place to a more perfect Institution, that is, to *Mahomet's*, who as he came after Christ, so was he to fill up his Defects, and to deliver the last and standing Will of God. And will he not find pretence to be confirmed in this his Opinion, and to prefer his Master *Mahomet* as much before Christ as we do Christ before *Moses*; when he shall perceive (as quickly he may) that there is not half so much Unity and Agreement among Christians, even concerning their very Religion, which is to be the Bond of their Unity, as there is among *Mahometans*? Certainly he will, and tho' he perish in his Error, yet I fear his Blood will be upon those who administer the Occasion of it. These are great Scandals and Objections both to the Heathen, Jew and *Mahometan*, and Woe be to them by whom this great Offence comes. Our Saviour pronounces a severe Woe against them that shall offend, even one of his little ones, *Mat. 18. 6.* and what then shall be the Doom of those that scandalize so great a part of the World ! I heartily wish that the present Disturbers and Dividers of the Christian State and Church would seriously consider these things, and how they act the part of *Antichrist* in thus letting and hindring the Course of the Christian Religion.

IN the mean time I shut up all with this Prayer, that God would give Light to those *Heathens*, *Jews* and *Mahometans* that sit in Darkness and in the Shadow of Death, and that in order to this, he would first guide the Feet of us *Christians* into the Way of *Peace*. Amen.

DISCOURSE the Eighth.

MATTH. V. Ver. x, xi, xii.

Blessed are they which are persecuted for Righteousness sake, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. Or, as it may be read from the Close, Great is their Reward in Heaven.



T has been ever a great Occasion of Dissatisfaction to some Men that there should be any such thing as Evil in the World. A greater yet, that this Evil should often fall upon good, and sometimes upon the best of Men. But the greatest of all is, that not only good Men should meet with Evil, but that their very Goodness should betray them into it; that suffering should not only be the Portion of the Righteous, but that Men should suffer for the Sake of their Righteousness. It seems hard indeed that a Righteous Man should suffer, but much more that he should suffer for his being Righteous, and that Affliction should not only be the *Lot*, but also the

the Effect and Consequence of his Virtue. For if Honesty and Integrity cannot be a Defence and Privilege against Evil, yet one would expect it should not be a Procurer of it, and that if the Man were not the better for his Virtue, yet at least he should not be the worse.

THESE have been always as perplext Appearances in the Moral, as any that arise in the Natural System of the World; a frequent Trouble and Discouragement to the Good and Pious, and a more frequent Occasion of Triumph to the Atheistical and Prophane, who have raised from hence their most plausible Objections both against the *Being* and the *Order* of Divine Providence, which by these greatest Difficulties of it they have been encouraged either to Deny or to Condemn.

WITH the two first of these Difficulties I am not at present concern'd, nor shall I determin of what Force the last and greatest might be, were this the last State of things, and the *All-concluding Scene* of the World. Perhaps it might then be strong enough to conclude what some are now so weak as to wish and believe. But certainly with the Supposition of an After-state the Objection is so far from being *Desperate*, that I can see nothing *Difficult* in it: And I think 'tis here sufficiently answer'd by that ample Compensation promis'd by our Saviour to all those whose faithful Adherence to a good Cause, shall at any time engage them in Sufferings and Afflictions. For says he, *Blessed are they which are persecuted for Righteousness sake, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.*

WHICH last Words (as our Saviour afterwards explains them) contain not only a Promise of Heav-

Heavenly Happiness in general, but of a greater Degree and Measure of it, and intitle the Sufferers for Religion, those who undergo Persecution for Righteousness sake, to a more than ordinary weight of Glory. So that hence arise two Propositions to be distinctly consider'd :

FIRST, That there are Degrees in that Glory which shall be the Reward of Saints in Heaven.

SECONDLY, That one of the highest Degrees of it shall be the Reward of those who suffer Persecution for the sake of Righteousness.

T H A T there are Degrees of Glory, tho' by some a much contested, is yet I think a most certain and unquestionable Truth. The Certainty of which I shall endeavour to establish upon these few evident Principles.

FIRST, I consider that this must needs be the natural and necessary Result of things. And here I desire only it may be granted me, That there are some certain Dispositions of Soul necessary to relish and enjoy the Happiness of Heaven. • This I think is a Supposition that need not be disputed, since even to the Enjoyment of sensible Good there is requisite a Proportion of Sense. The Ear must be tuneably set to relish the Charms of Musick, and the Palate must be rightly dispos'd to find any Pleasure in the sweetest Delicacies. And if these grosser Objects that have a more natural Affinity with the Organs of Sense, and strike hard upon them, will not yet affect them without some more particular inward Preparation ; there is greater reason to think that the Delights of Heaven

ven that are so far above the Level of our Natures, so pure and so refined, cannot be tasted but by a suitable Disposition of Soul. The Necessity of which appears so great, that I am apt to think (as a late worthy Writer of our Church does) that the whole moral Excellency of some Virtues is their Qualification for the Happiness of another State, they being of no great consequence to the present Order of this World.

Practical
Discourse of
Death, p. 76.

Well then, if certain Dispositions of Soul be requir'd to fit us for the Happiness of Heaven, then it follows, that the more disposed any Soul is for the Glories of Heaven, the more happy she must needs be in the Enjoyment of them. And if so, then 'twill be necessary to say, either that all Souls are equally disposed, which would be to contradict the Sense and Experience of the whole World; or if one be better disposed than another, then in proportion one will also be more happy than another. The Consequence is plain and necessary, If there must be a Moral Qualification of Soul to fit a Man for Happiness, then certainly the more qualified the more happy. Which has made me often wonder at the Self-inconsistency of those who allowing a virtuous Frame and Temper of Mind to be a Natural Disposition for Happiness, do yet deny greater Degrees of Glory to greater Degrees of Virtue. Indeed if a Moral Disposition of Soul did not fit us for Happiness, the case were otherwise; but since 'tis allow'd to do that, I cannot conceive but that the Degrees of Happiness must follow the Degrees of Virtue. And indeed how can he that thinks at all, think otherwise, but that

that a Soul well purg'd and purify'd, that has undergon a long Course of Mortification, till she is throughly awaken'd into the Divine Life and Likeness, and is arriv'd to *the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ*, Eph. 4. 13. must find more Happiness in the Vision of God, than a Soul just pregnant with the Divine Form, and that carries away with her only the first Rudiments of Spiritual Life ! Certainly that Soul which is most like God will be most happy in the Fruition of him. This is no more than what may be concluded from the meer natural necessity of things, without having recourse to any positive Order of God about it. But neither may that be supposed to be wanting. For,

SECONDLY, I consider that the same may be concluded from the Justice and Goodness of God, as well as from the Nature of things. And first, from his Justice. Not that there lies an *Absolute* and *Antecedent Obligation* upon God to bestow greater Rewards upon greater Saints ; for if Eternal Life it self be (as the Apostle represents it) *the Gift of God*, Rom. 6. 23. no doubt but the Degrees of it are so too. God cannot become a Debtor to Man, or to any other Creature but by a free Act of his own. He may indeed oblige himself to us by a voluntary Ingagement, but we cannot pass any strict Obligation upon him by any thing we can do ; and to talk of *Meritizing* in this Sense is no less than Blasphemy, and I can hardly believe that any Man that understood himself, ever thus held it.

BUT tho' God be not absolutely obliged to his Creatures, but only upon Supposition, and consequently cannot be Absolutely bound to reward

ward greater Saints with greater Happiness, yet if we once suppose him to engage himself by Promise to be a Rewarder of Vertue in general; there will be all the Reason in the World to think that by the same Promise he has also *Virtually* obliged himself to crown the greatest Vertues with the greatest Rewards. For since the Reason why he ingag'd himself to be a Rewarder of good Men was not (as is already precaution'd) any Absolute Merit of theirs, but only to shew his great Love of Vertue and Goodness, 'tis reasonable to conclude that by the same Motives, and in pursuance of the same End, he also ingaged himself to be a more liberal Rewarder of greater Saints. Since this is as necessary a Means to shew his Love to Vertue and Goodness as the other. And therefore though we should grant (which yet in the Sequel will appear otherwise) that God had expressly promised only to be a Rewarder of Vertue in general, yet since the End and Reason of this His Ingagement was to shew His great Love to Vertue, this would be warrant enough to conclude, that he had implicitly and virtually ingaged Himself to have an equal regard to the several Degrees of Vertue, and to reward them after their respective Proportions.

But to rise higher yet, tho' God cannot be in Strict Justice oblig'd to reward the best of our Services but by an Ingagement of his own, much less to reward them with Eternal Happiness, yet I think there must be acknowledged a kind of Congruity or Becomingness on God's part so to do, even Antecedently to any Promise or Covenant. There is indeed no strict Obligation till after

Some Covenant ; but there may, and I think must be a Congruity even before. For tho' there be no Proportion of *Equivalence* between our best Works and the Rewards of Heaven, and consequently no possible room for any strict Merit, yet

I cannot but think with a Person
Le Blane Theses of great Judgment and Modera-
Theolog. p. 590. tion, that there is a Proportion
of *Convenience* ; that is, as he afterwards explains
it, tho' there be nothing strictly due from God to
the Services of good Men, yet 'tis highly worthy
of God to reward them ; upon which Account
they also may be said to be worthy, according
to that of the *Apocalyps*, *They shall walk with me in
white, for they are worthy*, Rev. 3. 4.

AND indeed unless we will admit of this *Congruity*, I do not see how to justifie the Sense of that Apostolical Maxim, *He that comes to God
must believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of
them that diligently seek him*, Heb. 11. 6. 'Tis plain that the Apostle here speaks of the Grounds of Natural Religion, and what should move and qualifie a Heathen Man to make his first Addresses to God. This he tells you is to believe the Being and the Providence of God, that he *is*, and that he is a *Rewarder*. But now how shall a Heathen Man believe that God is a Rewarder ? By any Revelation of his ? But that he is not yet supposed to admit. He must therefore conclude it by his own natural Reason, by considering the Idea and Nature of God, the *πόνηστον τὸ Θεόν*, that which may naturally be known of him, and how becoming it is for so excellent a Being to reward those who apply themselves seriously and heartily to him.

Well then, if it be reasonable to believe upon the Stock of natural Principles that God is a Rewarder, without being assured of it by any Revelation (which is here supposed in the Heathen's Case) then it follows, that even antecedently to any Promise of God there is a great Congruity, tho' not a strict Obligation that he should be a Rewarder. For otherwise what Ground could the Heathen Man have so to Conclude or Believe? This Congruity therefore must of Necessity be allow'd, however apt some may be to startle at it, when the Word *Merit* is put before it. This is *Prejudice*, but the thing it self as I have here stated and explain'd it, is both innocent and necessary to be granted. And if there be such a Congruity that God should be a Rewarder in general, then by the same Proportion it follows that he should dispence his Rewards according to the Degrees of Virtue. There being certainly at least as much Congruity in this as in the other.

AND besides this, there is no reason to question but that the *Goodness* of God which is in it self infinite, and which is already suppos'd to exert it self so liberally as to reward the little and defective Services of a short Life with Eternal Glories, will also be so consistent with it self, as to reward those most, who have press'd forward to the highest Degrees of Sanctity. And were it not for this, I do not see what Incouragement there is for Men to *Excel* in Virtue, which yet the Goodness of God obliges us to suppose. For what should move a Man to be eminently good, considering how difficult it is to be so, and how

little recompens'd in this World, if it were not in order to a greater Reward hereafter?

If it be said, that the least Degree of Glory is a sufficient Incouragement for the greatest Degree of Virtue; I grant it is so, were that greatest Degree of Virtue the necessary Condition of it, without which the least Glory could not be obtain'd. But since less will suffice for that (as must be admitted, unless you will say that all glorified Saints are equally good and virtuous) I do not see how there can be sufficient Incouragement for higher Attainments, but only upon the Supposition of greatest Rewards. Which therefore from the Goodness as well as Justice of God there is good Reason to conclude.

THIRDLY and lastly, From Principles of Reason I appeal to Holy Scripture, which I think will be found to speak as fully and plainly to this purpose as may reasonably be desir'd. For there we find that *God will render to every man according to his deeds*, Rom. 2. 6. And again, that *every one shall receive the things done in his Body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad*, 2 Cor. 5. 10. And lest this should be referr'd to the general Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, more expressly it is said, that *he that sows sparingly, shall reap also sparingly, and that he that sows bountifully shall reap also bountifully*, 2 Cor. 9. 6. The same again is expressly represented under the Parable of the *Talents committed to the Management of Servants*, who were severally rewarded according to their several Improvements, Luk. 19. And tho' Parables are not allow'd to conclude throughout, yet certainly as to the thing directly and purposely intended by them they are

as conclusive as any other Forms of Speech, which in this Parable must be the different Dispensation of Rewards hereafter, or nothing. Again, the Scripture mentions different Seats of Glory, *Job. 14. 2.* *In my Father's House are many Mansions,* says our Saviour, that is, Mansions of distinct Ranks and Orders: For 'twould have been but a small piece of News for our Saviour to have told his Disciples, that in Heaven there were a great many Mansions in Number. Nor would this be so suitable to the Introduction of his Discourse, *Let not your Hearts be troubled.*

AGAIN we read of particular Rewards belonging to Men of particular Characters, as of a *Prophet's Reward,* and a *Righteous Man's Reward.* *He that receives a Prophet in the name of a Prophet, shall receive a Prophet's Reward,* says our Saviour, *Mat. 10. 41.* Why a Prophet's Reward, if there be not some special Reward assign'd to a Prophet? And again, 'tis plainly intimated that every Degree, and every act of Virtue shall have its proper Recompence, where 'tis said, *Mat. 10. 42.* *Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a Cup of cold Water only in the Name of a Disciple, shall in no wise lose his Reward.* To which Purpose there is also a very express place in the *Proverbs,* *Pov. 19. 17.* *He that hath pity on the poor, tendeth unto the Lord; and look what he layeth out it shall be paid him again.* Where there is a Reward promised not only to Charity in general, but to every Degree of it. And if every Degree of Virtue shall be particularly rewarded, it evidently follows that the greater our Vertues are, the more abundant shall be our Reward, other-

wise some Degrees of Virtue would go unrewarded, contrary to the Supposition.

To this it may be added, that a greater Degree of Blessedness is every where attributed to Patriarchs, Prophets and Apostles, &c. when their Glorification is expressed by their *Sitting down* in the Kingdom of God, and that of other Saints, by their sitting down with them in allusion to the Eastern manner of Feasting. This Privilege of a more eminent Seat is particularly assign'd to *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob* by our Saviour, when he tells us, *Mat. 8. 11.* that *many shall come from the East and the West, and shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the Kingdom of Heaven.* And so again to the Apostles, *Mat. 19. 28.* *Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in the Throne of his Glory, ye also shall sit upon Twelve Thrones.* It cannot be denied but that this is meant of the Apostles only, and not of his Disciples at large, because of the Twelve Thrones. And why should Twelve of them only be specified, if they were not to be Thrones of an higher Order? Or what Extraordinary would our Saviour have promis'd to his Disciples? And this is further confirm'd by St. John, who in the Description of the Heavenly Jerusalem, makes the Twelve Apostles the Foundations of the City. *And the Wall of the City (says he) had twelve Foundations, and in them the Names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb.* *Rev. 21. 14.* A Place exactly parallel to that of the Twelve Thrones.

To dispatch all in a Word, the Condition of Saints in Glory is expressed in Scripture by their being *made like unto the Angels,* *Mat. 22. 30.* and 'tis

'tis of it self reasonable to think that the same general Order and Proportion shall be observ'd in both these Sons of God, *Angels and Men*. But now 'tis most certain that the Angels have their different Orders and Hierarchies, being distinguish'd into Thrones and Dominions, Principalities and Powers, and into Angels and Arch-Angels, and that some of them sit nearer to the Throne of God than others. Whereupon the Talmudists call *Michael* the Arch-Angel, *The Prince of Faces*, or the Prince of the Presence, being (as they say) so near to the King of Heaven, as to be admitted to sit down by him, and register the good Actions of the *Israelites*. And says the Angel *Gabriel* of himself, *I am Gabriel that stand in the presence of God*, Luk. 1. 19. He distinguishes himself as much by his Station as by his Name. And the Vision of *Isaiah* represents one of the Angelic Orders covering their Faces with their Wings, which supposes them to be nearer than Ordinary to the Presence of God, so as not to be able to abide the Glory of it, without the help of a *Veil*.

SINCE therefore there is such a Variety in the Angelical Stations, and our future Condition is generally represented by theirs, this alone were enough to put us upon thinking that our Glorification must admit of the like gradual Diversity. And 'tis no more than what natural Order and Decency seems to require, that the Members of Christ's Mystical Body should retain the same Diversity in the other World that St. Paul ascribes to them in this, that there should still be an *Eye* and an *Hand*, an *Head* and a *Foot*, more Honourable and less Honourable Parts, 1 Cor. 12.

Whereof the Natural Heaven exhibits a very convenient Emblem, in which one Star differs from another Star in Glory. And after all, tho' there were no plain Proof to be had for this, yet there is such an obvious Congruity in the thing as would *convince* where it could not *silence*. And I believe there is no Man, tho' never so forward to raise Objections against what has been contended for, and to equalize the Glories of Heaven (for the other World has its *Levellers* as well as this) that could yet obtain leave of his own Modesty to expect as bright a Crown as the *Virgin Mary*, or St. *Paul*.

HAVING thus far asserted the different Degrees of Glory, which I have the longer insisted upon, because 'tis a very *practical* as well as *notional* Theory, being of great consequence to the encouragement of Heroick Goodness, I come now to consider the second thing propos'd, That one of the highest Degrees of Glory shall be the Reward of those who suffer Persecution for the sake of Righteousness, that is, of *Martyrs*. And here for the Eviction of this, having already shewn that there are Degrees of Glory in proportion to the Degrees of Virtue, I think 'twill suffice to shew that Martyrdom is one of the highest Degrees of Virtue. For the Argument reduc'd to Form will stand thus :

A N higher Degree of Virtue shall have an higher Degree of Glory.

B U T Martyrdom is an higher Degree of Virtue :

T H E R E F O R E Martyrdom shall have an higher Degree of Glory.

THE first Proposition is what we have been proving hitherto. To infer the Conclusion therefore there needs only a Proof of the second. Here therefore my Busines shall be to give a short Representation of the Excellency of *Martyrdom*.

THE Honour of Martyrdom was so great in the Primitive Church, that even the Commonness of it, which depreiates every thing else, could not diminish from its Veneration. It was then thought of so great Excellence, as to supply then room of Baptism, and the new Convert, whose early and sudden Execution prevented his solemn Admission into the Christian Church, was yet esteem'd a very good Member of Christ's Mystical Body, and number'd with his best Saints in Glory everlasting. The same Honour to Martyrs made them chuse their Tombs for the Places of their Devotion ; and God himself was pleased to signalize his speical regard to these his Saints, and to shew how precious their Death was in his Sight, by making the Places of their Rest the Stage of his Miracles.

St. Jerome a-
gainst Vigilan-
tius, as I think,
Chap. 4.

NOR is there any thing in all this more strange and extraordinary, than the Excellency of the Vertue it self which was thus honoured. A general Representation of which is thus given by the Pen of a Celebrated Writer of the Roman Church. A Church which, by the way, has made more Martyrs, and has fewer than any in the World. But she has dealt long enough in Blood, to be able to form an Idea of Martyrdom from the Martyrs which she has made, *We see* (says one of her Sons) *nothing in the*

Monsieur Se-
nsult Christian
Man, p. 336.

the Church more noble than Martyrdom. 'Tis the highest Form of Virtue, the last Expression of Charity; and when a Man has shed his Blood and parted with his Life for Jesus Christ, there is not any instance that can further be expected from his Love. Justly therefore may we acknowledge nothing more August in Religion than Martyrs. They are the Heroes of Christianity, the Gallant Men of this State, the Noblest Parts of this Mystical Body. There is no Greatness that gives not way to their Dignity; whatever we admire is below their Worth, and according to the Opinion of one of the wisest Fathers of the Church (he means St. Cyprian) 'tis more to be a Martyr than to be an Apostle. Neither hath any thing been ever more Honour'd in the World. Heaven has wrought an Hundred Miracles to discover their Innocence, wild Beasts have respected them, the Flames have spared their Garments, Tyrants have admired them, and many times their Executioners have become their Disciples, in so much that these renowned Champions had great reason to be afraid of Vain-glory, at the same time that God delivered them from Sorrow. The Description is handsome and elegant, but what they Describe, they have left to our Church to Practise.

But more particularly and distinctly, to take the just Height of the Excellency of Martyrdom, we must first lay down a Measure whereby the Excellency of any Virtue is to be estimated. Now the Excellency of any Virtue may be measured either from the Goodness of the Object willed, or from the Degree of willing it. And two Persons that are equally Virtuous with respect to the Good that is will'd, may yet be very unequally so with respect to the Degree of Willing, because

because one may will the same Good, and the same Degree of Good more intensely and affectionately than the other. Thus for Instance, *Virginity* may be said to be more excellent than a Conjugal Life, and that tho' you do suppose the States themselves to be equally Pure, because 'tis harder to preserve Virginal than Conjugal Chastity: So that tho' the Degrees of Purity be supposed the same in both States; yet because they are more strongly will'd in the one than in the other, the Virgin may be said to be more pure than the Conjugated Person; not, perhaps as a Lover of greater Purity, but as a stronger and more pertinacious Lover of the *same*, which he adheres to under more disadvantageous Circumstances.

AND this I take to be the Case of *Martyrdom*, whose general Excellency above other Vertues consists in the Degree of Inclination or Adhesion to good, which in the Martyr is supposed to be so strong as to determine him rather to suffer Death, and the utmost Extremity of it, than to transgress what he knows to be his Duty. And indeed if we consider how sweet Life is, and how naturally averse we are to Death even in the most easy, much more under the most terrifying Circumstances, it must needs be a very strong and peremptory Adhesion to Virtue that shall ingage a Man to quit his Life rather than his Innocence, and Die rather than offend.

BUT to be more particular yet. To recommend the Excellency of Martyrdom there is a Concurrence of the greatest Vertues. The most eminent of which (for 'twere endless to reckon

up all) are the greatest *Faith*, the greatest *Love*, and the greatest *Courage*.

FIRST, The greatest *Faith*. There is indeed no *Faith* like the *Faith* of a *Martyr*. This is that *Faith* which overcomes the *World*, and all that is terrible in it; That *Faith* to which all things are possible and nothing difficult, and that removes *Fear*, which is more than to remove *Mountains*. This is that *Faith* which is more especially the *Substance* of things hoped for, and the *Argument* or *Demonstration* of things not seen. This noble Definition of *Faith* is never so fully verify'd as in the *Faith* of a *Martyr*. This is that *Faith* that turns the End of the *Perspective*, and shortens the interval of *Time*, and makes the future *World* present, and represents *Heaven* open, and the Son of Man standing on the Right Hand of God ready to defend, and receive, and reward those that will be content to endure the *Cross*, and despise both the *Shame* and the *Pain* of it for his sake. And all this with such Certainty and fulness of *Persuasion*, that 'tis ready to change its *Nature*, through too much *Evidence*, and to cease to be any longer *Faith*, and commence *Science* or *Revelation*. For indeed nothing less than this, than such a full down-bearing *Persuasion* can well enable a *Man* to drink off this bitter *Cup*, and to be *Baptized* at this *Bloody Font*. It must certainly be a strange Degree of Affiance and Confidence which that *Man* has in God, who can resign up all that is good and pleasant, and submit himself to all that is evil and terrible in this *World*, and meet *Death* with all its Natural and Artificial *Terrors*, and trust God for his *Reward* in another *Life*.

Life. What a generous, victorious Faith is this ! And what a noble Idea must such a Person have of God ! The Faith of *Abraham* is highly celebrated in Scripture for his readiness to offer up his Son at the Command of God. And no doubt 'twas a very rare and extraordinary Faith that could reconcile him to such an unnatural Undertaking. But certainly the Faith of a Martyr is very much beyond this, as much as 'tis an higher Act of Reliance to trust God with ones own Soul, and for ones Eternal Happiness, than for a Posterity to inherit a promised Land.

SECONDLY, The greatest *Love*. There is indeed no Love like the Love of a Martyr. This is that Love which is properly stronger than Death, and which is so perfect as to cast out or overcome all Fear. This is a Degree of Love truly *Seraphick*, and which comes the nearest of any to the Love of Angels and Beatify'd Spirits. If there be any such thing as Seraphick Love in the World, this is it. Not only because 'tis bright and flaming, noble and generous, but because 'tis a Love that gets above all the Bodily Passions, silences all the Motions of the lower Life, and makes the Man act as if he were all Soul and Mind. More particularly, Martyrdom is the greatest Love of *Virtue*, and the greatest Love of *God*.

FIRST, Martyrdom is the greatest Love of *Virtue*, because that is valued at an higher Rate than Life it self, which the Martyr will rather lose than sin. Our Saviour makes it the greatest Instance and Argument of Friendship, for a Man to lay down his Life for his Friend. And so doubtless it is. For 'tis then plain that the Man sets

sets a greater Value upon his Friend, than he does upon Life. And the like may be said of the Martyr, that he sets a higher Value upon Virtue, than he does upon Life, which yet is so dear that (as one observes, who for our Safety too well understands the secret Springs and Inclinations of Human Nature) *all that a man has will be give for it*, Job. 2. 4. And yet this very Life for which a Man will give all things, is by the Martyr given as a Sacrifice to his Innocence.

SECONDLY, Martyrdom is the greatest Love of God, because the Martyr sets so high a Price upon him, that he will chuse rather to die than forfeit the Enjoyment of his Favour and Blessedness, and may truly say with the Psalmist, *Psal. 63. 4. Thy loving kindness is better than life.* 'Tis an easie thing for a Man in a warm gusty fit of Devotion, when the Evil day is far off, and no probable Danger of any Competition between his Religion and his Life, to say that he sets a greater Value upon the loving Kindness of God than upon Life, You know who did so. *Tho' I shoud die with thee, yet I will not deny thee*, that is, (to reduce the Words to a more Logical Order) I would rather die than deny thee This is easily said, but not so easily done, as the Event too sadly shew'd. But he that says he values the loving Kindness of God more than Life, and dies rather than forfeit it, may be believed. For what greater Love can there be than this, or what higher Instance or Tryal of it? The greatest Love of God was to die for Man. God could not signalize his Love to Man by any higher Instance than by dying for him, and the greatest Love of Man is to die for God.

THIRDLY,

THIRDLY, The greatest Courage. For there is also no Courage like the Courage of a Martyr. He fears no Evil but only Sin and Damnation, which are just and reasonable Objects of Fear, and will undergo any other Evils to avoid these, which is the truest and the greatest Courage. For where is there any like it? I would not have the Man of Honour or Duelist, of all the Pretenders to Courage in the World, offer at a Competition here. For 'tis most certain that he abuses the Notion of Courage as well that of Honour. His Courage is to dare to sin and be damn'd, that he may avoid the Reproach of Cowardize, that is, not to fear and avoid what with all possible Concern he should, and to fear and avoid what he should not. And if this be Courage, I must then confess that I do not know what is Cowardize.

BUT neither may the Military Man be a Competitor here. 'Tis I confess great and brave for a Man in a just and laudable Cause, for the Defence of his Prince and Country, to fall a Sacrifice at the Head of an Army. And the Heralds Office supposes as much. But there are also some Allays that qualifie the Glory even of this Action. For the Man is supposed to be ingaged with Multitudes and Numbers, which *incourage* as well as *defend*; and to fight in a Heat, when his Spirits are raised, and his Blood runs high, so as scarce to be able to feel a Shot or a Stab that shall be given him, and to want Opportunity of Retreat, and to be kept from reflecting upon his Danger by Noise, Tumult and Confusion, and to have the Spur of Emulation, and the Incentive of Anger, sometimes of Hatred and Revenge; and

and which is more than all the rest, the Hopes of a safe come off at last. Believe me, this goes a great way, and I question whether among those that venture themselves in War, one of Ten Thousand would do so, if he knew before-hand that he should certainly die in the Field. But now to have a Man go alone and in cold Blood to the Stake, or to the Scaffold; When in every Period of his Advance 'tis still in his Power by compliance to recede from his dreadful Undertaking, and there calmly and deliberately submit himself to *certain Execution*, and *feel himself die* with all his Thoughts, Reflections and Passions about him; this is Courage indeed; and such a Noble Spectacle as might well deserve to be a *Theatre to Angels and Men*, yea even to God himself.

THESE are some of those great things that illustrate the Excellency of Martyrdom, and shew it to be one of the highest Degrees of Virtue, and consequently that it is intitled to an higher Degree of Glory: Which the Scripture also expressly makes to be the Portion of Martyrs, who are said, *to indure tortures, and not to accept of deliverance, that they might obtain a better Resurrection*, Heb. 11. A Better Resurrection, that is, a Resurrection to a Better State of Happiness, that being the only Measure whereby one Resurrection may be said to be Better than another. And says the Angel to St. John concerning those who are cloathed with white Robes, and had Palms in their Hands, Rev. 7. 14. *These are they which came out of great Tribulation, and have wash'd their Robes, and made them white in the Blood of the Lamb. Therefore are they before the Throne of God, and serve him*

him day and night in his Temple. And he that sitteth on the Throne shall dwell among them.

AND now since there is a brighter Crown of Glory prepared for Martyrs, and those that suffer Persecution for the sake of Righteousness, all that further remains is to commend from the Premises these two Practical Inferences.

FIRST, That we entertain no hard Thoughts of the Justice or Goodness of God for suffering so many severe Persecutions in the Christian Church, some whereof were violent, as under the Roman Emperors ; some Fraudulent by Hetericks, as *Arius, Nestorius, &c.* And some of a mixt Nature, consisting both of Fraud and Violence, when both Temporal and Spiritual Power did combine together (as now in the Papal See) against the Lord and his Christ. I say we should learn from hence not to censure the ways of God for this, nor to charge him foolishly, since there is so plentiful a Reward laid up for those that suffer in the Cause of Righteousness.

SECONDLY, That we do fortifie our selves with the Consideration of this Beatitude, That if God should ever honour us so far as to call us to the Trial of the Crofs, we may be so true to God, to Religion, and to our own Souls, as to suffer courageously and thankfully, ever looking up to that glorious Crown, that white Robe, and those Triumphant Palms which distinguish the Noble Army of Martyrs, who eternally sing Hymns and Praise to God for the Blessing of those Crosses, which now spring up into Crowns, and in bearing of which they find so great Reward.

Glory be to God on High.

*The Conclusion of the Whole, in
a DISCOURSE concerning the
BEATITUDES in general.*



A VING hitherto discoursed upon every Beatitude particularly by it self, I think it may not be improper for the further Accomplishment of this Work, to conclude all with a Discourse concerning the Beatitudes in general. Where there are Three Material Enquiries that seem to demand Satisfaction.

THE First is, Concerning the Manner and Way of this Divine Sermon, Why our Lord chose to deliver his Laws and Precepts by the way of *Blessing*?

THE Second is, Concerning the Number of the Beatitudes.

THE Third is, Concerning their Order and Method.

FOR Satisfaction to the first Enquiry, I consider first, That Christ who came into the World upon an *Errand of Love*, the greatest Love that an infinitely good God could express to a Creature, and who no doubt had also a Soul well tuned, and a Body well temper'd, and both set to the softest Key of Harmony and Sweetness, was willing to deliver his Laws in the most *in-dearing*

dearling and charming Manner that could possibly be, that he might the better recommend both *Himself* and his *Doctrin* to the good Will of his Auditors, and reconcile them thro' the Love of the *Former*, to the Obedience of the *Latter*. Which is a very laudable Affectation of *Popularity*, first to engage Men's Affections to our *Persons*, that we may the better win them over to the Acceptance and Entertainment of our *Doctrins*. This indeed ought to be the Care and Endeavour of all Preachers; but there was this more particular Reason for it in our Lord, because the Love of *his Person* was not only an *Indearment* of Obedience, but also a very considerable part and instance of it. He therefore instead of using an *Imperative Style*, by down-right commanding such and such things, chose rather in a more gentle and condescending way to insinuate what was *his Will*, and *our Duty*, by pronouncing them *Blessed* that do so and so.

SECONDLY, I consider that our Lord Christ being to act the *Counter-part* to *Moses*, and to relax the rigour of his Law, by being the Author of a milder Dispensation, thought fit to give an early and a solemn Specimen of his greatest Mildness, by varying the Style of his Legislation from that used by *Moses*. And therefore whereas *Moses* deliver'd his Law after an *Imperial* way, by saying, *Thou shalt not do this*, and *Thou shalt not do that*: Our Good Lord chose rather to express his Law more tenderly and *Humanly*, by declaring the *Blessedness* of those that should observe it. And the rather, because *Moses* had armed and immured his Law with *Curses* and *Maledictions*. First in General,

Cursed is every one that continues not in all things which are written in the Book of the Law to do them. Secondly, more particularly, by annexing a Curse to particular Transgressions, as in that famous Commination in the 27th of *Deuteronomy*, to every Clause of which the People were to say *Amen*. And therefore to shew of what a different Spirit the Christian Institution was from that of *Moses*, our Lord chose to administer his Law in a form of *Blessing*, in Opposition to *Moses* his *Cursings*; thereby verifying thole farewel Words of St. Peter's Sermon to the Jews, in a larger Sense than he intended them, *God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his Iniquities*, *Act. 3. 26.*

THIRDLY, I consider that our Saviour was to deliver a *Law of Love*, a Law that required Love both as the *Matter* and as the *Principle* of Obedience. Love was both the *thing* to be done, and the *Motive* of doing it. The Son of God was to be the great Prophet of Love. 'Twas reserved for him, as being the *Express Image* of him who is Love it self, and therefore the only Master fit to teach it. This was the *Fire* which he came to *kindle upon Earth*, *Luke 12. 49.* the most ardent and affectionate Love towards God and towards Men. This was to be the Substance and Accomplishment of his Law, and the distinguishing Badge of those that profess'd Devotion to it. By this shall all Men know that ye are my Disciples, &c. But now 'twould not have been agreeable for a Law of Love to begin its Recommendation from such Arguments as should work upon the more *Servile* part of Man.

Man. Moses indeed deliver'd his Law with all the Circumstances and Arguments of Fear, and the Nature of his Law required such an Address, but 'twas fit that a Law of Love should come recommended to the World by Motives of Love.

FOURTHLY and Lastly, It may be further considered that this solemn Instruction of our Lord upon the Mount consisted of Precepts so very sublime and elevated, and withal so strange and unusual, as having had no Credit, if Reception, in the World before, that 'twas but necessary for the Prevention of Prejudice to set a Beatitude in the *Front* of every Duty, and to bribe the Passions of the Hearers with a forward Anticipation of Happiness, lest Men should say of the Commands of Christ, as the Prophet brings them in saying of his Person, Isa 53. 2. that *there is no Form nor Comeliness, nor Beauty in them that we should desire them.*

FOR these and other like Reasons that may be added, our Divine and gracious Law-giver was pleased to deliver his Laws rather by asserting the *Blessedness* than the *Obligation* of them. Which while I consider, I cannot but enter into a profound Admiration of the strange Goodness and Condescension of our Lord, that he should so far lay aside the Majesty of a God and a Law-giver, that he might the better act the part of a *Friend* and of a *Redeemer*. And to set this Consideration the more home upon our Minds, let us by the Aids of Fancy draw the Curtains of this Intellectual Scene, and imagin to our selves that we saw our Saviour seated upon the *Mount of Blessing*, with his Eyes devoutly set towards

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Heaven, and his Hands affectionately stretch'd forth over the adoring and attentive Multitude, and with Looks full of Concern for the Good of Souls, gravely and pathetically distilling down upon them the Dew of his Heavenly Doctrin, and tempering his Authority with the Style of Goodness, and Kindness, as well as his Divinity with the Veil of Flesh. Who can with sufficient Wonder contemplate so pleasing a Scene of Love and Sweetness! And who, that well contemplates it, can find in his Heart to transgress a Law delivered with so much Condescension, or offend a Law-giver so infinitely, so amazingly good!

Now concerning the Number of the Beatitudes, why our Lord should assign *Eight* and no more, 'tis not easie to offer what shall satisfie all Minds. Were I minded to amuse my Reader, I could tell him that in the *Mystick Philosophy* 8 is the Number of Justice and Fulness, because it is first of all divided into Numbers equally even, namely into 2 Fours, which Division again is by the same Reason made into 2 times 2, that is, 2 times 2 twice reckon'd. And by reason of this Equality of Divisions it received the Name of *Justice*. But I do not believe our Saviour intended any *Rosie-Crucian Mystery* in this Matter, tho' a certain Gentleman of that Order would fain insinuate that he did, reckoning this among other Observations upon the Number 8, that there were 8 kinds of Blessed Men in the lesser World, *The Poor in Spirit, the Mourners, the Meek, they that hunger and thirst after Righteousness, &c.* But I

Mr. Heydon
Rosie-Crucian
Infallible Actions,
pag. 73.

think

think all that can here be warrantably and safely said is, that our Saviour intending (as he signifi'd by his Ascent into the Mount) a Discourse of Perfection and Excellence, consisting of such Divine Vertues as were most perfective of Human Nature, and for the Practice of which he himself was most exemplary, was by his Design concern'd to instance only in the most select and excellent Duties both to God and Man. Whereupon premising Humility as being a Duty common to both, and withal the Foundation of all the rest, he found remaining Three extraordinary Duties relating to Man, *Meekness, Mercifulness and Peaceableness*; and Four to God, *Mourning for Sin, Hungring and Thirsting after Righteousness, Purity of Heart, and Suffering of Persecution for Conscience Sake*. So that our Saviour seems rather to have been directed by a natural Measure, and to take things as he found them, than to proceed by any Arbitrary Measure of his own. And this I think is the only Ground of his assigning Eight Beatitudes, and not that he had any Fondness to the Number it self.

THEN lastly, as to the Order of the Beatitudes, Dr. Hammond in his *Practical Catechism*, Pag. 114. remarks two Things. First, That the Grace first named is a general Principal Grace, and the Foundation of the rest, as he there shews in particular. Secondly, That there is an interchangeable Mixture of these Graces, one towards God, and another towards Man, so interweav'd, that the first respects God, the next Man, the next God again, till you come to the last which respects God again. To verifie which Remark, he begins his Computation not from *Humility*, which

is a general Fundamental Grace, but from Mourning, which is the first particular one, and respecting God. So that the First and the Last both respect God, who is the true *Alpha* and *Omega*, the First and the Last, and those between divide between our Neighbour and God. To teach us, that to God belongs the Chief, the First and the Last of our Love, and that our Neighbour is to be regarded after and in Subordination to God. To this I further add, that there is also a gradual and descending Connexion between all the Beatitudes, the latter still depending upon the former, as well as all the rest upon the first. For from Humility 'tis an easie descent to Mourning. When a Man takes a just Survey of his own Nothingness and Unworthiness by contemplating himself as a Creature and a Sinner, 'twill be so natural for him to mourn and be sorrowful, that the Danger is of being overwhelm'd with too much Sorrow. Then from Mourning 'tis easie to advance to Meekness, it being one of the chief Properties of Sorrow to soften and melt down the Spirit, which when meekly disposed, will also be in a fair Disposition to Hungering and Thirsting after Righteousness. *The Wrath of Man worketh not the Righteousness of God*, says the Apostle, that is, is no way a Friend to the promoting of Righteousness; whence on the contrary we may gather, that Meekness is a Friend to Righteousness; As it must needs be, since a calm and sedate Soul is most fit for attending to the Beauty of Holiness, and for admitting the Spirit of Holiness, which as the Jews say, will not rest upon a turbulent Mind. And when once the Soul is wrought up to a quick and lively relish of what is Good

Good and Righteous, 'tis then an easie Step to Mercifulness, it being a very Just and Righteous thing to shew Mercy. Which also leads a Man to Purity of Heart, as that without which even Mercy it self will not find Mercy. From whence the very next step is to Peaceableness, to which nothing more conduces than a pure Heart, free from those Lusts and Sensual Affections which are the Seeds of Strife and Contention. And when a Man has attain'd to a peaceable Temper, then he is fit for the greatest thing in the World, to be a Martyr, and will readily suffer Persecution rather than occasion any Disturbance either in the Church or State, and with the generous Prophet be content to be thrown overboard to appease the Tempest. So admirably well contriv'd and full of Order was our Saviour's Discourse, as it became him who was the Wisdom of God, as well as the Light of Men, and in whom were *bid all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge*, Colos. 2. 3.

ALL now that further remains, is that by a strict Conformity to these excellent Measures of Christian Perfection we endeavour to bring our selves within the Number of these Blessed Persons, whom our Saviour pronounces Happy here, and to whom he will say in a more Emphatical Accent, *Come ye Blessed*, hereafter.

T H E E N D.

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UPON A
BOOK
CALL'D, AN
ESSAY
CONCERNING
Human Understanding.

Written by JOHN NORRIS, M. A.
late Rector of Bemerton near Sarum.

In a LETTER to a Friend.



L O N D O N:

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CURSORY REFLECTIONS

ON A

BOOK

OF AN

YEAR

BY JAMES COOK

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR

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1830



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1830.



AN AT / 1708 A.D. / OCTOBER 1st

CURSORY REFLECTIONS Upon a Book call'd, *An ESSAY concerning Human Understanding.*

SIR,

You obliged me so highly by acquainting me with the Publication of so rare a Curiosity as Mr. Lock's Book, that should I dispute your Commands when you desire my Opinion of it, I should hazard the Credit of my *Gratitude*, as much as by my ill discharging them I am like to do that of my *Judgment*. This, Sir, already reduces me to an even Poise. But to this the just Authority you have over me, and the Right your other Obligations give you to all the Service I can do, being added, and thrown into the Scale, do quite weigh it down, and leave no room for any Deliberation, whether I should obey you or no. Without therefore any further Demur or

Delay

2 *Reflections upon an Essay*

Delay I shall apply my self to the Task you set me, in giving you my *Free Censure* of Mr. Lock's *Essay*, which I shall do by reflecting upon what I think most liable to Exception, in the same Order as the things lie before me.

INTRODUCTION, Pag. 1. Sect. 1. *The Understanding like the Eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things takes no notice of it self.* What the Ingenious Author intends in this Period, or how to make out any consistent Sense of it, I do not understand. For if his meaning be, That the Understanding while it is intent upon other things; cannot at that time take notice of it self; this comes to no more, than that when 'tis intent upon one thing it cannot attend to another, which is too easily and obviously true of all *Finite Powers* to be any great Discovery. But if his meaning be (as it rather seems, because of the Particle (*All*) and the Comparison here used) that the Understanding like the Eye, though it makes us see all other things, yet it takes no notice of it self, then 'tis a Contradiction to his whole following Work, which upon this Supposition must needs be very *unaccountably undertaken*.

INT. Pag. 2. Sect. 3. *First I shall enquire into the Original of those Ideas which a Man observes, &c.* But sure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defin'd what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Origination. For how can any Proposition be form'd with any Certainty concerning an Idea, that it is or is not *Innate*, that it does or does not come in at the Senses, before the meaning of the word

concerning Human Understanding. 3

word Idea be stated, and the nature of the thing, at least in general, be understood? If the Nature of Ideas were but once made known, our Disputes would quickly be at an end concerning their Original, whether from the Senses or not: But till that be done, all further Discourse about them is but to talk in the *Dark*. This therefore ought to have been his *first*, and indeed *main Business* to have given us an account of the Nature of Ideas. And yet this is not only neglected in its proper Place, but wholly omitted and passed over in deep Silence; which I cannot but remark, as a *Fundamental Defect* in this Work.

In the Three following Chapters our Author sets himself to prove that there are no *Innate Principles*. But before I consider whether there be or no, I premise this double Remark. First, That a thing may be false in it self, and yet not so because, or in virtue of such an Argument. Secondly, That tho' a thing be really false, yet it may not become such a Man to deny the Existence of it, who by some other Principles of his may be obliged to hold the contrary. The first of these argues the Writer guilty of *Inconsequence*. The Second of *Inconsistency*. Upon both which accounts this otherwise very ingenious Writer seems in this part to be chargeable. Which from the Sequel I leave to be collected.

His First Argument against *Innate Principles* is taken from the want of Universal Consent. There are (says he, Pag. 5. Sect. 4.) no Principles to which all Mankind give an universal Assent. But in the first place how can this Author say so, since in several Places afterwards he resolves that ready and prone Assent which is given to certain Propositions

positions upon the first Proposal, into the *Self-evidence* of them? There are then even according to him *Self-evident Propositions*. And will he say that *Self-evident Propositions* are not universally assented to? How then are they *Self-evident*? There must be therefore, according to him, some Principles to which all Mankind *do give* an universal Consent. I do not say that this proves them *Innate*, but only that there are such Propositions.

WELL, but how does he prove there are no such? Why, he instances in some of the most Celebrated, and says, Pag. 5. Sect. 5. That *All Children and Ideots have not the least apprehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy universal Consent.* Now I always thought that Universality of Consent had been sufficiently secur'd by the Consent of all and the Dissent of none that were capable of either. And what then have we to do with *Ideots* and *Children*? Do any or all of these *dissent* or think otherwise? No, that he will not say, because they think not at all, having (as he says) not the *least Apprehension or Thought of them*. And how then does the want of their *Suffrage* destroy universal Consent, when all Persons that think at all about such Propositions, think after one and the same way?

THE most therefore that this Author can mean by want of Universal Consent, is that every individual Person does not *actually Assent*. This perhaps may be granted him from the Instance of *Ideots* and *Children*. But then the Question will be about the *Consequence* of his Argument, whether Actual Assent from every Individual be necessary to the Supposition of *Innate Principles*?

Or,

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Or, in other Words, whether from there not being any Propositions to which every individual Man gives an actual Assent, it follows, that there are no Innate Truths. The Author is of Opinion that it does. *For, says he, Pag. 5. Sect. 5.* *It seems to me near a Contradiction to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not.* And again in the same place, *To imprint any thing on the Mind without the Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.* And again, *Pag. 12. Sect. 24.* *That a Truth should be Innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time.* Here we have both the Consequence of the Author, and the *Ground* upon which it stands. The Consequence is this. If there be no Truths actually perceiv'd by all Minds, then there are none naturally imprinted. The Proof of it is this. 'Tis impossible that what is imprinted on the Mind, should not be perceiv'd by the Mind. Therefore if there be no Truths actually perceiv'd by all Minds, there are none naturally imprinted. Now on the contrary to this I thus oppose. If there may be Impressions made on the Mind, whereof we are not conscious, or which we do not perceive, then (by the Author's own Measure) the not Perception of them is no Argument against such Original Impressions. The Consequence is unexceptionable, not only as clear in it self, but as being the very *Reverse* of the Author's own Argument. And now that there may be such Impressions whereof we are not Conscious, is what the Author himself expressly does own, and what by his Principles he stands oblig'd to own.

FIRST, 'tis what he does expressly own. For, says he, Pag. 38. Sect. 6. *Being surrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diversly affect us, variety of Ideas, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children.* And yet they do not perceive them, as he had said before. Therefore by his own Confession there may be an Impression of Ideas where there is no Perception. The same he confesses again, Pag. 61. Sect. 4. *How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his Mind is intently employ'd in the Contemplation of some Objects, and curiously surveying some Ideas that are there, it takes no Notice of Impressions, &c.* And again, Sect. 5. *I doubt not but Children by the Exercise of their Senses about Objects that affect them in the Womb, receive some few Ideas before they are born, &c.* And if before they are born, then certainly before they are conscious of them. There may therefore be Impression without Consciousness. Which he also plainly implies in his Account of Memory. Which he does not make to be a Recovery of Ideas that were lost, but a Re-advertency or Re-application of Mind to Ideas that are actually there, tho' not attended to. For, says he, Pag. 65. Sect. 2. *The narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it might have use of.* And accordingly, Pag. 66. Sect. 7. he calls them *Ideas which are lodg'd in the Memory.* And Pag. 67. Sect. 8. he calls them *Dormant Ideas.* So that according to him, to remember is to retrieve, not the Ideas themselves, (for they are suppos'd to lie *Dormant* in the Mind) but only the *Perception* or *Consciousness* of them.

This

This he makes to be the Business of Memory, and therefore there may be an imprinting of Ideas without actual Perception, which may now, it seems, stand well enough together without any danger of a *Contradiction*.

AND to the Acknowledgment of this, his own Principles will also oblige him. For since in conformity to the *Aristotelian Philosophy*, he makes all our Ideas to be deriv'd from our Senses, or rather by our Senses from sensible Objects, he must needs suppose (considering the variety of sensible Objects wherewith we are surrounded) that there are infinitely more Ideas impressed upon our Minds than we can possibly attend to or perceive. Which may also be argu'd from the Finiteness of our Faculties, as was hinted in the beginning.

WELL then, since there may be an Impression of Ideas without any actual Perception of them, whether there be any *Innate Ideas* or no (which I shall not now dispute) it does not therefore follow that there are none, because they are not universally perceiv'd. Which utterly silences that Argument taken from the Non-Perception of them in Children. And since our Author both does, and is by his Principles obliged to allow that there are many Ideas impress'd upon us when we have no actual Perception of them, it does not certainly become him, tho' there were really no such thing as *Innate Ideas*, and tho' the Non-Perception of them were an Argument against them, to bring this as an Argument against the Existence of any such, because they are not universally perceiv'd. This is not to agree with *himself*, however he may agree with *Truth*.

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OUR ingenious Author further argues, against *Innate Principles* from the *Lateness* of the Perception of such which are presumed to be of that Number, in that they are not the first that possess the Minds of Children. *Can it be imagin'd* (says he, Pag. 13. Sect. 25.) *that they perceive the Impression from things without, and are at the same time ignorant of those Characters which Nature it self has taken care to stamp within?* This I take to be a very uncertain way of arguing, and of less Cogency than the Former. For if *Nullity* of Perception will not conclude against *Innate Principles*, much less will the *Lateness* of Perception be able to do it. * And besides, there may be many Reasons drawn from the inward, and to us unknown Contexture of Minds, and from the manner of that Original Impression (if any such there be) which would also be to us equally unknown, besides the Order of External Circumstances, that may be the Cause why these natural Characters may not be so soon read as some others. And therefore I do not see what sufficient Ground the Author has for saying, Sect. 26. *That if there be any Innate Truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on.* Why? Where is the Necessity? The Reason given by the Author is because, *If there are any Innate Truths, they must be Innate Thoughts.* Are then Truths and Thoughts the same? Indeed Truth of the Subject is the same with a Conformable Thought. But Truth of the Object is not the Thought it self, but that which is thought upon. And why then must Innate Truths be Innate Thoughts? . . .

BUT our Author proceeds to another Argument wherein he places more Strength. If, says he,

he, Pag. 13. Sect. 27. These Characters were native and original Impressions, they would appear fairest and clearest in those Persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them. He means in Children, who, he says, have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment to hinder them from shining out in their full Lustre. But how does the Author know but that this Natural Impression may be so order'd that it shall not become legible till such a certain Period of Time, and without such and such Laws and Conditions? We know very well that we do not come to the use of Thinking in general till such a certain Period of Time, and the Author himself confesses, Pag. 12. Sect. 25. That there is a Time when Children begin to think; and why then may there not be a Time set for the arising of such and such particular Thoughts? And how can he tell that Childhood is that Time? Or if it be, why do not the Ideas impressed by sensible Objects appear fairest in Children for the same Reasons? If there be any Force in this Argument, the Author's own *Hypothesis* is as much concern'd in it, as that which he would overthrow.

COME we now to his Arguments against *Innate Practical Principles*, the first of which is from their not being universally assented to. But what does he here mean by their not being universally consented to? That they are not actually assented to by every Individual whether capable or not? Or that they are not consented to by all that judge any thing about them; if the former, that proves nothing, as we have shewn already; if the latter, then I deny the Proposition, and affirm that there are not only as *Certain*, but as *Uncontested* Proposi-

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tions in Morality as in any other Science. But our Author demands, Pag. 15. Sect. 2. *Where is that Practical Truth that is universally receiv'd?* I answer by referring him to the 274th Page of his own Book, where he says, Sect. 18. That this Proposition, *Where there is no Propriety there is no Injustice,* is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in *Euclid*; I add, and as plain too. It needed nothing to assure the Truth of it but only the Explication of the Terms. And I further remark, that in the same Place he says, that Morality may be placed among the Sciences capable of Demonstration. Well then, if there may be Propositions demonstrated in Morality, then those Propositions must at last be resolved into *Principles evident and incontestable.* Since otherwise there can be no Demonstration. There are therefore incontestable Principles in Morality. And he confesses as much in express Terms; *I doubt not,* says he in the same Place, *but from Principles as incontestable as those of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences, the Measures of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one, &c.* Here he expressly owns incontestable Principles in Morality, that is, incontestable Truths, that is, Truths that cannot be denied, and therefore *must* be assented to. And how then can he with any tolerable *Self-Consistency* say that there are no Moral Principles universally consented to? If none are universally consented to, then all are by some contested. And yet he says there are in Morality incontestable Principles. How to adjust this I no more know, than he does to reconcile *Morality* and *Mechanism.*

concerning Human Understanding. II

His next Argument is, That there cannot any one Moral Rule be propos'd whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason, Pag. 16. Sect. 4. Well, what then? Therefore they are not *Innate*. I do not see the Consequence. Why may not the same Proposition be Innate, and yet deducible from Reason too, as well as the same Proposition be the Object of both *Faith* and *Science*? Why may not Conclusions be Innate as well as Principles? Why may not God be supposed for a further Security of our Vertue to implant even those Practical Propositions upon our Minds, which are also capable of being demonstrated from Principles of Reason? Whether he has so done or no I do not dispute; I only say that their Dependence on Reason is no Argument that he has not.

He argues again, Pag. 18. Sect. 9. from Mens transgressing these Moral Rules with Confidence and Serenity, which he says they could not do, were they *Innate*. I do not apprehend here the least Appearance of a Consequence. Why may not an *Innate Law* be transgres'd as well as a *Written Law*? An Innate Law only dictates that such a thing ought or ought not to be done, and so does a Written Law. He might therefore as well have concluded that there is no Written Law, because it is Transgres'd, as that there is no Innate Law because it is Transgres'd.

THE Author seems to have been sensible of the Weakness of this Argument, and therefore to strengthen it, says he, Pag. 19. Sect. 12. *The breaking of a Rule say you is no Argument that it is unknown; I grant it, but the generally allow'd Breach of it any where, is a Proof that it is not Innate.* Here

I remark by the way that he grants that the Breaking of a Law does not prove it *not known*, and why then should it prove it not *Innate*? If a known Law may be transgressed, why may not an Innate Law, Innate being only another way of being known? But says he, *The generally allow'd Breach of it proves it not Innate.* I do not see the Necessity of this neither. The allow'd Breach of a Law is only a more aggravated Breach of it, and if the Breach of a Law does not prove it not to be Innate, why should the allow'd Breach of it do so? And besides, why may not an Innate Law be *Allowedly* broken as well as a Written Law?

BUT says our Author, Pag. 21. Sect. 14. *Did Men find such Innate Propositions stamp'd on their Minds, they would be easily able to distinguish them from other Truths, and there would be nothing more easie than to know what and how many they were.* Perhaps not so very easie. For I see no Absurdity in Supposing, and 'tis what I can very well conceive, that a Man may be sensible of a *Truth impress'd*, and yet not of the *Impression*, and so may not know that it is impress'd, but think it came some other way, and consequently may not be able to distinguish it from some other that does so. The Truth of this may be seen in the Instance of *Inspiration*. Since there have been Prophets (*Cainphas* for one, *Joh. 11. 51.*) who were not able to distinguish Divine Inspirations from their own proper genuin Thoughts: 'Tis therefore no Consequence to say that there are no Innate Principles, because we cannot distinguish them.

THESE are the main Arguments, and to which all that is further offer'd may be reduc'd, whereby

whereby this Author impugns the *Doctrine of Innate Principles*; and I think neither any nor all of them are sufficient for the Cause wherein they are engaged. And I am so far from being surpriz'd at their *Deficiency*, that I think it absolutely impossible for him, or any Man else upon his Principles, to prove that there are no *Innate Truths*. For since with those of the Peripatetic School he allows that Ideas are impress'd upon the Mind from sensible Objects, he cannot (as another might) object against the *Possibility* of such Impressions. He cannot say they are capable only of a Figurative and Metaphorical Sense; since according to him the same is literally and really done every Day, every Hour, every Minute. No, he must grant that 'tis possible there may be such Impressions. All the Question then will be concerning the *Timing* of it, whether any of these Impressions be *Original Characters* or no! And why may they not be at first as well as afterwards? How can he or any Man else tell (upon his Principles) whether the Author of Nature has imprinted any such or no? Or whether we brought any with us into the World or no? However that be, I am satisfied 'tis impossible for any Man that holds *Mental Impressions*, to prove the contrary; especially if with that he allows the Possibility of *Pre-existence*, which I believe no considering Man will say is impossible.

FOR my part, I do as little believe there are any such things as Innate Principles strictly and properly so called, meaning by them certain Original Characters written upon or interwoven with the Mind in the very first Moment of its Being

Being and Constitution, I say I do as little believe this as the Author himself. Not for the Reasons by him alledg'd, with the Cogency of which I am not satisfied ; but because I do not allow any such thing as *Mental Impressions*, or Characters written upon the Mind, which if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor, I take to be mere Jargon, and unintelligible Cant. You know Sir, I account for the Mode of *Human Understanding* after a very different way, namely, by the Presentialness of the Divine αὐγή or Ideal World to our Souls, wherein we see and perceive all things. For a fuller Account of which I refer you to my *Reason and Religion*, and to my *Reflections* lately publish'd. I cannot therefore by my Principles admit of any such Innate Characters in a strict and proper Sense. Only I may, and am also inclined to admit something of near Analogy with it. Supposing that God may and does exhibit some particular Truths of the Ideal World more early, more clearly, and more constantly to the View of the Soul than others, that by these she may be the better directed to the Good of the Reasonable Life, as Animals by sensitive Instincts and Inclinations are to the Good of Sense. This is all that I conceive to be strictly either Possible or True in that grey-headed venerable Doctrin of Innate or Common Principles.

HAVING thus far considered our Author's Impugnation of Innate Principles, I come now to examin the Original which he gives to Ideas. These he derives, Book 2. Chap. 1. from this double Fountain, *Sensation* and *Reflection*. Especially from the former, telling us again and again,

again, that the Senses let in Ideas and furnish the yet empty Cabinet, Pag. 8. Sect. 15. That the Senses convey into the Mind several distinct Perceptions of things, Pag. 37. Sect. 3. And that the Senses do furnish the Soul with Ideas to think on, Pag. 44. Sect. 20. with many other such Expressions.

THESE indeed are pretty Smiling Sentences. But before we go a step further I would willingly know of the Author what kind of things these Ideas are which are thus let in at the Gate of the Senses. This indeed I expected an Account of in the Beginning of the Work; but since the Author has been pleased to cast a *Shade* upon this Part, I now demand, What are these Ideas? Why you shall know that presently, *Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate Object of Perception, that I call Idea*, says he, Pag. 55. Sect. 8. Very good; so much my Lexicon would have told me. But this does not satisfie. I would know what kind of things he makes these Ideas to be as to their *Essence* or *Nature*. Are they in the first place Real Beings or not? Without doubt Real Beings, as having Real Properties, and really different one from another, and representing things, really different. Well, if Real Beings, then I demand, are they Substances, or are they Modifications of Substances? He will not say they are *Modifications*. For besides that a Modification of Substance cannot be a Representative of a Substance, there being no manner of Likeness between a Substance and a Mode; if an Idea be a Modification only it cannot subsist by it self, but must be the Modification of some Substance or other, whereof also there may be an Idea; which Idea being (as is supposed) only

a Mode, must have another Substance, and so on without end. As for Example, If my Idea of *Figure* be only a Mode, then it must have a Substance wherein to exist as well as Figure it self, which cannot exist alone ; and since of that Substance whatever it be, there may be also an Idea, which is supposed to be a Modification, this Idea must also have another Substance, and so on to Infinity. He will not therefore, I suppose, say that our Ideas are *Modifications*.

He must then say that they are *Substances*. Are they then Material Substances or Immaterial ? If he says they are *Material* Substances or Corporeal Emanations from sensible Objects, I would desire him to weigh with himself, and try

De inquirend. if he can answer, what is alledg'd
Verit. Lib. 3. by M. Malebranch against the Possi-
Part 2. C. 2. bility of such Emanations. Parti-
cularly, let him tell me how this can
consist with the *Impenetrability* of Bodies, which
must needs hinder these Corporeal Effluvias from
possessing the same *Ubi* or Point, which yet must
be supposed, if these be the Representers of Ob-
jects, since there is no assignable Point where
the same, and where multitudes of Objects may
not be seen. This one Difficulty is enough to
make this way *impassable*. But let him further
tell me how any Body can eradiate such an in-
conceivable Number of these Effluvias so as to
fill every Point of such vast Spaces, without the
least sensible Diminution. Well, but suppose
they could, let him tell me how these Corporeal
Effluvias, sometimes of vast Extent and Magni-
tude, can enter the Eye ; Or if they could, how
they can do it in such Troops and Numbers
with-

without jostling, refringing, and inverting one another. Or if this might be avoided, where shall we find room to receive such a numerous Company of Corporeal Images? And upon what part will you have them impressed? Upon the Soul? Or upon the Brain? But who can understand either of these? How can an indivisible Substance, as the Soul is, *receive* any Stamp or Impression? And how can such a fluid Substance as the Brain is, *retain* any? The least jog of a Man's Head must needs obliterate such slight and Aerial Traces, as the Wind does the Figures that are written upon the Sand; Not to say that these Impressions coming on so thick one upon another must needs work out themselves almost as soon as they are in, and in a short time consume the very Brain too. But suppose we could get over all this, the greatest Difficulty is yet behind; How will such Corporeal Effluvias be able to represent immaterial and intellectual Objects? They will at the most be able but to represent Material Objects, and not all of them neither, but only those whose Emanations they are. And what shall we do with Ideas that will not do their Office, that cannot represent a quarter of the things which we are concern'd to understand?

THESE and a thousand more Absurdities must he wade through, that will assert our Ideas to be Corporeal Effluvias derived from external Objects. It remains then that they must be *Immaterial Substances*. And so without all question they are. *All* of them as to their *Essence*, and *most* of them as to their *Representation*. But how shall Bodies send forth such Immortal Species?

They

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They can emit nothing but what is Corporeal, like themselves. How then shall they commence Immortal? Body can no more emit Spirit, than it can *create* it. And what is there after Emission that shall be the Principle of Transformation? Some I know talk of strange Feats done by the Dexterity of *Intellectus Agens* and *Patiens*, which they say refine and spiritualize these Material Phantasms; but I suppose our Author is of too Philosophical a Faith to admit of such a *Romantick Transubstantiation*.

THE short of this Argument is, if our Ideas are derived from sensible Objects, then they are Material Beings, because Matter can send forth nothing but Matter. But they are not Material Beings, for the Reasons alledg'd above. Therefore they are not derived from Sensible Objects. Which I think has the force of Demonstration. And to this purpose it may be further consider'd (what I hinted before) that as our Ideas are all of them Immortal as to their Essence and Substance, so many, perhaps most of them, are also Immortal as to their Representation, that is, they represent after an Immortal Manner, as

Meditat. 6. p. 36. the Ideas of Truth, Virtue, and the like; which *Cartesius* makes to be the Difference between *Imagination* and *Pure Intellection*, and whereof he gives an Instance in the Example of a *Chiliagon*, whose Angles we cannot represent in a distinct View, but may clearly understand it. But now how can that which represents after an Immortal Manner, come from Sensible Objects? Again, we have Ideas of things that are not to be found in the Material and Sensible World, as of a Right Line,

Line, or an exact Circle, which our Author himself confesses, Pag. 283. Sect. 6. not to be really extant in Nature. And what does he think of the Idea of God? Will he say that *that* is also derived from sensible Objects? Yes: For, says he, Pag. 147. Sect. 33. *If we examin the Idea we have of the Incomprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find that we came by it the same way*, that is, by Sensation. But in the first Place, how does this agree with what he says, Pag. 341. Sect. 2. *That we have the knowledge of the existence of all things without us (except only of God) by our Senses?* So then it seems we do not know the Existence of God by our Senses. No? then neither have we the Idea of him by our Senses. For if we had, why should we not know his Existence by Sensation as well as the Existence of other things, which, as he says, we know only by Sensation? For, says he, Pag. 311. Sect. 2. speaking of the Knowledge of Existence, *We have the knowledge of our own existence by Intuition, of the existence of God by Demonstration, and of other things by Sensation.* Then it seems we do not know the Existence of God by Sensation, but that of other things we do. But why are other things known by Sensation, but only because their Ideas come in at our Senses? For I suppose he will not say that the things themselves come in at our Senses; for then what need is there of Ideas at all? And if other things are therefore known by Sensation, because their Ideas come in by the Senses, then why is not God also known by Sensation, forasmuch as his Idea according to him, comes also the same way? And yet he will not allow that God's Existence is known by Sensation; which indeed

indeed is very true, but then he should not have said that the Idea of God comes in by the Senses.

BUT what a strange *Adventure* is it in Philosophy to make the Idea of God to come in by our Senses, and to be derived from Sensible Objects ! For besides the Difficulties and Absurdities already touch'd upon, what is there in the Material World that can resemble God ? Nay, what is there in the whole Creation that can represent him to our Thoughts ? God himself cannot make an Idea of himself : For such an Idea, whatever it be, must be a Creature ; and can a Creature represent God ! Nothing certainly but God himself can do that. He must be his own Idea, or he can have none. There is but one possible Idea of God, and that is his Son, the Divine $\lambda\delta\gamma\Theta$, or Ideal World, *the brightness of his Glory, and the express Image or Character of his Person.* 'Tis he that is the Idea of God, and of the whole Creation, that both *is*, and *represents* all things. And since the way of Knowledge by our Senses turns to so poor an Account, I would desire our most ingenious Author to consider, whether it be not abundantly more rational and intelligible (not to say pious) to suppose that we see all things in God, or the Divine Ideas, that is, in the partial Representations of the Divine Omnipresence. For our Author himself confesses, Pag. 315. Sect. 10. that *Whatsoever is first of all things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least all the Perfections that can ever after exist.* Nor can it ever give to another any Perfection that it has not, either actual in it self, or at least in an higher degree. God then, even according to him, is all Beings ; or, has the whole Plenitude

Plenitude of Being. And I wonder that this Principle had not led this Sagacious Person further. I know whither it would have carried him, if he had follow'd the Clue of it. For why should we seek any further, and puzzle our selves with unintelligible Suppositions? What else need, and what else can be the immediate Object of our Understanding but the Divine Ideas, the *Omniform Essence* of God? This will open to us a plain intelligible Account of *Human Understanding*, yea of *Angelical* and *Divine* too. Here I can tell what an Idea is, viz. the *Omniform Essence* of God partially represented or exhibited, and how it comes to be united to my Mind. But as for all other ways, I look upon them to be desperate. But these things are already by me purposely discours'd of elsewhere, *Reason and Religion*, p. 181. in my *Theory of the Ideal World*.

HAVING thus far reflected upon the two Principal Parts of this Work concerning *Innate Principles*, and the *Origin of Ideas*, in a continued way of Discourse, all that further remains is now to consider only some few single Passages as they stand by themselves.

P A G. 16. Sect. 3. *Practical Principles must produce Conformity of Action*, or else they are in vain distinguish'd from *Speculative Maxims*. 'Tis enough to distinguish them from Speculative Maxims, if they are in order to Action, that is, if they are concerning such things as may and ought to be done by us, tho' in the Event they do not produce any such Conformity. Otherwise a Law would not be a Law till 'tis obey'd.

P A G. 57. Sect. 15. *There is nothing like our Ideas existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies only a Power to produce those Sensations in us.* The first Part I acknowledge to be true: For certainly Heat in the Fire is no way resembling what I call Heat in my self, meaning by it either such a grateful or ungrateful Sensation as I feel, when I approach the Fire more or less. But the latter Clause I cannot approve, thinking it impossible that any Body should directly and properly produce any Sensation in my Soul. 'Tis God certainly that is the Author of all my Sensations, as well as of my Ideas. Bodies can only be Conditions or Occasional Causes of them.

P A G. 158. Sect. 10. Speaking of the Law of Virtue and Vice, says he, *If we examin it right, we shall find that the measure of what is every where call'd and esteem'd Virtue and Vice, is the Approbation or Dislike, Praise or Dispraise, which by a secret and tacit Consent establishes it self in the several Societies of Men, &c.* Praise or Dispraise may be a probable Sign, or secondary Measure, but it can never be the Primary Measure or Law of Virtue and Vice; whose difference must be founded upon more certain and immutable grounds of Distinction than the Praise or Dispraise of Men. For Praise or Dispraise does not make, but suppose the difference of Virtue and Vice as already settled, and antecedent to it. A thing is not good because 'tis praised, but is therefore praised because 'tis good. And how comes this Praise or Dispraise to be establish'd by such a secret and tacit consent, if there be not some other more certain Measure of Good and

and Evil, according to which our Praise or Dispraise is to proceed?

P A G. 185. Sect. 5. *I doubt not but if we could trace them to their Originals, we should find in all Languages the Names which stand for things that fall not under our Senses, to have had their first rise from sensible Ideas.* Let him tell me what he thinks of the Word (*Although*). Has he not a clear Conception of what is meant by that Word? And yet is there any thing of the *Material Relation* under it? I the rather instance in this Word, tho' I might instance in a thousand more, because I have read of a Man (I think the Relation is in Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual System) that was of our Author's Mind, that there was no Word but what ultimately stood for something material and sensible, and was convinc'd of the contrary by lighting upon the first Word of *Tully's Offices* which is *Quanquam*.

P A G. 196. Sect. 19. *The Doctrin of the Immutability of Essences proves them only to be abstract Ideas, and is founded on the Relation that is establish'd between them and certain Sounds as signs of them.* True indeed with respect to us, who because we do not know all the Essences of things, must be supposed to make that only the Essence which we intend to signify by calling it by such a Name. But I hope notwithstanding this, the Author will allow that there are also in reality Immutable Essences of things, independent on our Conceptions, as may appear in *Mathematical Figures*. Where the *Nominal Essence* and the *Real Essence* are all one.

PAG. 205. Sect. 9. He tells us that *Essences* are only *Articles of the Understanding*. 'Tis true, those Collections of simple Ideas which we bind up together under one Name, which he elsewhere calls *Nominal Essences*, are only Creatures of the Understanding; but as I said before, there are also determinate Essences in the things themselves, tho' for the most to us unknown, which have a fix'd and immutable Nature without any dependence on any Understanding but the Divine. 'Tis true indeed, we are fain to sort and rank things by their Nominal Essences, because the Real Ones are most times unknown; but that is no Argument against the Being of Real Essences. And this is by the Author himself confess'd, Pag. 234. Sect. 11. where he says that *in our Ideas of Substances we have not the Liberty as in mix'd Modes, to frame what Combinations we think fit to rank things by, but must follow Nature, and suit our Complex Ideas to real Existences.* So that here we have Patterns to follow, and I desire no more.

PAG. 242. Sect. 6. *Were the Signification of Body and Extension precisely the same, it would be as proper and intelligible to say the Body of an Extension, as the Extension of a Body.* Here he supposes it would be proper, to say the Extension of a Body upon that Supposition, whereas indeed were they precisely the same; neither of them would be proper.

PAG. 244. Sect. 14. *The Platonists have their Soul of the World, the Epicureans their Endeavour towards Motion, &c.* These the Author reckons among unintelligible Forms of Speech, and supposes

poses them to be no better than *Gibberish*. As to the Soul of the World 'tis a Subject of too great a Latitude to be discours'd of at present. But as to the Epicureans *Endeavour* towards Motion, that there is such a thing, he may be sufficiently convinc'd by looking upon a pair of Scales, where tho' the lesser Weight does not actually weigh down, yet that it presses and endeavours towards it is most certain, since otherwise as much Weight would be required to weigh it down as if it were quite empty. But this we do not find; whence it must of Necessity be concluded that the former Weight tho' it did not pass into actual Motion, yet it did something toward it, that is, it *Endeavoured*. The same might also be illustrated from the Actions of the Will, some of which are perfect and compleat Determinations, others only *Velleities* or *Endeavours*. But if the Author would be further satisfied in this Matter, I desire him to read the 19th and 20th Chapters of Dr. *Giffon*, *de Natura Substantiae Energetica*, where he will find this Argument very curiously handled.

P A G. 274. Sect. 19. *The Ideas of Quantity may be set down by sensible Marks, Diagrams, &c. But this canot be done in Moral Ideas, we have no sensible Marks that resemble them.* Very true, which is a plain Argument that such Ideas are not from our Senses.

P A G. 289. Sect. 2. *Truth seems to me to signify nothing but the joyning or separating of Signs, as the things signified do Agree or Disagree one with another.* This indeed is Truth of the Mind or of the Subject, but not Truth of the Thing or of the Object, which consists not in the Mind's joyn-

ing or separating either Signs or Ideas, but in the Essential Habitudes that are between the Ideas themselves. And that these are such, our Author himself implies, by saying, *as the things signified do Agree or Disagree with one another.* Here then is Agreement and Disagreement antecedently to any joining or separating. And I very much wonder that our Author professing in the Title of the Chapter to discourse of Truth in general, and particularly of that Truth too which has been the Enquiry of so many Ages, should yet confine his Discourse to Truth of Words and Truth of Thoughts, without the least mention of Objective Truth. Which indeed is the Principal kind of Truth.

PAG. 300. Sect. 5. *I think it is a self-evident Proposition, that two Bodies cannot be in the same Place.* If the Proposition be Self-evident how comes he only to Think 'tis so? If it were only Evident he must do no more than so.

PAG. 323. Sect. 14. *Eternal Truths are not so from being written in the Minds of Men, Or that they were before the World : But wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as Man is, inabled with such Faculties, we must conclude he must needs when he applies his Thoughts to the consideration of his Ideas, know the Truth of certain Propositions, &c.* This is a true Aristotelian Account of Eternal Truths. But I demand, Are these Eternal Truths in being before the Existence of Man or no? If not, how comes he to understand them when he does exist? What, does he make that to be true, which before was not so? But if they were in being before the Existence of Man, then their Eternity

Eternity does not consist in their being understood by Man when-ever he shall exist, but in their own fix'd and immutable Relations, whereby they have an antecedent Aptness so to be understood. Which the Author himself seems to imply by saying, *He must needs so understand them.* Why must needs? But only because they are necessarily so and no otherwise intelligible. But of this I have discoursed elsewhere.

Reason and Religion, p. 76.

P A G. 344. Sect. 8. He takes notice of one manifest Mistake in the Rules of Syllogism, viz. That No Syllogistical Reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has at least one general Proposition in it. This our Author thinks to be a Mistake, and a manifest Mistake. But perhaps if we rightly understand that Rule of Syllogism, there is no Mistake at all in it. All the Ground of the Dispute is from the Doubtfulness of what is meant by a general or universal Proposition. A Proposition may be said to be universal either when a Note of Universality (as *All*) is prefix'd before the Subject. Or when tho' that Note be not prefix'd, yet the Predicate is said of the whole Subject according to the full Latitude of its Predication, so as to leave nothing of the Subject out, whereof the Predicate is not said. According to the former Sense of Universality it is not necessary that in every concluding Syllogism one Proposition be universal. But according to the latter Sense of Universality (which indeed is the most proper Sense of it) it is certainly necessary. And I dare challenge any Man to shew me one Instance of a concluding Syllo-

gism that has not one Proposition universal in the latter Sense. For even a singular Proposition is thus universal, since being indivisible, it can have nothing said of it, but what is said of it wholly and universally, ~~as Aristotle~~, as Aristotle expresses it. The Author may see a further Account of this in Dr. Wallis his Thesis de Propositione singulari, at the latter end of his *Institutio Logicae*.

THESE, Sir, are the most considerable Passages that at once reading I thought liable to Reflection in this Work, which, notwithstanding these few *Erratas*, I think to be a very extraordinary Performance, and worthy of the most publick Honour and Respect. And tho' I do not approve of every particular thing in this Book, yet I must say that the Author is just such a kind of Writer as I like, one that has thought much, and well, and who freely writes what he thinks. I hate your *Common-place* Men of all the Writers in the World, who tho' they happen sometimes to say things that are in themselves not only true, but considerable, yet they never write in any Train or Order of Thinking, which is one of the greatest Beauties of Composition.

BUT this Gentleman is a Writer of a very different Genius and Complexion of Soul, and whose Character I cannot easily give, but must leave it either to the Description of some finer Pen, or to the silent Admiration of Posterity. Only one Feature of his Disposition I am concern'd to point out, which is, that he seems to be a Person of so great Ingenuity and Candor, and

and of a Spirit so truly Philosophical, that I have thence great and fair Inducements to believe that he will not be offended with that Freedom I have used in these Reflections, which were not intended for the lessening his Fame, but solely for the promoting of *Truth* and *right Thinking*.

AND this will justify that part of the Reflections, where agreeing with the Author in the Proposition intended to be proved, I lay open the Insufficiency of his Proofs. For to say that a thing is false for such Reasons, when 'tis not false for such Reasons, though it be absolutely false, is as great an Injury to Truth, as to say a thing is false when 'tis not false. A false Inference is as much an Untruth, as a false Conclusion ; and accordingly he that might reflect upon the Conclusion if false, may with as much reason reflect upon a wrong way of inferring it, though the Conclusion it self be true. Which I mention with respect to the former Part about Innate Principles, where though I agree with the Author in the thing denied, yet I think his Reasons are not cogent.

AFTER all, notwithstanding my dissenting from this Author in so many things, I am perhaps as great an Admirer of him as any of his most sworn Followers, and would not part with his Book for half a *Vatican*. But every Writer has his Alloy, and I exempt not any Writings of my own from the like Defects : Of which perhaps, Sir, I have been convincing you all this while. But that shall not trouble me, if at the same

30 Reflections upon an Essay, &c.

same time I may be able to convince you of my Readiness to serve you at any rate, as it highly becomes,

S I R,

Your Obliged and

Humble Servant,

J. N.

A

*A Brief Consideration of the
REMARKS made upon the
foregoing REFLECTIONS by
the Gentlemen of the ATHENIAN
SOCIETY, in the Supplement to the Third Volume,
&c.*



THE Gentlemen of this new Society undertake two things, to *Report*, and to *Judge* of the Contents of the most considerable Books that are Printed in *England*; which I acknowledge to be a very useful and laudable Undertaking, if performed Skilfully and Faithfully, with Judgment and Integrity. But whether they have thus acquitted themselves in reference to the foregoing Reflections, the Liberty they have taken with the Author, will I think warrant him to examine.

SUPPLEMENT, Pag. 2. Paragraph 1. *It will be sufficient to observe that Mr. Norris is a Cartesian, and as it seems, of those of the Cartesians that are of Father Malebranche's Opinion. This occasions that being full of these Thoughts, he seems not always to have well comprehended his meaning whom he Criticises upon. Why the being a Cartesian, and according to the way of M. Malebranche, Should make me less apt to*

to comprehend Mr. Lock's Book, I cannot divine. Were the thing it self never so true, yet I think the Reason here given of it, is as odd as may be. But 'twill be time enough to seek out for the Reason of my misunderstanding Mr. Lock's Book, when it is better prov'd than at present, that I have done so. But as to that, if Mr. Lock himself had told me so, his bare Authority without any Reason would have obliged me to suspect my Apprehension, and to think once again; it being a Deference owing to every Author to suppose that he best understands his own Meaning. But from you, Gentlemen, who stand upon the same Level with me, I expect Reason, and to be shewn where and how I have mistaken him. For the present I am rather apt to think that I have comprehended Mr. Lock's Sense well enough, but that you understand neither Me, nor Mr. Lock.

P A R A G R . 2. *He upbraideth Mr. Lock of attempting to treat of Ideas, without defining what he understood by this Word. Here is a false Report. I did not censure Mr. Lock for undertaking to discourse of Ideas, without premising a Definition, of the Name or Word, (for that I grant he has done) but for offering to account for their Origination, without giving a Definition, or any Account of the thing. My Words are, But sure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defined what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Origination. And again, This therefore ought to have been his first and indeed main Business, to have given us an account of the Nature of Ideas: And yet this is not only neglected in its proper Place, but wholly omitted and passed over in deep Silence, which I cannot but*

but remark as a Fundamental Defect in this Work. What is it pray, that is here remark'd as a Fundamental Defect? Not sure his not defining the Term Idea (for that I grant pag. 16. where I say, that so much my Lexicon would have told me;) but his giving no Account of the Nature of Ideas, That is there remark'd as a Fundamental Defect, and I find no Cause yet to think otherwise.

I BID. But Mr. Norris may see that he's mistaken, if he'll read over again the end of the First Chapter of Book I. where the Author begs his Readers Leave, &c. Mistaken indeed, if he had charg'd the Author with not defining the Term *Idea*, but not at all mistaken, in case the thing charg'd upon him was the not defining the *Nature* of Ideas; for of that the Author gives no Account, neither in the place these Gentlemen refer to, nor any where else.

I BID. It was sufficient to him (viz. Mr. Lock,) to shew in what manner, or if you will on what occasion we come to have different Ideas, without its being necessary to speak of the Ideas themselves. Here is an implicit Concession that Mr. Lock does not undertake to open the Nature of Ideas, and withal that that was the thing laid to his Charge, which sufficiently clears the Reflector from the pretended Mistake. But then withal 'tis affirmed here, that there was no need he should undertake such an Account. Now this being matter of Judgment, not of Report, the thing must be a little argu'd. These Gentlemen say it was sufficient to shew how we come by our Ideas, without speaking of the Ideas themselves. Against this I contend it was not sufficient, it being impossible to give any Satisfactory Account how we come by them

them, till their Nature be in some measure discover'd. For how can any thing be affirm'd or denied of any thing, unless its Nature be known? How can any Attribute be given with any certainty to an unknown Subject? Indeed when the Nature of the thing is sufficiently known and agreed upon, we need only define the Term whereby we express it: As when 'tis suppos'd to be known what the Nature of an Angle is, I need only say that a Triangle is that which has Three Angles. Which is the Reason why *Euclid* in his Geometry thought himself concern'd only to give *Nominal Definitions*. For the Nature of *Figures* is evidently known; we see the very Essence of them, and therefore there needs no other Definition but that of the Term only, whereby we signify them, that so there may be no mistake of our Meaning; that we may not be supposed to mean a *Square* when we talk of a *Circle*. But when the Nature of the thing is not known or agreed upon (as in the present Case) then a bare Definition of the Term is not sufficient; but the thing it self must be (at least in general) explain'd, before any Proposition can be with any Certainty advanc'd concerning it. For suppose instead of saying that our Ideas come from our Senses, I should say that *the immediate Object of our Conception* (which is the Nominal Definition) comes from our Senses, what Advantage would this be to the Certainty of the Proposition; or how could it be decided whether the immediate Object of our Conception be from our Senses or no, unless it be first made known what this immediate Object of our Conception is? We must know its Nature, before we can derive its Pedigree.

PARAGR.

PARAGR. 3. Mr. Lock hath maintain'd that there are no Innate Ideas, since there is no Principle wherein all Mankind agree. But to that the Author opposes the Evident Propositions which all the World agrees to, &c. To that ; To what ? Here is either a great Blunder, or a very gross Prevarication. What Mr. Lock is here said to maintain, consists of two distinct Parts, a Proposition, and a Reason of the Proposition. The Proposition is, that there are no Innate Ideas : The Reason is, because there is no Principle universally assented to. Now to which of these is it that the Reflector opposes Self-evident Propositions ? Not to the Proposition certainly, but to the Reason of it. He alledges Self-evident Propositions not to prove against the Thesis laid down, that Ideas are Innate (for that he expressly denies, *Pag. 15.*) but to prove against the Reason given, that there are Principles universally assented to. As may appear from the very Words of the Place refer'd to, *Pag. 4.* which I leave the Reader to consult. The short of Mr. Lock's Reasoning in that part is this, If there are no Principles universally assented to, then there are none Innate ; but there are no Principles universally assented to. &c. Now the minor Proposition is what the Reflector denied, and to which he opposed evident Propositions, a thing granted by the Author. Not that he intended to infer thence, that there are Innate Ideas : For though it may follow that if there be Innate Ideas they will be universally consented to, and consequently if not so consented to, they are not Innate : Yet it does not follow that if they are universally consented to, therefore they are Innate, that being accountable for upon other Grounds.

36. REMARKS upon the

Grounds. The Reflector urges Mr. Lock's Concession of Self-evident Propositions, only to evince that according to him, there must be Principles universally consented to, and consequently that he ought not to argue against Innate Ideas from the want of such Principles. But the Question of Innate Ideas themselves is not here so much as glanc'd at: And therefore says the Reflector, Pag. 4. *There must be therefore according to him, some Principles to which all Mankind do give an universal Consent.* *I do not say that this proves them Innate, but only that there are such Propositions,* wherein he thought he had laid in a sufficient Caution against all Mistake. And yet these Gentlemen would fain insinuate as if the Reflector alledg'd evident Propositions in opposition to the Thesis laid down, to prove that there are Innate Notions, as plainly appears from the State of the Question which they are so kind as to put for him in the very next Words. For,

I B I D. Say they, *The Question is to know if we understand the same thing by Innate Notions and Evident Propositions, which is not assuredly in the Ordinary usage of the Word Innate, that has not at all the same Signification with that of Evident.* Had I opposed Evident Propositions to the Thesis maintain'd, in order to prove that there are Innate Notions, then indeed the Question might have turn'd upon this Hinge, whether we understand the same by *Evident* and *Innate*; and their saying that this is the State of the Question, does impute the other to me. But since my Appeal to Self-evident Propositions is only to prove against the Reason of the Proposition, that there are Principles universally consented to, this is so far from being a true State

State of the Question, that 'tis an utter Mistake of the Argument. 'Tis plain that my Design was not to prove by that or by any other Argument, that there are Innate Ideas, (for I expressly disown them as well as Mr. Lock,) but only to prove that there are Principles of Universal Consent. And for this I insist upon Self-evident Propositions, and I see nothing wanting in the Argument to serve the purpose for which it was used.

I B I D. Yet Mr. Norris supposing that the Author of the *Essay* confounds these Two things, accuses him of Contradicting himself, since he granteth that there are evident Propositions. Well, I find when Men are once got into a Wood, 'tis a hard matter to get out again. Here is still a further Continuation of the same Blunder. I am far enough from ever supposing that the Author of the *Essay* confounds these Two things, viz. Evident Propositions and Innate Notions, and as far from confounding them my self, or from arguing from the Former to the Existence of the Latter, which I tell you again I expressly deny. Nor do I make the Author's Inconsistency and Self-Contradiction to consist in granting evident Propositions, and denying Innate Notions (which neither of us take to be the same) but in granting evident Propositions, and at the same time denying Principles of Universal Consent : Therein I tax him with Self-Contradiction.

P A R A G R. 4. One of the Reasons which Mr. Lock used to overthrow Inbred Ideas, is that there is no Appearance that any has these Innate Ideas, which he never minded. But Mr. Norris maintains that the Consequence is not good, because according to him (according

ing to Mr. Lock it should be) our Spirit may receive Impressions which we do not at all actually perceive, as are the Ideas which the Memory preserves. It may be replied to him that he must prove that we may have Notices which we never made Reflection on. It is replied again, that he need not prove it, since Mr. Lock has freely granted it more than once, and is also by his Principles obliged to grant it; as is observ'd in the Reflections themselves, Pag. 6, 7, 8. whither I refer the Reader.

PARAGR. 5. *The Author in reasoning against what Mr. Lock had said of the Innate Principles of Morality, insists anew upon this Bottom, that he can evidently prove, even by Mr. Lock's Confession, diverse Principles of Morality. He concludes also from thence, that he is in the wrong, to say that there are no Principles of Practice to which Mankind give an universal Consent, since there are Principles of Morality uncontrovertible. But tho' a thing be uncontrovertible, &c. it does not thence follow that 'tis Inbred or Naturally known.* What, again in the same Blunder? Sure these Men's Heads turn round. Who ever said it does follow? Does the Reflector by this contend for Innate Notions? No certainly; he only infers from evident Principles of Morality, that there are some that are universally assented to, in Opposition to the Author, who affirm'd there were no such. But he does no where make that an Argument for Innate Notions, which he expressly declares against. One would think these Men were hard put to't for Employment, thus to frame Consequences of their own, that they may afterwards overturn them again.

PARAGR. 6. *In fine, the Author after having made diverse Remarks like these which we relate, upon Mr. Lock's*

Lock's *Notions*, &c. But what if these hitherto related be none of the *Author's*, but your own? However, I believe the rest of those diverse Remarks would truly appear like these, if represented by the same Glass: But whether in Reality they are like these or no, I leave to the Consideration of better Judge.

PARAGR. 7. *This Definition is notwithstanding like to that of Father Malebranch.* What if it be, is it therefore Sufficient? 'Tis true, Father *Malebranch* in the Second Part of his *De Inquirend. Verit.* Pag. 196, does thus define an Idea, *Objetum Immediatum Mantis*, which is only a Nominal Definition, as Mr. Lock's is; but will these Gentlemen say that he stops here, and gives no Account of the Nature of Ideas? If so, either they have not read him, or do not understand him, or do misreport him.

I B I D. *When we have no design to treat of the Nature of a certain thing, it is sufficient to define the Word which we use.* If the Nature of the thing be evident and acknowledged, 'tis sufficient to define the Term, otherwise not.

I B I D. *He enlarges very much, especially to shew that the Ideas are not all of the Emanations of the Bodies which we see, which yet Mr. Lock does not in the least say.* What if Mr. Lock does not expressly say so? He says however that they are from our Senses, that is, from sensible Objects: And if so, then supposing that he makes them real Beings, they must either be Corporeal Emanations, or Spiritual Images; the Absurdity of both which I was concern'd to shew. And I think it is shewn sufficiently.

I B I D. *What seems to have set Mr. Norris upon these Reasonings, is that Mr. Lock says, that most of our Ideas draw their Original from Sense, which signifies nothing else but this, that we could have no Idea of Diverse things, unless we had perceiv'd them by means of the Senses.* If this were all that Mr. Lock contends for, we are better agreed than I was aware of; for 'tis acknowledg'd also upon my Principles, that the Senses are the *Occasions* of our having Ideas; that is, that God has establish'd a certain Order and Connexion between such Impressions made upon our Senses and such Ideas. Not that these Impressions do cause or produce these Ideas, but that they are Conditions at the Presence of which God will, and without which he will not raise them in, or to speak more properly, exhibit them to our Minds. But that Mr. Lock means quite another thing from this; when he ascribes the *Original* of our Ideas to our Senses, I think no one that reads him with even ordinary Attention, can doubt. 'Tis plain, that he means that our Ideas do proceed from *without*, namely, from sensible Objects, and are by our Senses convey'd into the Mind; according to the Hypothesis of the Vulgar Philosophy.

P A R A G R. 8. *Mr. Norris reproaches the Author of the Essay of saying, Pag. 147. Sect. 33. that 'tis by means of the Senses that we form the Idea of the Supreme Being.* 'Twere well if these Gentlemen were as free from Reproaching the Author of the *Reflections*, as he is from reproaching the Author of the *Essay*: I should not then have had this Objection to answer.

I B I D. *But our Critic has undoubtedly strangely err'd in this place. But what if our Critic should prove*

prove to be in the Right, and our *Critics* to be they that so strangely err? Undoubtedly this would be but an ill come off after so Magisterial and Decisive a Sentence. But why is the Critic so strongly presum'd to have err'd? Why because Mr. Lock after having nam'd Sensation and Reflection as the Sources of all our Ideas, continues thus: *It is so in all our other Ideas of Substances, even of that of God* (that is to say, that they are all form'd either by Sensation or Reflection) *for if we examin the Idea which we have of the Supreme and Incomprehensible Being, we shall find that it comes to us the same way* (by the one or by the other) *and that the complex Ideas that we have of God and separated Spirits, are composed of the Simple Ideas that we have by Reflection.* For Example, Having formed in our selves by our own Experience the Ideas of Existence, Duration, Knowledge, Power, Pleasure, Success, and of diverse other Properties, which 'tis better to have than not to have; when we will form a just Idea of the Supreme Being, we augment each of these Ideas, joining that of Infinity to them; and thus we form the Complex Idea of the Divinity. If Mr. Norris had read all this Article with Attention, he would have spar'd himself the Pains of seeking Figures of Retic to refute an Opinion which no body maintains. Now to set this whole matter in a clear and fair light, the short of it is this: I had charged Mr. Lock with deriving our Idea of God from the Senses. Herein they say I reproach him, pretending that Mr. Lock derives the Idea of God not from *Sensation*, but from *Reflection*. Well, be it so, yet this is to set the Idea of God but one Remove further from the Senses still, which will come to one and the same thing at long run. For these Ideas of Reflection

flection are but a Secondary sort of Ideas that result from the various Compositions and Modifications of those Primary ones of Sensation. This is all that can possibly be understood by this second Order of Ideas. They are only a various Composition of the first. For 'tis not in the Power of the Soul to make any new Ideas it has not receiv'd; she can only variously modifie and compound those which she has. So that notwithstanding this Expedient, the Idea of God will be, tho' not *immediately*, yet *mediately* and ultimately from the Senses. If it be pleaded that these Ideas of Reflection are not form'd out of those of Sensation, but from the Operation of the Mind about those Ideas. In answer to this, I grant that the Mind may reflect upon its own Operations as well as upon those Ideas they are conversant about, and that these Operations may then be consider'd as Objects that terminate the Understanding. But then I say that 'tis impossible that hence should spring any new Ideas of a distinct Nature from the rest, it being both against the Nature, and above the Power of the Understanding to make its own Object. And besides, this Expedient is so far from helping, that it rather heightens the Absurdity. For according to this Account, the Idea of God would not only be a Creature, but a Creature of a Creature. Indeed, whether it be said that the Idea of God be from Sensation or from Reflection, it would both ways follow that 'tis a Creature; only there's this Difference between them, that in the former way, it would be a Creature of God's making, but in the latter way, a Creature of our own making: Which I think is the greater Absurdity of the two.

I B I D.

I BID. *He joineth therewith some Reflections, to make Father Malebranch's Opinion more probable, with which it does not fadge, no more than with those which he makes on diverse places of Mr. Lock's Book.* Thus these Gentlemen are pleased to say ; but since they offer neither Instance, nor Reason of it, I shall content my self to Reply, that as Wise Men are of another Opinion.

I BID. *Whom concluding, he highly commends, which a great many People will Subscribe without Trouble.* Well, I am glad there is something wherein I have the good Fortune to agree with this Noble Society, and if it will be any Pleasure to them to know how much I do so, I shall take this Occasion to tell both them and the World, that tho' I have writ against Mr. Lock, I have yet as great Thoughts of him as any of those that so ignorantly defend him ; that I both honour his Person, and admire his Book, which, bating only some few things, I think to be one of the most exquisite Pieces of Speculation that is Extant. And that were I in order to notional Improvement, to recommend but Three Books only in the World, one of them should be this of Mr. Lock's.

PARAGR. 9. *We find furthermore at the end of the Book where the Author retracts, having maintain'd in an English Book, that Sin was a Real thing, he declares now that he believes 'tis meer Nothing.* This is a gross Misrepresentation that savours neither of the Justice nor of the Civility of the Press. *He declares now.* How does he declare it ? Expressly or by Consequence ? Not sure expressly. If by Consequence, not to remark the Impropriety of declaring a thing by Consequence, or the Injustice of charging any Man with the Consequences

of any Opinion as by him *declar'd*, were they never so truly deduced, does it follow, that because I disown the Positiveness of Sin, that therefore I hold 'tis a *meer Nothing*? Suppose I should say, that these Gentlemens Ignorance in Philosophy, and the common Principles of Metaphysicks were not of a Positive Nature, do I thereby say it is nothing? Must Sin either be Positive or Nothing? Is there no Medium? What, did these Gentlemen never hear of a *Privation*? But this 'tis when Nature is not follow'd, when Science is Usurp'd, and when a sort of Men whose Talent was never known to lie much towards Philosophy, will needs turn a Conventicle into a *Port Royal*, and set up for *Vertuoso's*.



An Admonition Concerning two late Books, call'd *Dis- courses of the Love of God.*

IN the first place I acknowledge the Persons that appear against me to be Men of Considerable Character and Eminence in their several ways, and therefore would not have any thing that I shall further say upon this Occasion to be interpreted to the Diminution or Dispragement of either of them, to whom I mean nothing but Good Will, Honour and Respect.

Not that the First of my Adversaries has given me any Example of this. On the Contrary (though I am not over-quick at resenting) I cannot but be Sensible, and so must any Indifferent Reader, of the unkindness and disrespect he expresses towards me, and with what Disdain and Contempt he treats me. 'Tis true indeed he has been so Civil (to me shall I say, or to himself) as not to foul his Pen with dirty and scurilous Language, the too fashionable Rhetorick of the Times, but yet the spiteful Ayr that runs through his Book too plainly shews with what Spirit and Temper he writes, and may justly tempt even Candor it self to suspect, that he that could allow himself so free an Indulgence of his Spleen and Prejudice, forbore the other rather out of Regard to *himself* than any kindness to his *Adversary*, lest he should thereby bring his Breeding into question, and forfeit the very plausible and

and agreeable Character of a *Civil Writer*. Which yet I think he has in great Measure done however: For sure *good Nature* is a very considerable Ingredient of *good Manners*, and a Man cannot very well be said to be *Civil* to any one to whom at the same time he plainly appears to be very *unkind*.

Why our ingenious Author *has* used me thus I partly Guess, though why he *should* I know no just reason, especially considering the different Treatment he had from me upon a like publick Occasion. Which I cannot mention without telling him by the way that as if I had made *no* reply to his late Treatise, I had not been in his Debt, so if I make him a *Civil* one he is *doubly* in mine.

But to let that pass, I know nothing more unbecoming either a Searcher after Truth, or an Advocate for it than Peevishness and Ill-Nature, nor how this Author could be guilty of a greater Incongruity than while he was writing of the *Love of God* to let fall such broad indications of Disaffection towards his *Neighbour*, especially being Unprovoked, I might say Obliged, and upon the very first Aggress.

When indeed the *Saw of Contention* has been drawn backward and forward for some while, no wonder if at length it wax hot, and great Allowances are to be made for Men that grow out of Temper after they have been chaff'd and warm'd with long Dispute, as also *Some* for him that is the Respondent, and upon the defensive part; But for one that is the first Aggressor to come on so fiercely, and at first dash to fall upon a Man like a red-hot piece of Iron upon an *Anvil*,

vil, burning and sparkling as it falls, this I think is against all the Measures of *Decorum*, and that common Civility that is due from Man to Man, not to say from one Christian to another. And he will hardly persuade the World to believe (were it more Candidly disposed than it is) that he had either Truth or Charity in his *View* that shall allow himself such a free Range in Malicious Railery, and whose Expressions are so high-season'd with Spite and ill-Nature. He may talk of preventing *Mistakes about Religion*, &c. but the jealous World will be apt to believe this only a good Covering for a bad Design, and that whatever shews of Zeal for Truth or Religion may swim at top, there is an old Grudge at the Bottom.

I am not so wedded to an *Hypothesis* (whatever the Kindness of this Adversary may insinuate) but that I value *Truth* more, and if I know my own Heart, should gladly and thankfully receive the poorest Endeavours from the meanest hand, whose sincere Intention I have reason to believe is to reduce me to it. But when Men shall write upon a *Pique*, and instead of opposing their Adversaries Conclusions shall reflect spitefully upon their Persons, as the Case is then far otherwise, so 'tis no wonder if the Resentment be so too. I do not therefore thank our Author at all for the Pains he has taken in his Book, which I cannot think written out of love to *Me* at least, if out of any to *Truth* (for if his Busines had been only to convince me, and set my Understanding at rights, what need so much Personal Reflection and Spiteful Insinuation) but rather to give vent to an Angry and uneasy *Humour* of his own, and

and to entertain his Reader at the Expence of my Reputation. If therefore I Forgive him 'tis sufficient, which I assure him I heartily do; Praying for him among those that *despitefully use me*, and wishing him a better Spirit, and that he would endeavour to reform his Temper, which I'm afraid is more *unserviceable* to Religion than any *Hypothesis* of mine can be. And for his better Assistance herein I would humbly Command to his Reading and serious Consideration part of one of the New Moral Essays of M. Placete, (they are *Protestant Essays*, and therefore he need not be afraid of any *Mystic Divinity* in them) Vol. 2. Pag. 284. concerning the Evil of abusing Men in Print.

My Second Adversary treats me with a little more Civility and Respect, for which I thank him. And yet there are here and there some Roughnesses, little Flirts, and not very good-Natured Reflections and Insinuations that need some allowance, though not more than (I thank God) I can give. Only there is one Passage which I take very unkindly of him, and for which I think he owes me some Account, I may say Reparation. He says, Page 62. that I Charge the Authors of the Vulgar Exposition with *In-sincerity and love to their Lusts*. And that I do this *Plainly and Confidently*. And upon this he proceeds to Sound an Alarm, and to stir up all the Clergy of the Nation to engage and rise up in Arms against me, by saying, That *in defence of their own Reputations, and the Reputation of their traduc'd Brethren, all the whole Body of the Clergy who differ, &c. stand bound to vindicate themselves from those vile Implications which I cast upon them.*

Now

Now he cannot but be sensible that there may be an odious and invidious manner of expressing even a *Truth*. Which may be represented either nakedly as it is, or with some tenderness and mollification, or else odiously and by way of aggravation. To the first of these Justice would persuade, to the second Kindness and good-Nature, but the third is altogether unfair, and unbecoming a Man that pretends to either of the other. And yet is not this the thing he does by me? Does he not aggravate my Sense, and give it an harsher Ayr by his way of expressing it? He says in down-right terms, that I charge these Men with *Insincerity*, and *Love to their Lusts*, and that I do it *plainly* and *confidently*. Now any one that reads this would be apt to think that I had Directly, Formally, and Expressly Charged them with these things. But do I do so? He knows that I do not; and I appeal to my Words, or to any indifferent Considerer of them, whether I do or no, and withal whether he has not done unfairly by me, by thus odiously representing me, though the Charge it self, as to the Matter and Substance of it, had been never so true.

But neither Secondly is it true. 'Tis not true in the first place that I charge the Men with *Insincerity*. Had I said that they were Conscious to themselves that this was not the Sense, and yet would exhibit it as the Sense against the Persuasion of their Judgments and the Light of their Minds, this indeed would be to tax them with Insincerity. But do I say so? I do not say that upon the whole they were sensible that this was not the meaning of the Text; on the contrary, I suppose them, all things consider'd, to be forc'd to

to take up with it as low as it was, for want of a due foundation for a higher ; as would be seen if he had quoted me throughout. All that I say is, that they could not but be sensible that herein they did not rise up to the *Letter*. But by his good leave, 'tis one thing to be sensible that such a Sense falls short of the Letter, and another to be sensible that it is not the true Sense, unless he will say that never any Man thought that a *True* Sense, which at the same time he knew not to be the *Literal* Sense of a Text. Which he must, and does by consequence say, when he makes me Charge the Vulgar Expositors with Insincerity, which fixes that very Imputation of Insincerity upon all the *Protestant Interpreters* against the *Papists*, which he supposes me to lay upon those of our own *Church*. And now he has made a fine piece of work on't. But where then is the pretended Insincerity ? I know of none, nor do I Charge any Man, or Body of Men, with any such thing, though whether there be not some body in the World that I might now Charge with it, I leave him to consider.

Then neither secondly do I Charge them with *Love* to their *Lusts*, at least not as he represents it. For first, his Words imply as if I Charg'd it upon them in particular, whereas I speak of Men in general, not excluding my self, saying, *Were it not a matter of Practice wherein our Passions and Interests are concern'd*. Again secondly, He says *Love* to their *Lusts*, whereas I say only *Lusts*. But now *Lusts* and *Love* to their *Lusts* are two distinct things ; the former importing only the Natural Corruption of Human Nature, that propensity that is in us to sensible Good, which is the same with

with Originally Sin, and the latter the free Adhesion and voluntary Obsequiousnes of the Will to that Corruption, which is the same with Actual Sin. And how does he wrong me then when he imputes this Latter to me, whereas 'tis plain that I speak only of the Former. Any one that hears him say, that I Charge such Men with Love to their Lusts, would by the Natural import of the Words (especially when joyn'd with the dreadful Alarm that follows upon them) be led to think that I had Charged them, and them in particular, with a wilful Adhesion to, and Compliyance with their Lusts, whereas I speak only of that general depravation of Human Nature, that Corrupt *Adam* which is in every Man, and which indisposes Men for the reception of such Truths as cross and oppose that Natural Bias, which I make to be the great disadvantage of *Moral Truths*, in comparison of those which are *Physical* and *Mathematical*, &c. This is the Drift of my Meaning, as may appear by the whole Scope of the Place referr'd to, than which I think nothing could be more innocent or inoffensive in it self, how choquant or distastful soever it may appear as our Reverend Author has been pleased to dress it up, and represent it; with what design I will not assume to judge, but I am sure with no great Prudence, since he cannot but know, as well as the rest of the World, how well affected I am to the *English Clergy*, and that I need not him, nor any other Reconciler to make me think better or more honourably of them than I do. But as the most serious things may be Burlesqu'd, so the most innocent things may

may be render'd offensive and disobliging, either by a false or an untoward Representation of them. And after he has thus misused me, then to beat up for Voluntiers, and to endeavour to animate and stir up the whole Clergy against me as a Common Enemy, who mean no harm to any Body— But I will say no more, than that by it he has utterly forfeited all the Thanks which perhaps he might otherwise pretend due to him for his kind Intentions and Endeavours.

I confess however that I did not expect to be so publickly assaulted by a Neighbour and a Friend, who methinks might with greater *Decorum* have left so ungrateful a Work to another hand, especially at this time of Day, when we have no need of quarrelling among our selves for want of Adversaries to try our Skill upon. But it seems, contrary to the Proverb, Necessity has now *too much Law*, and Neighbourhood, Friendship, Peace, *Decorum*, and every thing must be sacrific'd to that which is *better* than Sacrifice. But to the Point.

In order to which be it premised, that in all Personal Disputation or Controversie an Objection carries in it this Addition to the Nature of an Argument in general, that 'tis an Argument against something before laid down or maintain'd by the Party oppos'd. So that an Objection is an Argument, and something more, and consequently there goes more to make an Objection good, than to make an Argument good. For to make an Argument good, 'tis sufficient that it be True as to Matter and Form ; but to make an Objection good, it must not only be a *Truth*, but

but a *Contradictory Truth*. So that though a good Objection be also a good Argument (because Objection includes Argument in it) yet a good Argument is not always a good Objection, and that because an Objection implies something more than bare Argument as such; as being not only an Argument, but a *Contradictory Argument*.

And therefore though there be but one general way whereby an Argument may be Faulty, *viz.* by reason of the *Untruth* of it, either as to Matter or Form, yet an Objection may be Faulty two ways, either for want of *Truth*, or for want of *Contradiction*; that is, it may be Faulty either simply as an Argument, or as an Objection; or if you will, either as to the Argument part, or as to the Objection part of it. Either the Thing Objected is not True, or if it be True, yet it is not a *Contradictory Truth*, and so a bad *Objection*, though perhaps a good *Argument*.

Accordingly there are two general ways of dealing with an *Objection*, according as the deficiency of it is in one or other of these respects. If it be truly *Contradictory*, but not absolutely true, as to the Matter or Form of it, then I have something to *deny*, the Syllogism it self if wrong in Form, or some Proposition of it if wrong as to Matter, and that again either Major or Minor, or Consequence according to the Matter of the Propositions, and the Form of the Syllogism.

But if the Objection be Absolutely true both Materially and Formally, but not truly *Contradictory*, what is to be done then? Why in this Case B. Sanderson says in his *Appendix de usu Logicæ*, pag. 273. that the Conclusion is to be denied. There are Three Things, says he, that may be

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denied,

denied, the Conclusion, the Form, and the Proposition. The Conclusion if it be Foreign, the Form if Vicious, and the Proposition if False. And again says he, *Si Opponens aut in primo Syllogismo non Contradicat Thesi Respondentis, aut in reliquis non inferat propositionem ab eo proxime Negatam, Respondens habet negare Conclusionem.* But then he after explains what he means by Denying, viz. by rejecting it as not to the purpose, or (which he says is all one) by admitting the whole Argument. In which Account though his meaning be right enough, if rightly understood, yet I think he has not express'd himself with either his usual, or with sufficient Clearness. For as 'tis most certain in the general that the Conclusion can never be denied if the Premises are allow'd to be True (because the Conclusion is contain'd in the Premises) and therefore the Denial when any is necessary, properly falls upon one of the Premises, not upon the Conclusion, so 'tis also most certain that in the present Case there is no need of denying any thing, there being indeed nothing at all to be denied. And therefore this great (and otherwise very Logical) Writer did not do so well in using the word *Deny*, however interpreted afterwards by *Rejecting*, in reference to the Conclusion, since Denying is always applied to the *Truth* of the Objection, and that as to the Matter, or as to the Form of it, in relation to the Former of which we say *Negatur Propositio*, and in relation to the Latter, *Negatur Syllogismus*. But now here the Objection is supposed to be Absolutely True both as to the Material and also as to the Formal part

part of it. And therefore 'tis most certain that here is nothing to be *Denied*, or that can be said with any Propriety to be so. And then again, whereas he says, by *Rejecting it as Impertinent*, or (which is the same) by *admitting the whole Argument*, I cannot think this neither to be a clear Account of the Matter. For Rejecting and Admitting are in themselves so far from being the same, that they are Formally Contrary, and Virtually Contradictory to each other, and are no otherwise to be reconcil'd than by the difference of Respects, which yet he has not here assign'd.

Let us see then whether this Matter may not be set in a little clearer Light. The Question is, what is to be done when the Objection is absolutely true, both Materially and Formally, but not truly Contradictory? To which it is answered in the first Place, Absolutely and without any Qualification, that here is Nothing to be *Denied*, the Matter and Form of the Argument being supposed to be True. And as there is nothing that can justly be denied, because all is supposed to be true; so neither has the Respondent any Reason, Persuasive or Inducement to deny any thing, since though a Truth 'tis yet an uncontradictory one, and such as though admitted does not concern him, nor affect the Thesis he Maintains. What then is he to do? I answer Secondly, That he is e'en frankly to admit the whole. For what should he do else? He *cannot* deny it because it is *True*, and he *need* not deny it because it is also an *uncontradictory* Truth. He must then, and may safely grant it intirely. Not that the Admission is so intire Neither, but that it *Consequentially implies*

plies a Rejection too, though in a different Respect. That is, he Admits it as a Truth, but then by doing so does by Consequence Reject it as an impertinent unconcerning Truth, (since if it were to the purpose, and against him, he wou'd not *Admit*, but *Deny* it) or if you will, Admits it as an Argument, but rejects it as an Objection, because not a Contradictory Argument, as every good Objection should be.

But then it may be further consider'd (which is all that can be said in this matter) that as in denying any part of an Argument, either as to Matter or Form, the Respondent may be sometimes oblig'd to assign some Reason of his Denial (for otherwise there would be no End of Disputation, since one Fool may deny more than a Hundred Wise Men can prove) so likewise in this Second way of dealing with an Objection by admitting the Argument as True, but rejecting it as Impertinent, the Respondent may sometimes be concern'd to assign a Reason of his Procedure, which is to be done only by Stating his own *Thesis*, and by shewing that the Conclusion of his Opposers Argument does not really Contradict it. This indeed is a short Cut, but 'tis all that can or need be done in this Case; and when he has done this, he has done as much as his Opposer can justly demand, and though in this way of proceeding he has nothing of *Denying*, *Solving*, *Refuting*, &c. he has yet answer'd his Objection as fully as such an Objection is capable of being answer'd.

Now thus stands the Case between me and my late worthy Opposers, who have both of them (especially

(especially the Second) taken a great deal of Pains
not to contradict me. They pretend to write against
me, and seem not to doubt but that they have
Confuted me, and yet do not so much as *attaquer*
me. Not attending sufficiently to the Principles,
nor to the Conclusion of the Discourse they offer
to oppose, nor duly considering the exact State
of the Question, they misapprehend my Meaning,
and so supposing me to hold what indeed I
do not, they run on upon a wrong Ground, very
elaborately set themselves to prove a Conclusion
that is not Contradictory to mine, and so fight,
not with me, but with a Shadow of their own.
In short, they both harp all along upon the same
false String, and bestow great Pains to prove a
wrong Proposition : Wrong I mean not *absolutely*
in it self, but in *relation to me*, as not being truly
Contradictory to what I maintain, and so are
guilty of that Fallacy which in Logick is call'd
Ignoratio Elenchi, as St. James would have been
in relation to St. Paul, (supposing he had intended
to contradict him) when he says that a Man
is not justified by Faith only, he not taking Faith
in the same Sense, when he says a Man is *not* justi-
fied by Faith only, as St. Paul does when he says
that he *is*, and so not truly Contradicting him,
because not denying the same thing that the other
affirms, whereas all Contradiction should be *ad
Idem*. And therefore I look upon my self to be
no further concern'd with my present Adversaries
(if I may so call them) than only to grant them,
without any more ado, the main body of their
Argument, allowing it to be True, but at the
same time rejecting it as an Uncontradictory, and

therefore not Pertinent Truth. I say I have no more upon my hands than this, unless it be for their Satisfaction to give them some Account why I do thus, which may be done in a little room.

I remark then that the whole Argument of the present Controversy is a mere *Equivoque* upon these two Terms, *Love* and *Good*, which my Adversaries (I hope they will pardon me for giving them a wrong Title) are pleas'd to take in the most large and popular Sense, and not according to that due strictness wherein I do, and wherein they should take them to contradict me. Thus as to the Term (*Good*) they use it according to the utmost Latitude, as it comprehends all that which any manner of way contributes to our good, ministers to our conveniency, and is better for us to have than to be without. And taking (*Good*) in this large popular Sense, they contend that the World is good, that the Creatures are good, that Meat is good, and Drink is good, &c. and for the truth of this appeal to *Experience*. And no doubt all this is true. But herein they do not contradict me, who use the term (*Good*) in a stricter, and as I think more Philosophical Sense, meaning by it that which really and truly does us good, or is the efficient Cause of Pleasure to us. In which Sense it is that I deny the World, or any Creature in it to be a Good to us, truly and properly speaking, because not efficient Causes of the least degree of Happiness or Good to us, wherein I am not at all contradicted by their saying that the Creatures are good in the other larger Sense, especially considering that at the same time that I deny them to be *Efficient Causes*, I allow them to be *Occurrences of Good* to us.

Then

Then again as to the term (*Love*) this also they use in the large and popular Acceptation, as it extends even to the *willing the use of a thing*, as suppose of Fire when we are Cold, or Meat and Drink when we are Hungry and Thirsty, and the like. But now I use the term (*Love*) more strictly, and it may be more Philosophically, for the Souls uniting it self to any thing as its true Good, Beatifick Object, or the Cause of its Good or Happiness. And accordingly in this strict and rigorous Sense of Love I make God the only due Object of it, and deny that the World, or any Creature in it, is to be loved by us, and that because God only, not the Creature, is our true Good, Beatifick Object, and Efficient Cause of all our Happiness. Whereas they taking the word (*Love*) more largely and popularly, as it comprehends within its Latitude even the willing the use of a thing, contend that God is not the only Object of our Love, but that the Creature may also be loved by us. Wherein indeed they say true, but do not Contradict me, especially considering that at the same time that I deny that the Creatures are to be loved *as* our Good, I allow that they may be sought and used for our Good.

Serm. Of the
Love of God.
Pag. 74.

And indeed setting aside the Passage last quoted, which fully expresses my meaning, and several others which I might quote both from the Discourse it self, and the Letters which Comment upon it, to the like purpose, the very Principles I go upon, my way of arguing upon those Principles, and the whole Current of the Discourses

themselves do all so jointly combine to determine my Meaning, that a Man who is awake when he reads them, might justly wonder how my Adversaries could miss it so widely, or suppose me to mean so absurdly as they do. Nay, the very Nature of the Thing speaks it self. For supposing I had not laid in any Cautions against such a Construction, nor had dropt one word whereby my Meaning might have been explain'd, yet if they will but allow me to have Common Sense (which their very Writing against me supposes me to have) how could they imagine that my words were intended in such a Meaning as by their opposition of it they put upon me!

As first of all for the World's being a *Good*, can these Men imagine that I ever meant to deny the Creatures to be good in the lax and popular sense of the Word, meaning, that they contribute some way or other to our good, and serve to the Necessity and Conveniency of Life, so that it is better to have them than to be without them? Or do they in good earnest think that I would scruple in the ordinary way of speaking, to call the Furniture of my House, or the Books of my Study, my *Goods*, especially since the late augmentation it has received by their two Learned Discourses? There is indeed a Sense wherein I do not, cannot allow them to be my *Goods*, but sure not in the Sense that is pretended.

And then again as to *not loving* the Creatures, can any Body imagine that 'twas ever my intent to deny the lawfulness of loving them in the lax and popular sense, as that signifies the willing the use of them, or the desiring to have them,

or

or serve our selves of them for our present Accommodation and Conveniency while we are here? Or that I would scruple to conform to the common way of speaking, by saying, that I desire Meat when I am Hungry, or Drink when I am Thirsty, or Cloaths when I want them to keep me warm, or Physick when I have occasion for it for my Health: Or that I would make any doubt to say, I love a Pen that writes well, or a Knife that cuts well, or a Horse that goes easie, or an Adversary that reasons closely and to the purpose. There is indeed a Sense wherein I cannot allow the Love of these things, but sure not in that popular Sense which is pleaded for, which as my Discourses do not condemn, so I can safely say it was never in my Thoughts to deny.

To what purpose then does Dr. Wh— lay himself out so profusely to prove that the Creatures are good, quoting that Text for it, P. 8. that every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with Thanksgiving, for it is sanctified by the Word and Prayer. Upon which he gravely Comments, *by the Word giving us Authority to eat of every Herb, and every living Creature*, quoting for it Gen. 9. 3. And by Prayer, asking these good Creatures of him who is the giver of every good thing. From whence he very solemnly draws two Weighty (I do not say Heavy) Inferences: First, *That every Creature of God is good.* i. e. good for Food to be received by us, (I fancy 'twas about Dinner-time when he wrote this, and he thought he was saying Grace) and therefore for our Food and consequently for our good. And why

why else is it to be received with *Thanksgiving*, for what we are obliged to thank him for is sure his Blessing, and our good. Secondly, That every Creature which is thus good for us must be desired of God, it being Sanctified or fitted for our use by intercession to God for the enjoyment of it. *Ibid.* To what purpose again does he tell us that Temporal things are good because God promises them as the Reward of our Obedience, and that Rubies are good, p. 10. because Wisdom is better than Rubies, *Prov. 8. 11. p. 11.* And that Life, Plenty, and the Fruits of the Earth, Kine, Sheep, are good things, because in certain Cases God threatens to deprive Men of them. *Ibid.* And that Temporal Enjoyments are good things because Mens Iniquities are said to with-hold good things from them. p. 12. And because they are God's Blessings, and his Gifts, and are also call'd the good of a Man's Labour, *Ibid. Eccles. 3. 13.* And because in the Story of *Lot* we have twice mention of his Goods; and in that of *Jacob*, that he carried away all his Goods. And because St. *Luke* says, of him that taketh away thy Goods ask them not again. And because the Rich Man is introduced, saying, There will I bestow all my Fruits and my Goods. As also *Abraham* saying to *Dives*, Son remember that thou in thy Life time receivedſt thy good things. As also *Zacchæus* saying, Half of my Goods I give to the Poor. And says St. *Paul*, Tho' I give all my Goods to the Poor, and have not Charity--And he Commands the believing Jews for taking joyfully the spoiling of their Goods. And then comes in the Wise Man also frequently informing

us that it is the good of Man to Eat and Drink, and make his Soul Enjoy the good of all his Labour. p. 13. Well, here are a great many *good* things reckon'd up, and yet I can tell him of a very good thing (though not always well used) that he has left out, and that is a good *Concordance*, which I find has done him good Service.

To what purpose again is he so free of his Pains and of his Readers Patience in proving so largely (in Sense as well as Compass) that the Creatures may be lov'd, that we may desire our daily Bread, p. 5. that we may move towards our Meat when we are Hungry, and Drink when Thirsty, p. 14. and that we may rejoice in these things, and that the *Jews* were Commanded to rejoice in their Feasts, p. 7. telling us withal that the Contrary Doctrine (as he will have it, though I know of no such) is contrary to our Prayers for daily Bread, to God's Promises of Temporal good things, and his Threats of Temporal Evils, to the representation of them as God's Gifts and Blessings, and our good Things. p. 8. To God's Command to Rejoice in them p. 15. To the Industry required by God to procure these things, and his Blessing promised to that Industry, p. 21. And that 'tis inconsistent with our Obligation to pray for Temporal Blessings, and with the Prayers of our own and Ancient Liturgies. With the Praises due to God for Temporal Blessings, and with the Thanksgivings for them, used in our Liturgy, p. 22. That it tends to deprettiate the Divine Gifts, to teach Men to slight God's Promises (he might as well have said to stand upon their Heads) and Contemn

Contemn his Threats, p. 24. to destroy all Industry in our Calling, and that it lays the vilest Imputation upon the Dispensations of God's Providence towards us, p. 25. To what purpose again does he Appeal to *Solomon's Prayer* at the Dedication, imploring Temporal Mercies, and asking Deliverance from the Pestilence, Famine, Mildew, Blasting, Locust, Drought, Exile, p. 21. And to Dr. Comber about the Ancient Liturgies, Praying for Temperate Air, Gentle Showers, Refreshing Dews, and Plenty of all Fruits; and to our Liturgy, Praying that God would give and preserve to our Use the Kindly Fruits of the Earth---And that the King may study to preserve his People in Wealth, Peace, and Godliness; with a long Story about the Land of *Canaan* flowing with Milk and Honey, p. 72. and tedious Quotations out of *Deuteronomy*, *Exodus*, and *Leviticus*, about being bleis'd in the City, and bless'd in the Field, in the Basket, and in the Store, &c. I say to what manner of purpose is all this, and abundance more that I might Muster up together of the same importance, but that I am weary of Repeating, what once said is too much. For 'tis visible to the Eye that can see any thing, that all this is quite off from the Point, vastly *Wide* of the Mark (whoever 'twas that shew'd him his *Ground*) and a pure *Ignoratio Elenchi*, such as Learned Men use to be guilty of, that won't Think. Of which we have a late and fresh Instance in the very Noisy Controversy between *F. Malebranch* and *M. Arnauld*, Dr. of the *Sorbonne*, who with great Zeal and Earnestness write

Volume

Volume after Volume against the Other, and yet very seldom, if ever, Opposed his true Meaning.

Suppose I should say after St. Austin, that the World is not to be *Enjoy'd*, taking the word (*Enjoy*) as he does, strictly, as 'tis opposed to, and distinguish'd from *Using*, and a Zealous and Over-Orthodox Adversary thinking to Contradict me, should with great Passion Contend that we *may* enjoy the World, using the Term (*Enjoy*) in the large Popular Sense, as it signifies the Having, Possessing, or using of a thing, and should quote Scripture for it, who giveth us richly all things to *enjoy*, and should also pretend that the Contrary is against the Doctrine of the Church of England, who Prays in her Liturgy, *That it may please thee to give and preserve to our use the Kindly Fruits of the Earth, so as in due time we may enjoy them,* would not this be mere Stuff, wretched Trifling, quite beside the Matter, a perfect Ignoratio Elenchi, and as much to the Purpose as if he had said just Nothing?

Now this is the very Case in hand. Dr. Wh. has taken a great deal of pains to prove that we may desire to have Fire when we are Cold, Meat when we are Hungry, Drink when we are Thirsty, and other Accommodations of Life as we want them. And he has proved these things very Learnedly, and like a Sound Orthodox Divine. But I think he might have spared his Pains, for who opposes him in any of these things? I know of no Adversary he has, or is like to have in any of these Momentous Points. For though I cannot allow the Loving of Creatures in the strict and

and rigorous Sense of the Word, meaning by it the Uniting our Souls to them as our True Goods or the Efficient Causes of our Happiness (as not being able to Conceive that they can be so) yet 'tis plain enough that I allow the Use of them, and the Willing or Desiring them for that Use, and therefore he might have spared, among other Impertinencies, that Abusive Reflection, p. 5. Now is it not strange Doctrine to affirm as Certain, that we cannot truly love God if we desire our daily Bread, and that we forsake God if we move towards Meat when hungry, or Drink when thirsty. Strange Doctrine indeed, but whose 'tis I cannot at present recollect. This therefore I say might have been spared, as well as that Invidious Quotation from St. Paul who he says *Condemns those Hereticks who taught Men* (as if I did so) to abstain from Meats, which God hath Created to be received with Thanksgiving, &c. p. 8. 1 Tim. 4. 3. The Unkindness as well as Impertinence of which Insinuation is Obvious enough both from the place it self, where this is also call'd the Doctrine of Devils, and from his distinguishing the word (*Heretick*) by a different Character; and I need not aggravate it any further to ingage the Readers Notice, than by praying God to forgive him for it.

But to set him right in the Notion he pretends to oppose, but indeed does not understand, and so levels his Aim at another Mark, let him take this short Account of it. 'Tis consider'd here that we are Beings of a Compounded Nature, consisting of Body and Spirit, having our Place and Abode in a Material and Sensible World.

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Tis also supposed that neither the Body to which we are united, nor the Bodies which are without and about us, no part of the Material World can act upon our Spirits, which are subject to the Power of God only, whose Privilege alone it is to act upon them. And that therefore we are not to unite our Souls to these external Objects, which cannot really and truly by way of Causal Efficiency act upon them, but to God, who both can and does. But yet however because Bodies do make a real Impression upon our Bodies, and by that (according to the Divine Establishment) are also Occasions of what is felt in our Souls, we may unite our Bodies to these external Objects, which tho' occasional Causes with respect to our Souls, are yet real ones with respect to our Bodies, and therefore may be approached to and united with by our Bodily part, as the Natural Condition, Means, or Occasion of that Pleasure which God truly causes in our Spirits upon such Impressions made in our Bodies : That is, in other words, we may Will the use of these things according to the Order of Nature, or rather the Law of its Author, but not unite our Souls to them, as not being our Beatifick Objects : or, as I otherwise express it, seek or use them for our good, but not love them as our good ; or, as in the Letters, approach them by a Movement of the Body, but not by a Movement of the Soul. Which Distinction is as clear as that of the Soul and Body it self, and is not in the least invalidated by what Dr. Wh--- has offered against it. For what tho' the Movements of the Body are

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not pure Mechanical Motions, but do also include a Movement of the Soul, (as he very truly observes, but not very pertinently objects, p. 122) yet 'tis to be consider'd here what this Movement of the Soul is, or, what is its *Term*. And when we do so we shall find that all the Movement of the Soul here is only to will the Movement of the Body towards these things, and not that she unites her self to them, which comes to the same as that she wills the use of them as *Occasions*, but does not unite her self to them as *Causes* of her Good, as was said before. So that the Distinction remains firm and unshaken.

In short then, I allow the Loving of Creatures, as that signifies at large *the willing the use of them*, but I deny the Loving of Creatures, more strictly speaking, as meaning by it the uniting our Souls to them as our true Goods, or Beatifick Objects. Which will resolve at last into that Maxim of St. Austin, *Utendum est hoc Mundo, non fruendum*, that the World is to be used, not enjoy'd, only with a better Foundation for it than he has assign'd, viz. because the Creatures are only Occasions, not the true Causes of all that Good and Happiness which accrues to us in the use of them. A Principle which I have elsewhere proved at large, and which my Leaned Adversaries have not thought fit (no doubt with due Prudence and Caution) so much as to meddle with, much less to Confute, tho' one of them thinks it might be done by some, if they would be at the Pains, and thought it worth their while. Now for my part I think it very well worth their Pains and their *while* too, and

I Disc. p. 78.

and that so much, that I cannot but wonder that Men should pretend to Confute a Moral Discourse built upon Philosophick Principles, and yet shou'd let the Foundation alone upon which it rests, and more yet, that one of my Adversaries should in the Title Page of his Book (the only place where some Authors confute those they write against) pretend to answer all the Arguments, &c. and yet not meddle with the Philosophical, which is the chief part of the Discourse. But 'tis New Philosophy, and that he does not care to trouble his Head with, but likes the Company of his Systematical Divines better, whose *Appretiative*, *Comparative* and *Intensive* (whatever my Thoughts may be of them in other respects) I no more envy him, than he does me the *French Poets* and *Divines*.

But though our Learned Author thus starts and boggles at New *Philosophy*, yet he has the Courage to venture boldly and hardily upon New *Logick*, whereof he has given us a very pregnant Instance, and such as is not to be parallel'd in the whole *Art of Thinking*. Had Mr. N. p. 96. says he, when he said there are but two sorts of *Love*, that of *Desire* and *Benevolence*, consider'd that this *Love of Desire* may be branched into *Religious* and *Natural Desires*, *Desire* of things *Spiritual* and *Temporal*, of things good for the *Body* and for the *Soul*, of things to be used here, and to be enjoy'd here and hereafter, of things as necessary for our being and our well being, of things to be desir'd for their own and for God's sake, he would have discern'd as great a difference betwixt one *Love of Desire* and another, as betwixt *Love of Desire* and of *Benevolence*. As much as to say, had Mr.

No: when he said there were but two sorts of Lines, Strait and Crooked, consider'd that Crooked might be branch'd into a *Circle*, an *Ellipsis*, a *Parabola*, &c. he would have discern'd as great a difference between this Crooked and that Crooked, as between Crooked and Strait. Well said Logician: What do things that differ *genere* the Co-ordinate Members of a Division, differ no more than things that differ only *Specie*? Do a Strait Line and a Crooked Line differ no more than a *Circle* and an *Ellipsis*? This 'tis to think freely, and to leave the Company of the Systematical Men. Not that I would insinuate hereby that our Author does not understand Logick. On the contrary, I verily believe he does. But as the Best Men have their Failings, so the Wisest have their Oversightes and Blunders. And all the use I would make of this is only to advise him not to be too secure of his Understanding, which by this he may see is lyable to Confusion and Mistake as well as other Mens, and to look better to his hits the next time.

But to return, having thus stated and explain'd my Sense, I leave it to the Rational part of the World to consider whether my Learned Adversaries have Confuted me, or so much as opposed me or no. In the mean time, I shall take the liberty to conclude that they have not, and accordingly shall not think my self any further concern'd with them at present, than to grant them the main Conclusion they contend for, as being attene from the Business, and utterly beside the Point in Question. I was inclining once to have made some Remarks upon the particular Arguments,

ments, together with other incidental Passages that run through the Bulk of their Discourses, but a kind and ingenious Hand has sav'd me that Pains in relation to Mr. L— and as to the other, I consider that there needs only a particular Application of that general Ground I have laid, which may serve as a Key to unlock his Difficulties and Objections, which run upon a mistaken Sense of my Meaning, and light with all their Weight (whenever they have any) upon a Proposition that is not mine. And indeed I think I have taken the only proper Method to answer a Book that is written as his is. For when the whole runs upon a false Ground, to have taken him Peacemeals, Paragraph by Paragraph, and to have consider'd every single Objection distinctly, by shewing that such a thing is true in this Sense, which is not to the purpose, but not true in that Sense which only is so, would have been a thing somewhat tedious and troublesome to me (who have neither *Time* nor *Health* to spare) and not very delightsome to my Reader, who also need not find the want of it, if taking the general Ground I have laid along with him, he makes a particular Application of it as he goes. Upon which Consideration I shall concern my self no further at this time: And let not any so far pre-judge my Answer as to think it less Just and Perfect because so short; for as short as it is, 'twill be found as long as the Objection, and if I do not answer more largely, 'tis because my Adversaries have not opposed me Pertinently; which is also the Reason why I did not Reply to Dr. *Wh--by's* Private Papers. A Fencer that sees his

Adversaries Pass very wide of him, and running quite beside him, need not be very solicitous of his Defence, nor use a great deal of Guard; but when he finds him to strike directly at him, he is concern'd to ward off the Blow as well as he can. And so shall I, and doubt not but by God's Assistance to be able to do it. And they may begin the Experiment as soon as they please.

In the mean time may the good Spirit of God shine forth upon all our Minds with his Heavenly Light, and assist our weak Understandings in the Study and Contemplation of all that Truth which it concerns us to know, and also by his Divine Grace so dispose our Wills to all Charity and Brotherly Love, that whether we find and consent in the Truth or no, we may yet continue well-affected to each other, and may study to preserve the Unity of the Spirit in the Bond of Peace, and in Righteousness of Life. Which Things I value more highly, and am, I hope, more heartily concern'd for than for any *Hypothesis* in the World.

E I N I S.

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